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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As globalization and migration increase, traditional nation-states erode and debates about 
the cultural diversity of states, minority rights, and self-determination intensify. These issues 
exacerbate the ongoing struggle of indigenous and sub-national groups for political 
representation. These concerns are particularly relevant to the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, whose administration of overseas collectives is 
contingent on effective multicultural governance. France’s colonial history, changing notions of 
inclusion and current struggle with sub-national populations underscore the importance of my 
research in the evolving territory of New Caledonia. Since the 2007 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, indigenous groups have been increasingly supported in their push 
for self-determination. The future of good governance in multinational states is contingent on 
understanding the efficacy of multicultural policies at both the state and sub-state level. It is 
critical that we understand how diverse cultures can be peacefully integrated without 
assimilatory practices. New Caledonia offers a unique case study where issues of self-
determination, national identity, multicultural governance, and economic constraints can be 
examined through discursive political objectives. I will examine how these objectives frame the 
independence debate and hinder or promote the five potential outcomes of the referenda.  
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In 2011, the Committee of New Caledonian and French politicians involved in the 
Nouméa Accord called for the establishment of a Steering Committee on the Insititutional Future 
of New Caledonia (SCIFNC) (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). The Committee included 
Jean Courtial (a French Councillor of State), Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien (a French law 
professor), and Stéphane Grauvogel (a delegate of the French Overseas Deputy General). Their 
goals were to outline the possible outcomes of the Nouméa Accord. According to international 
law, the Nouméa Accord, and Caledonian politicians, there are three basic options that the New 
Caledonian people can vote on in the referenda: full sovereignty, independent-association, or 
association. Full sovereignty would mean that New Caledonia would become a sovereign state, 
gain a seat in the United Nations, and all forms of French aid would end or be re-negotiated. 
Independent-association may be sought with France or a Pacific country or international 
organization. In this situation, New Caledonia would become a fully sovereign state and then 
cede certain powers to another country or group of countries. If independent-association is 
achieved, New Caledonians would likely cede powers of defense or something else to another 
state and strengthen their ties with that state or organization. Under the association option, New 
Caledonia would either solidify the status quo and maintain permanent association with France, 
or agree to another accord that further delays independence or sets up a schedule for the return of 
the remaining five sovereign powers held by France.  One of the few remaining UN Non-Self 
Governing territories, New Caledonia’s struggle for self-determination is unique. The dominant 
indigenous group has played a significant role in the political development of the country despite 
continued French supremacy and efforts to create an indigenous minority.  
This research aims to explore three questions. What are the dominant narratives 
underlying the independence debate? How are these narratives defined? How does the framing of 
  
   
3 
 
these narratives and the narratives themselves promote or hinder certain outcomes? To answer 
these questions, I collected information about how politicians from each of the major political 
parties in the Territorial Congress view the independence debate and upcoming referenda. I 
focused on party leaders and founders who are currently serving a term in the Territorial 
Congress. These individuals will guide New Caledonians through the first of the referenda. 
Many of them will most likely aid the country in its move to implement the result of the three 
referenda after 2022. Semi-structured personal interviews of the Caledonian political leaders in 
the Territorial Congress concentrated on self-determination, the referendum, cultural diversity 
and representation, and the role of foreign aid and mining. Interviews conducted by news 
agencies, news articles quoting politician’s, public speeches made by political elites, and party 
literature offered a corroboratory layer of data. Using a grounded theory constant comparative 
approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Hsieh and Shannon 2005), interviews, articles, documents, 
and speeches revealed dominant themes and specific objectives that concerned politicians in the 
context of the independence debate.  
While a majority of the themes and objectives are strongly tied to and co-define each 
other, there are three that define political thought and actions in New Caledonia: political, social, 
and economic rebalancing. All of the themes and narratives can be organized under the umbrella 
of these themes. They define the very nature of the debate over independence in New Caledonia. 
The effort of indigenous Kanak to balance the scales of colonialism through independence and 
Caledonian’s effort to balance a strong indigenous population and minority rights with the rights 
of the whole. A discourse analysis helped identify how each theme and objective is defined and 
framed in contemporary political rhetoric. Taken together, this information presented a series of 
narratives and linked objectives influences how the potential options are presented.  
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Post-colonial relationships between colonizers and colonized islands resulted in a variety 
of dependent bonds. Not all colonized countries chose independence, leading to varying forms of 
federal and associated links and power sharing between mainland and island territories. Chapter 
Two summarizes the dependent forms of governance other colonial powers have maintained with 
their territories and explores options for autonomy within these territories at local and national 
scales. The colonial history of New Caledonia and oppression of Kanak from 1853 to the 1950s 
and the subsequent rise of the Kanak nationalist movement in the 1960s and 1970s are outlined 
in Chapter Three. The nationalist movement, heightened violence in the 1980s, and changes in 
the political orientation of the French government ultimately resulted in a series of agreements in 
1988 and 1998 that would pave the way for a decision on independence after 2018. The 
Matignon Accord and Nouméa Agreements have heavily influenced the rhetoric current 
congressmen and women are using to argue in favor of independence and continued association 
with France. Chapter Four details the grounded theory approach, methods of data collection, and 
forms of analysis used in this research.  
The following chapters are structured to show the progression and compilation of theories 
grounded in the data explored (Yin 2015). The chapters progress through the various forms of 
rebalancing discourse: pervasive in the perspectives and language of key decision-makers and 
caused by real and perceived political, social, and economic inequalities. In Chapter Five the 
meaning of political rebalancing is explored in the context of perceptions and interpretations of 
the Nouméa Accord, citizenship, the special electoral bodies, and perception of the UN. Chapter 
Six outlines the function of common destiny, identity, and victimization in solving or creating a 
need for social rebalancing. Chapter Seven reveals the connections between economic 
rebalancing, economic projects, and perceptions of France. Party objectives, narratives, and types 
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of rebalancing do not exist independently of each other: rather, party objectives co-define each 
other and form narratives about rebalancing that constrain or promote particular outcomes for the 
referenda. In Chapter Eight, I evaluate how the various narratives of rebalancing influence the 
five options for New Caledonia after the referenda. The chapter begins with a summary of the 
2014 Steering Committees findings on each option and each party’s platform on independence. 
The following sections briefly explore how party narratives might influence the options for the 
referenda. Special attention is paid to how the narratives might promote one outcome over 
another based on the way in which they are framed.  
New Caledonia has the opportunity to create new domestic and international political 
structures that will shape its future and change how we think of multicultural governance. Unlike 
other multinational countries a strong political bloc represents the indigenous population in New 
Caledonia. This community finds itself in the unique situation of being able to shape the country 
as equal partners in self-determination. Social inequalities, colonial legacies of injustice, 
economic dependence on France, and a desire to build a country based on all of its inhabitants’ 
cultures further complicate the choices faced in the upcoming referenda. This research finds that 
a majority of politician’s goals will be best met through independent-association with France. 
The nationalists would be satisfied with full sovereignty and the loyalists appeased by an 
agreement with France ceding control over areas that New Caledonia needs time to better 
develop. However, as the following chapters will show, the narratives and goals promoted by 
these political parties stem from complex networks of supporting discourses about inequality, 
victimization, identity, common destiny, and rebalancing. As a group, politicians need to clarify 
the options available to New Caledonian voters in 2018 and how the political, social, and 
economic landscapes will be impacted by each option. 
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CHAPTER 2  
GOVERNING PLURAL SOCIETIES 
 
Models of Post-Colonial Dependent Governance 
Baldacchino and Milne (2009) outline the benefits and methods of dependent 
relationships between mainland states and their island dependencies. In general, mainland-island 
arrangements consist of federal power sharing that gives the relationship structure and 
disproportional systems of governance that respond to the specific context and needs of each 
territory. Island territories are often small, have unique histories, colonial legacies, physical 
geographies, and economic capabilities that require different forms of governance depending on 
these variables. One mainland state may set up different options for its dependencies while still 
maintaining the overarching federal system of regulation and power sharing. Federal systems 
provide a sense of uniformity for mainland states that have multiple dependent relationships. 
Within these federal structures, states and islands can choose from a variety of context-driven 
political systems. This allows customary or non-Western forms of governance to be integrated 
with Western federalism. Unions, federations, and federacies offer several options for organizing 
the federal relationship between mainland and island central governments. 
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The primary difference between unions and federations is the level of power sharing. In 
federal systems, the central government shares power with subnational government bodies. In 
union structured political systems the central government has ultimate authority. Certain rights 
are delegated to constituent units who participate in the central government. The central 
government may devolve some or no autonomous rights to the subnational governments. In 
mainland-territory relationships this means that the mainland has ultimate authority to delegate 
as many or as few rights and privileges to its territories. In some situations, these central 
governments and their subnational units form constitutionally decentralized unions. Unlike other 
unions, some agglomerated subnational units are awarded a modicum of autonomy through a 
common constitution. While the subnational units have some self-determination, they are 
uniformly tied to the central government that has ultimate authority (Baldacchino and Milne 
2009).  
In direct contradiction to unions, federations involve greater power sharing between 
central and subnational governments (Baldacchino and Milne 2009). Citizens directly elect the 
central government and determine it’s sovereign powers, which are codified in a constitution. 
Federal systems are classified by the degree of autonomy subnational units can exercise. 
Confederations are more autonomous because they combine several pre-existing units to form a 
central government body based on a limited purpose. The motivation of the common government 
is dependent on the motivation and cooperation of each individual government. Typically 
confederations are led by representatives from each subnational unit of government. While these 
systems benefit from direct government participation they lack strong consensus and democratic 
characteristics because of their temporary nature and loose, goal-oriented, affiliation. Another 
type of federation is a federacy. Federacies, are more decentralized than federal systems and 
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more permanent than confederations. Subnational units are linked to a larger central government, 
but they retain considerable autonomy. Local subnational governments have a minimal role in 
the central government and the relationship can be dissolved only by mutual agreement. 
Associated states retain many of the same characteristics, but can be dissolved by either of the 
participants (Baldacchino and Milne 2009).  
Despite the variation in methods of integration, the dependent system has proved 
beneficial for island populations’ political and economic development (Baldacchino 2004; 2010; 
Baldacchino and Hepburn 2011; Baldacchino and Milne 2009; Dunn 2011; Hintjens 1997; 
McElroy and Mahoney 2000; Trompf 1993). Increased opportunities in trade, mobility, 
investment, standard of living, infrastructure funding, association with the European Union, and 
the protection of local identity (Armstrong and Read 2000; Betermier 2004; McElroy and 
Sanborn 2005;) have been identified. Several studies have shown that dependencies have 
progressed further along the demographic transition and made more social advancements than 
independent former colonies (Baldacchino and Milne 2000; Connell 2001; McElroy and Sanborn 
2005). However these benefits are limited to sub-national populations that are strongly 
incorporated into mainland political systems, like France’s overseas departments. In both 
situations, colonial legacies and the federal power-sharing systems born from decolonization 
have resulted in the formation of island states with plural and often marginalized societies, 
unequal power structures, and sometimes-inadequate representation within their federal 
mainland-island systems. Various forms of multicultural politics within these federal power-
sharing systems have attempted to alleviate the negative legacies of colonialism. 
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Examples of Post-Colonial Dependent Governance 
The transition from colonial empire to federated mainland-island system restructured the 
relationships between colonial states. After decolonization, many former colonizers viewed their 
island subsidiaries as strategically and geopolitically insignificant. Unlike larger mainland 
territories that had more resources for subsisting independently from their colonizers, island 
territories were more limited by their isolation and lack of marketable resources. Sharing 
sovereignty with a mainland state offers small island territories economic protection and security 
that would be difficult to achieve as an independent state (Baldacchino and Hepburn 2011). 
“Indeed, a close look at the sequence of decolonization these past seven decades suggests that 
territories with larger populations—and their elites—were much more eager to struggle for, and 
achieve, independence. In fact, there is a clear correlation between population size and year of 
independence” (Baldacchino 2010, 192). By the late 20th century overseas dependencies were 
being formally incorporated into the political systems of former colonizers. When the UN 
affirmed self-determination was possible in patron-state and island relations, former colonizers 
began integrating some of their territories into new post-colonial relationships (Aldrich and 
Connell 1997; Ramos and Rivera 2001; Lampe 2001; McElroy and Sanborn 2005; Cohn 2003; 
McElroy and de Albuquerque 1996). However, colonial forms of administration and 
decolonization often resulted in multiple groups competing for political power and representation 
in these post-colonial federal systems. Multicultural competition made the transition to 
representative and inclusive self-government difficult.  
After the intial wave of decolonization after WWII resulting in the formation of 
numerous independent states, views on the valid expression of autonomy began to shift. McElroy 
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and Sanborn (2005, 2) explain this shift in terms of four key variables:  
“First, in some cases metropolitan policy either neglected the territories because 
of more pressing matters or was inconsistent and/or lacked the flexibility for 
devising innovative solutions (Aldrich and Connell, 1997). Second, with the 
demise of the cold war, the dependent islands lost much of their strategic 
geopolitical value (Ramos and Rivera, 2001). Third, particularly since the 
escalation of global terrorist attacks, metropolitan policy shifted away from status 
concerns toward enlisting the territories in the fight against drug traffic, money 
laundering and illegal migration (Lampe, 2001). Fourth, the metropolitan powers 
became increasingly willing ‘to respect the wishes of the electorate(s) of the 
dependent territories on constitutional matters’ (Hintjens, 1997: 536), and 
islanders by and large have repeatedly opted to retain colonial ties.”  
 
If a shift in international norms allowed for the possibility of autonomy and self-determination in 
dependent relationships provided an outlet for islands that wanted to retain ties with their 
colonizers, then it also paved the way for colonizers to hold on to strategically and economically 
important distant island colonies. Colonies rich in natural resources, like New Caledonia, 
sustained an economic benefit for their mainland benefactors. Unlike large colonies that had a 
greater capacity for self-sufficiency, mainland states could barter military and other types of 
protection with islands in exchange for continued access to resources. Economic benefits for 
mainlands are not limited to natural resources. Islands serve as “tax havens” and “offshore 
finance centers” (Dunn 2011, 2134). They also expand a state’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
(Baldacchino and Hepburn 2011). A mainland with a number of distant island territories can 
significantly increase their EEZ because of an islands geographic position, compared to 
continental territories that have limited or no coastline. Island territories give mainland states 
control over two hundred nautical miles of coastline surrounding the island. This grants the 
mainland rights to the marine and energy resources and fees from foreign vessels contained 
within or traveling through this area. Island territory EEZ’s exponentially increase a mainland 
state’s power and control over marine corridors. Rather than colonizing land area, states are 
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taking control of marine spaces. The largest EEZ’s in the world are the result of island territories, 
with the excpetion of Russia who possesses considerable continental coastline. The US is the 
largest, followed by France, Australia, Russia, the UK, and New Zealand. Unlike the US who’s 
EEZ consists primarily of a large bloc in the Pacific Ocean, France has the most geographically 
diverse EEZ that is only slightly smaller that the US’. Stretigically, these distant spheres of 
influence also broaden a state’s military power. Financial and social support can be exchanged 
for land or the right to install military bases. The strategic and economic importance of overseas 
island territories has resulted in greater efforts by mainland states to retain control over these 
areas: much more so than large continental territories able to sustain themselves. Instead, island 
territories offer an opportunity for mainland states to benefit from their geographic location and 
resources and island receive the protection and aid that allows them to enjoy higher standards of 
living and greater stability. This reciprocal and mutually beneficial relationship was less likely to 
occur between former colonizers and large mainland colonies that are more able to become self-
sufficient, despite the lure of natural resources.  
Contemporary examples of mainland-island relationships exist in a variety of forms in 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, 
the United States, and France. To balance the needs of multicultural populations these states 
incorporate flexible federal structures and context-driven disproportionate systems of 
representation and rights allocation (Baldacchino and Milne 2009). Local autonomy in island 
dependencies varies, but each island territory retains some level of representation in the 
mainland’s government. Mainland governments typically possess ultimate authority in areas of 
defense and security, foreign political and financial relations, and public services, allowing local 
representatives power over the remaining domestic issues (Clegg 2011; Baldacchino and Milne 
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2009). The political structures between the states and their overseas territories combine elements 
of constitutionally decentralized unions, federalism, federacy, and associated state systems. 
Domestic politics in Greenland are characterized by what Gad (2013, 219) calls 
“postcolonial sovereignty games: linguistic games allowed by the concept of sovereignty, played 
on the way to the realization of independence. These domestic games structure the relations 
between three political priorities: legal self-government, economic self-sufficiency, and 
aboriginal cultural identity.” This vision of Greenland competes with Danes’ vision of a Danish 
nation-state. A strong indigenous push for increased autonomy in Greenland led to a referendum 
in 2008 (Nutall 2008). As a result, Greenland transitioned to greater self-government under 
Denmark in 2009. However, the island continues to fight for greater autonomy through economic 
independence. To decrease dependence on Danish aid, Greenland’s inhabitants increased 
domestic control over oil and natural gas production and fishing. As control over natural 
resource and fishing revenues continues to shift to Greenlanders, the hope is that aid from 
Denmark will decrease even though profits will be shared between Greenland and Denmark for 
some time. By increasing their direct connections with the European Union Greenland is 
bypassing Denmark economically and aiming for greater autonomy within this federacy system.  
Dutch overseas territories in the Caribbean have proved to be a financial burden rather 
than a strategic interest for the Netherlands. The inhabitants of these island nations benefit from 
the financial support of the Netherlands and the ability to freely migrate to Europe. However, the 
Dutch consider them a drain on resources, question the efficacy of local governance in the wake 
of rampant crime, and are frustrated with the lack of migrant assimilation into European Dutch 
communities (Oostindie 2013). Provisions enacted by the UN and the Dutch constitution, prevent 
the Netherlands from forcibly severing ties with their overseas dependencies. Instead, territories 
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are controlled by the Dutch constitutional monarch who manages foreign affairs, defense, and 
ensures governance. Under this federacy system, the representative of the monarch and a 
democratically elected parliament have significant autonomy and power over domestic policies 
within these islands.  
Both Portuguese and Spanish island territories are autonomous regions with degrees of 
self-government characteristic of other federacies (Suarez de Vivero 1995). Ceuta and Melilla 
are part of a federal relationship with Spain because they host their own governments and enjoy 
representation in the Spanish parliament (Ceuta 2013). While still part of the unitary Portuguese 
state, the Azores and Madeira have their own regional assembly that is democratically elected 
(Suarez de Vivero 1995). The regional governments are led by state-appointed ministers who 
appoint the president and remaining members of the regional government. The regional 
government is responsible for enacting legislation that directly affects the region and its 
population, but does not have any impact on the mainland state or international affairs. The 
geographic isolation and insularity of these regions is the reason for their autonomy. The 
Portuguese government hoped to promote local development by encouraging civic participation 
in these island’s governments – something that was much less likely if they were more directly 
governed by distant Portugal. “The tendency to deepen their political autonomy, emphasizing the 
maritime dimension of their territory, results in greater claims for competences to manage the 
ocean, as well as in the emergence of tensions between central government and regional 
government” (Suarez de Vivero 1995, 47). Portugal’s hope is that increased economic autonomy 
will simultaneously promote and create a greater sense of regionalism and nationalism that will 
in turn foster greater autonomy within these islands.  
The relationship between the UK and its overseas territories is characterized by 
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“symbiotic sovereignties” or a constitutionally decentralized union political structure where two 
different political authorities govern one place (Palan 2013, 102). Political relations between the 
UK and its Caribbean territories are defined by the West Indies Act of 1962 and the Anguilla Act 
of 1980 (Clegg 2011). Each territory has its own constitution outlining the jurisdiction and 
powers of the mainland UK (in areas of defense, external affairs, internal security and the police, 
external financial relations and the public service) and the local non-self-governing government 
(internal policy). Those territories that have not been subject to other colonizers, like Montserrat, 
the British Virgin Islands, and Bermuda, have greater political autonomy. Many of these small 
island nations owe their success to semi-sovereignty. Continued dependence on the UK provides 
a foundation of financial and political stability upon which these islands have developed 
profitable finance-based economies (Palan 2013). While independence movements have arisen, 
economic dependence on UK aid, recurring natural disasters, and political corruption have 
hindered independence movements in the British Caribbean (Clegg 2011).  
Australian overseas territories have varying self-governance under a federation type 
system. The least autonomous are the non-self-governing territories of the Cocos (Keeling) 
Islands. The executive branch of the local government is controlled by an administrator 
appointed by the governor general of Australia (who is also jointly appointed by the British 
Monarch and Australian Prime Minister) (Mowbray 1997). Local elections are held to determine 
the representatives of the local government: the legislative council. The council, in turn, is 
subject to the state and federal governments of Australia. Increasingly integrated with the 
Australian political system, in 2010 Norfolk Island adopted commonwealth administrative laws 
in exchange for financial benefits (Norfolk 2014). With mixed responses from the public, the 
government of Norfolk retains some autonomy and local power, but has become more integrated 
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with the Australian central government. Similar commonwealth laws were also adopted on 
Christmas Island that is currently governed by an appointed administrator and a locally elected 
council (Christmas 2014).   
 Within the realm of greater New Zealand, the Cook Islands and Niue adopted a free 
association agreement with the government of New Zealand (Fraenkel 2012). Both territories are 
self-governing with New Zealand citizenship, shared rights, and aid. The Cook Islands are 
administered by an elected parliament and a customary council. The parliamentary democracy of 
Niue is composed of a Cabinet (Premier and three ministers) and a legislative assembly. Each 
atoll of Tokelau has an elected leader and village mayors that compose the village council. In 
addition to the village councils, there is a territorial assembly or national legislature. The 
executive branch or Council for the Ongoing Government of Tokelau includes a leader (leaders 
from each of the local governments rotate this position), three village leaders, two village 
mayors, and a representative from the national legislature council (Fraenkel 2012). 
 Part of the drive to increase the US presence in the Pacific stems from the Japanese 
military strike in Hawaii and the Pacific theatre during WWII (Crocombe 1995). The relationship 
between the United States and its federally administered territories can be organized in three 
relatively distinct categories: former territories that are independent but exchange aid for hosting 
US military bases, commonwealth states with limited representation in the federal government, 
and unincorporated territories directly administered by the US federal government (Background 
2013).  American Samoa is a mostly self-governing presidential representative democracy. The 
US President is the ultimate head of state, but the domestic governor and legislative bodies 
conduct most administrative affairs. Legislators are elected according to traditional Samoan 
customs through local councils. Not all of the terms in the US Constitution apply to the 
  
   
16 
 
population because American Samoa is an unincorporated territory. Without an organic act from 
Congress detailing the relationship between the domestic and federal government, the territory is 
also considered unorganized (American Samoa 2015). The US Virgin Islands, Guam, and Puerto 
Rico are unincorporated, but organized. Their domestic governments include a Governor, 
legislature, and an elected US Congressional representative. In 1993 the US Virgin Islands held a 
referendum to gain a sense of the populations’ stance on the future of the country. Of the seven 
options (statehood, incorporation, free association, full sovereignty, commonwealth status, 
compact of federal relations, and maintaining the status quo) the population voted for “Enhanced 
Territorial Status with the United States” but a lack of voters left the issue unresolved (The 
United States 2015). Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico are commonwealth 
states within the US (Guam 2015). A federacy, Puerto Rico controls domestic affairs while the 
US federal government controls its international relations and external powers (Puerto Rico 
2006). Unlike American Samoa, a formal agreement between the federal government and the 
local government exists. The US constitution, with a few exceptions has been implemented (The 
Commonwealth 2015).  
 The mainland-island political systems implemented by these states have had varying 
levels of success. However, they should be considered part of a larger ongoing debate over 
systems of good governance for plural societies. The examples outlined here incorporate federal 
structures characterized by some degree of local autonomy. Mainland island relationships in the 
US and New Zealand nest customary governance and practices in more democratic and elected 
political systems. The US and Australian commonwealth systems give island inhabitants more 
rights in the mainland government. In each situation the territory typically depends on the 
mainland for external power relations and guidance while domestic politics are determined 
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internally rather than by appointed mainland officials. There are some exceptions in Portuguese 
and Australian territories, but these tend to be islands with very small populations. The legacies 
of two of the largest colonizers, France and Britain, have cultivated vastly different political 
climates in their former colonies. “Whereas successor regimes to the British crown have used 
their juridical independence to pursue a wide array of postco- lonial structures and policies, 
polities and nations decolonized by the French Republic have retained a comparatively formal- 
istic, top-down, and centralized approach to governance and state-society relations” (Miles 2014, 
9). While the British colonial enterprise privaledged a mercantilist system, French colonization 
was based on “cultural transformation” and “assimilation” (Miles 2014, 9). Although both 
colonizers implemented race-based policies and privileged colonies wit European settlers, 
France’s assimilation paradigm sought to subsume and destroy local cultures deemed savage and 
lesser compared to the unified French ideal (Miles 2014). Today, remnants of these paradigms 
linger in British and French administration of island territories. In particular, France’s efforts to 
retain control of overseas collectives, by granting special rights and privileges, are part of a 
greater geopolitical project to promote a unified Republic.  
 
Post-Colonial Relations and the Integration of French Overseas Dependencies 
During decolonization, the French state found it unrealistic to continue colonial practices 
promoting metropolitan citizenship and assimilation, while legally incorporating larger territories 
(Strang 1994). Although France is moving towards a more decentralized federacy model where 
federal authority is imposed only in special circumstances, the concept of an indivisible French 
state remains a strong part of governing rhetoric (De Jong 2005). According to the 1958 
Constitution, overseas departments (DOMs) and territories (TOMs) have authority over local 
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administration, while still remaining a part of the Republic. French dependencies include 
federally administered DOMs equivalent to their metropolitan counterparts and TOMs that have 
different levels of autonomy (Corbin 2011; Daniel 2005).  
The French colonial empire was a centralized bureaucracy designed to encourage a 
unified French empire (Strang 1994). Ironically, this unification ideal and the tenets of the 
French Revolution only applied to a select community within the French mainland population. 
Elsewhere in France’s overseas colonies, segregation, forced labor, and inequality were rampant. 
In New Caledonia, segregation policies were based on a sense of racial superiority and 
perceptions of indigenous savagery and naiveté (Chappell 2010). It should be noted, that the use 
of racialized discourse to define and maintain political and economic institutions is not unique to 
French colonialism. However only the French case will be examined in detail here as it directly 
resulted in ethnic violence in New Caledonia and the agreements that would eventually lead to a 
decision on sovereignty in which the marginalized indigenous people could participate. In 
conjunction with the indigénat policies, the French practiced “association” (Hargreaves 1967, 
134–143). Under association, the French government perpetuated a lack of education among 
indigenous people by refusing to spend money on educating its overseas subjects. This resulted 
in highly segregated and marginalized indigenous populations with few managing to become 
educated or migrate to Europe. Definitions of the French people have subtly changed over the 
last two hundred years as the French Republic itself becomes more decentralized. After the 
French revolution, the French people were a unified community that was expanded after WWII 
to include members of the overseas French population (Palayret 2004). Despite ongoing racism 
and marginalization, the inclusion of overseas members signified a return to one of the ideals of 
the revolution: equality. As a result overseas populations were awarded the right to self-
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determination in the mid-1900s, but remained a part of the French universal identity. 
Constitutional revisions in 2004 increased political decentralization by offering greater local 
autonomy within its overseas collectives. While the state remained unified and indivisible, 
decentralization and increased autonomy in DOMs and TOMs have raised new questions about 
the definition of a French people (Palayret 2004).  
France currently maintains five DOMs: Martinique, Mayotte, French Guiana, Reunion, 
and Guadeloupe. Each of these regions is presided over by a French appointed prefect, elect 
representatives to French legislative bodies, and have French citizenship (Kelly 2003). The 
departments also elect representatives to local General and Regional Councils. The remaining 
French holdings form a series of overseas collectivities and territories. French Polynesia, Wallis 
and Futuna, and New Caledonia are administered by a French appointed prefect, chief 
administrator, or high commissioner and elect representatives to the French legislature. In Saint-
Pierre and Miquelon the Prefect governs in conjunction with the Privy and General Councils. 
French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Saint Martin, and Saint Barthélemy have local presidents, 
legislative bodies, and supporting councils. Wallis and Futuna are governed by a French 
appointed chief minister who oversees the Territorial Council (including three kings from each 
of the local kingdoms and three others appointed by the minister) and the elected Territorial 
Assembly (Kelly 2003).  
Despite the introduction of local governments, minority rights are still a prominent issue 
in France’s overseas collectives. Minority rights are the right to self-determination of personal 
identity distinct from assimilation (Palayret 2004). France has a poor track record with minority 
rights. Historically, the French state forced its overseas population to conform to an imagined 
cohesive French people regardless of local diversity (Strang 1994). It is no surprise that 
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marginalized groups like indigenous people rejected these assimilationist policies that 
undermined their distinct autonomy (Murphy 2008). It was not until widespread disputes in the 
1960s and 1970s that the Republic began to acknowledge diversity and minority rights and move 
towards decentralization and local autonomy (Clegg 2011). The push for decentralization is also 
part of a strategy to prevent independence by offering pro-independence parties greater domestic 
autonomy (Baldacchino and Hepburn 2011; Hintjens 1997).  
Citizenship, and who has the right to it, is a critical part of the debate and definition of the 
French people. For the French it was a way to assimilate its colonial populations. Access to 
citizenship was a racialized process, (although they claimed it was not) based on education, 
property ownership, or public service designed to make colonized populations feel included. In 
granting colonized populations citizenship, the goal was to “make colonial peoples more French, 
not less” (Thomas 2014, 67). While France tried to assimilate its overseas populations through 
citizenship and a sense of national unity, the UK redefined citizenship in the British Nationality 
Act of 1981. The British Nationality Act of 1981 created three groups of citizens in an effort to 
control immigration and restrict movement from former and current territories (Blake 1982; 
Hintjens 1997).  
While more federally oriented British dependencies have British dependent territory 
citizenship, French and Dutch federacy-dependencies possess full citizenship (Hintjens 1997). 
Historically assimilatory strategies designed to create a unified citizenry resulted in a push in the 
opposite direction – towards the formation of ethnic nationalisms and ethnicity based political 
claims (Banting and Kymlicka 2004). The subtle transformation of the definition and application 
of French citizenship parallels the government’s acknowledgement of indigenous rights and 
cultural diversity (Palayret 2004). In New Caledonia, one of the most prominent changes brought 
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about by devolution was the acceptance of a future New Caledonian citizenship separate from a 
French citizenship under the Nouméa Accord in 1998.  
Former colonized indigenous people that still remain under French sovereignty include: 
“the Amerindians of Guyana, the Mahoris of Mayotte, the Kanaks of New Caledonia, and Pacific 
islanders in Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia” (Trepied 2012, 2). After WWII, the 
indigenous populations of Mayotte, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna were given special 
status independent of the French Civil Code. This changed after Mayotte became a DOM and 
New Caledonia implemented customary law under the Nouméa Accord. The status quo has 
remained in Wallis and Futuna leading to a massive outmigration to the neighboring New 
Caledonia where indigenous people are recognized under common law. Today, French policy 
towards overseas indigenous populations is congruent with minority rights policy. Examples of 
concessions made by the Republic include: land reform, formation of a recognized indigenous 
identity, the integration of customary political practices, and a multicultural justice system 
(Palayret 2004). While significant strides have been made in recognizing indigenous rights, these 
minority rights are limited to indigenous populations because the French state fears other 
minorities will demand special rights that would disrupt notions of a universal French people 
(Palayret 2004; Barelli 2011).  
 
IMPLEMENTING SELF-DETERMINATION AND MODELS OF ADMINISTRATION 
 
Definitions of self-determination fluctuate with international human rights discourses, 
territorial power, and cultural diversity. During decolonization, self-determination was 
exclusively defined as the right to independence (Barelli 2011). More recently, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging 
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to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, and the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous People expanded the right to self-determination to all minority groups, but limited 
the option for independence indigenous people affected by colonialism and who were 
geographically distant from their colonizers (Wiessner 2011; Kowal 2008; Berg 2009; Niezen 
2003; Palayret 2004; Weller 2009; Kolvurova 2010). Self-determination can manifest in a 
variety of ways: through forms of recognition, control over land and territorial integrity, control 
over resources and livelihood, justice, recognition of human rights and punishment of rights 
violations, and the opportunity to freely express cultural diversity (Kolvurova 2010; Weller 
2009; Berg 2009; Knight 1982; Barelli 2011; Niezen 2003). In practice, self-determination failed 
to be implemented in many places during decolonization. As a result, new geopolitical 
representations that undermined the state needed to be created in an effort to disrupt the notion of 
a unitary nation-state that abhors local autonomy or that Western political institutions should 
integrate customary or other forms of local governance (Lacoste 1993; Wesley-Smith 2007).  
Self-determination movements are defined by the sources of claims and potential 
outcomes. Halperin, Schefer, and Small (1992) identify six types of self-determination 
movements: anti-colonial, sub-state, trans-state, self-determination of dispersed people, 
indigenous, and representative. Anti-colonial self-determination is the pursuit of greater 
autonomy from a colonial power. Sub-state self-determination is when a sub-national group 
within a state seeks greater autonomy: often resulting in greater power sharing or federalism. 
Trans-state self-determination is when a nation without a state seeks to create an independent 
state from more than one existing state or will pursue greater autonomy within those existing 
states. The opposite, self-determination for dispersed people can be mitigated through 
representation and democratic governance. Indigenous self-determination covers a wide range of 
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possible outcomes, but all include the desire for self-determination by groups with a distinct 
ethnicity and historical claims to pre-colonial or pre-invasion territories. Furthermore, internal 
self-determination might occur when an existing population seeks to create a more representative 
political system through multicultural integration or minority rights (Halperin, Schefer, and 
Small 1992).  
 
Implementing Self-determination through Multicultural Integration and Minority Rights 
Multiculturalism can inform policy at a variety of levels or act as a theoretical basis for 
governing systems. It promotes cultural diversity by fostering recognition and tolerance of 
cultural differences through the allocation of citizens’ rights (Kowal 2008; Johnson 2008; 
Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1994). Policies might include identifying and protecting cultural 
difference through freedom of individual choice and action, equality, promoting a universal 
sense of morality, and good governance (Kowal 2008). The connection between a community 
and its members is an important consideration in multiculturalism. Policies targeting individuals 
may ignore the need for collective rights (Johnson 2008). Banting and Kymlicka (2004) argue 
that multicultural policies do not need to promote either the individual or collective rights. 
Instead of focusing on assimilation or exclusion to create unified nation-states, governments 
should ensure that all actors have equal access to the state and that this access is not based on 
their own personal identity. Equal access to government institutions is possible through market-
oriented approaches that promote multicultural cooperation via economic interconnection 
(Kukathas 2003). The goals of multiculturalism can also be realized through the establishment of 
institutions sensitive to the claims of all individual citizens (Cohen 1997; Dryzek 2000; Gutmann 
and Thompson 1996). This would require the implementation of minority rights that 
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simultaneously protect sub-national groups that do not alienate majority populations. Other 
models advocate including distinct groups in the decision-making processes and political 
systems that promote equal representation (Benhabib 2002; Fraser 1997; Young 1990; 2000). 
For Smooha (2002) it is possible to recognize ethnic affiliations without embedding them in the 
political system through multicultural democracies.  
According to Banting and Kymlicka (2004) there are two primary forms of 
multiculturalism oriented around alternative definitions of group identity. Liberal 
multiculturalism acknowledges the desire to expand democratic multicultural politics while 
mediating fears of destabilizing ethnic politics. For indigenous groups, LM includes the: 
“(1) recognition of land rights/titles, (2) recognition of self-government rights, (3) 
upholding historic treaties or signing new ones, (4) recognition of cultural rights, 
(5) recognition of customary law, (6) guarantees of representation/consultation in 
the central government, (7) constitutional or legislative affirmation of the distinct 
status of indigenous peoples, (8) support/ratification for international instruments 
on indigenous rights, and (9) affirmative action for the members of indigenous 
communities” (Banting and Kymlicka 2004, 248). 
 
By providing sub-state national groups a form of quasi-sovereignty and contemporaneous 
equality within the state system, liberal multiculturalism legitimates institutions and policies in 
favor of diversity (Galston 2004; Larmore 1996; Rawls 2005). Commutarian multiculturalism 
interprets multicultural claims more selectively by imposing cultural identifiers on group 
membership (Banting and Kymlicka 2004). Commutarians argue that defining specific cultural 
practices as authentic makes it easier to protect those practices and groups. This approach 
assumes that authentic cultural identifiers can be identified and agreed upon. Multicultural 
policies that promote equality in diversity through citizens’ rights can be implemented through a 
variety of democratic systems and federal power structures.  
 
  
   
25 
 
Implementing Self-determination through Democratic and Federal Systems 
Democratic political systems and federalist structures promote varying degrees of cultural 
collusion and cooperation. Although direct democracies are ideal for public participation and 
equal representation, the implementation of this type of democracy is impractical at a large 
national scale. Power structures conducive to multicultural governance also exist within 
parliamentary, presidential, and constitutional democratic systems. Although parliamentary 
democracies are considered more conducive to minority rights and voter participation, the debate 
over presidential and parliamentary systems is ongoing (Schmidt 2002; Lijphart 1992; Linz 
1990a; 1990b). Numerous participatory and power-sharing models enacted at local and national 
scales have been applied to multicultural governance (Fraenkel 2006; Berg 2009). Negotiation 
democracies like consociational, consensus, partly majoritarian, and partly non-majoritarian 
systems limit decision-maker’s power, incorporate proportional representation, group autonomy, 
minority veto power, and advocate for the integration of opponents or increased competition 
(Scharpf 1993; Consociationalism: Lijphart 2004; 1991a; 1991b; 1991c; non-majoritarian 
democracy: Schmidt 2002).  
Participatory and power-sharing models enacted at local and national scales have also 
been used to govern diverse populations (Fraenkel 2006; Berg 2009). The consociational model 
integrates “proportional representation, mandatory power sharing, group autonomy, and minority 
(or mutual) vetoes” (Fraenkel 2006, 318). The aim of this collective representation model is to 
make the government more responsive to minority concerns. It offers an alternative to secession 
and forces majority groups to allow minority groups to actively participate in governance (Nimni 
2009). Indigenous groups have been successful in implementing favorable laws and policies, but 
the issues associated with multi-party electoral and federal systems remain. Subnational groups 
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like indigenous peoples still find it difficult to gain adequate representation and balance local 
autonomy with national unity (McLeay 1980; Knight 1982). Lustick et al. (2004, 223) find that 
power sharing is a long-term solution that more often results in “broader and noisier 
mobilizations but substantially lower threats of secessionism” while repression works in the short 
term but results in greater long-term threats of secession. The key, here, is undermining 
independence movements by equalizing minority and majority group power through 
disproportionate representation in various governing bodies and institutions. It is a balancing act.  
Consociationalism combines conflict management through cooperation and agreement 
among elites (that represent each faction) and “segmented pluralism” or societal divisions 
(Lijphart 1977, 5). The goal of consociationalism is to make the government more responsive to 
minority concerns (Nimni 2009). For Lijphart (1977, 25) this form of governance includes: (1) “a 
grand coalition” of political leaders from the most significant segments of the plural society, (2) 
“the [right] to mutual veto or ‘concurrent majority rule’” – giving minority groups the right to 
veto or have a greater say on issues directly related to them, (3) a “proportional system of 
political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds” (compared to 
the winner-take-all system), and (4) “a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own 
internal affairs.” Smooha (2002) added that recognition and equality are critical components for 
the success of consociational political systems. Prior traditions of coalescent decision-making 
and segmented autonomy, strong ethnic loyalties and weak nationalism, some national feeling at 
the elite and mass levels, cooperation at the elite level resulting from similar interests, 
background, and outlook make states in the Third World pre-disposed to consociational 
democracy (Lijphart 1977). However, colonial indirect rule and other forms of colonial 
governance that resulted in a high degree of community isolation have left a legacy unfavorable 
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to consociationalism because communities have no basis for working together. In many cases, 
colonizers forced segments or communities to compete with each other for power or resources 
that directly contradicts the ideals of consociationalism. Therefore Reilly (2001) argued that 
within consociationalism minorities must define themselves into ethnic-based political parties to 
achieve some element of cooperation in an electoral system. In Belgium, this system takes the 
form of regional federalism and autonomy dominated by the majority ethnic factions in each 
region (Bieber 1999). Members of the government bodies are equally split between Flemish and 
French Belgians (Schneckener 2002). Consociational systems assume that ethnic cleavages will 
never lead to unification and therefore creates a system of representation that makes little effort 
to overcome these divisions (White 2007). Ethnic divisions are considered an easy method for 
dividing representation and regional jurisdictions (McGrattan 2014).  For the Northern Ireland 
case, however, political leaders are found to have more divisive viewpoint than citizens who 
overcome ethnic boundaries everyday (McGrattan 2014).  
Critics of consociationalism are skeptical of the possibility for success if accommodation 
is centered on the political elite. Covell (1981) in particular questions the long-term 
implementation of consociational systems in ethnically divisive states like Belgium. For 
consociationalism to be successful, elites and the political system must reject majority 
domination: an unlikely occurrence (Horowitz 2014). An alternative method of accommodation 
involves bargaining theories that emphasize the context of accommodation measures and issues 
being discussed. Context is addressed by acknowledging elite collusion in creating or 
exacerbating conflict as a political strategy in negotiation, “intra-elite conflict” within ethnic 
factions, the links between issues being bargained, and acknowledging that bargaining over one 
issue is part of a broader system of negotiation (Covell 1981, 215). Another option is centripetal 
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systems are designed to break down ethnicity and use electoral incentives to encourage 
cooperation and accommodation based on civic rather than ethnic nationalism (Horowitz 2014). 
 Beyond the scope of democracy, federalist power structures are essentially a form of 
politically and geographically segmented consociational government. Segment divisions are 
based on population concentrations or regional divisions that would create a natural climate for 
federalist authority (Lijphart 1977). Multinational federations include national minorities that are 
tied to the state through internal boundaries, but maintain a level of territorial autonomy 
(Dieckhoff 2004). Powers are distributed to sub-national units so that each group remains a 
distinct self-governing cultural group. Federal power structures, consociational models, and 
democratic political systems offer various forms of local autonomy and minority groups 
inclusion. However, multicultural governance can also occur at the sub-state level or within 
specific institutions and policies.  
Since many sub-national groups are reliant on their central governments for necessary 
financial aid and other resources they are unable to consider independence. Relational models of 
self-determination play a critical role in creating fair and equal systems of governance within 
these federal sub-state political systems. Relational models emphasize the importance of access 
to political power and institutional involvement from a variety of levels (Murphy 2008). This 
process, Murphy argued, can only be achieved through an electoral political system. Electoral 
systems encourage cooperation and inclusion by promoting centrist political parties  and multi-
party coalitions to gain broad support from an electorate. Offering institutional motivation for 
politicians to seek electoral support from disparate groups can result in a moderating, 
cooperation-inducing political climate (Reilly 2001). Proportional election systems can also 
achieve plural representation by producing multi-party systems and coalitions with an executive-
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legislative balance of power (Lijphart 2004). Alternative forms of electoral participation may 
include electoral law that distinguishes between an indigenous person voting as a citizen of their 
group rather than a citizen of their state (Murphy 2008). By encouraging cooperation, 
negotiation, and centrism, democracy can be re-defined as an ongoing practice in conflict 
management and resolution (Reilly 2001). Whether the electoral system is “plurality-majority”, 
“semi-proportional”, “proportional”, or “preferential”, providing the right to vote is itself a 
method of ensuring multicultural inclusion and equality for sub-state groups (Reilly 2001, 14).  
The aim of these representative models is to better incorporate disparate and marginalized 
groups beyond the application of citizenship. Some argue this incorporation can only be achieved 
through ethnically defined electoral politics. Others advocate centripetal systems that reorient 
ethnic, cultural, or national affiliations, focusing those nationalisms on political processes like 
electoral systems of representation and civic nationalism that encourages minority groups to 
work together (Reilly 2001). Unfortunately centripetal systems integrated into liberal 
democracies may promote assimilation that results in a forced civic culture (Smooha 2002). A 
third option, “multicultural democracy,” incorporates “liberal and consociational democracy” 
and “recognizes ethnic differences but without making them official and without 
institutionalizing the essential mechanisms of consociationalism” (Smooha 2002, 425). Although 
indigenous groups have been successful in implementing favorable laws and policies, the issues 
associated with multi-party electoral and federal systems, including adequate representation and 
the simultaneous maintenance of local autonomy and national unity, remain prevalent (McLeay 
1980; Knight 1982).  
 
  
   
30 
 
The Role of Identity and Nationalism in Self-Determination 
Nationalism and national identity are critical variables in the formation of a group that 
seeks self-determination and can help sub-national groups gain collective bargaining rights or 
further alienate them from the national whole. National identity is variously defined as a cultural 
grouping, a political group with a shared culture and co-cultural leader (Hall 1993), a grouping 
of individuals based on common ethnicity, language, assumed blood ties, race, religion, region, 
and/or customs (Hobsbawm 1990; Kaplan 1994; Geertz 1963; Hechter and Levi 1979), a 
relational grouping defined by the presence of a distinct other (Triandafyllidou 1998; Herb and 
Kaplan 1999), a national consciousness represented by a shared language (Gellner 1964; Breuilly 
1982), or a system of classification (Verdery 1993). In some instances, identity is linked to a 
particular territory or homeland (Smith 1989; Conversi 1995; Grosby 1995; Taylor 1996; 
Murphy 1996; Agnew and Brusa 1999; Knight 1982; Hakli 1994; Sack 1986; Kaiser 2002; 
Culcasi 2011; Kaplan 1994). Definitions of identity can be categorized according to whether they 
view identities as natural divisions (primordialist), tools of political elites (instrumentalist), 
constructed inventions (constructivist), a spontaneous reaction against the state (homeostatic), 
the cause of in-group and out-group border creation based on group interactions 
(transactionalist), or the result of the power of collective memory (ethnosymbolist) (Conversi 
1995). In addition, they can align with combinations of these categories.  
Consociational and centripetal systems are promoted as possible solutions to ethnically 
and culturally divided societies. Both systems acknowledge the strong ties of ethnic belonging 
and use those ties to incentivize cooperation among groups and balance minority and majority 
power. Before attempting to implement consociational, centripetal, or other forms of power-
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sharing political systems it is essential to understand the context and background of the societal 
divisions, or collectives, in a country.  
Collective identification, on the other hand, evokes powerful imagery of people 
who are in some respect(s) apparently similar to each other. People must have 
something intersubjectively significant in common – no matter how vague, 
apparently unimportant or apparently illusory – before we can talk about their 
membership of a collectivity. However, this similarity cannot be recognized 
without simultaneously evoking differentiation. Logically, inclusion entails 
exclusion, if only by default. To define the criteria for membership of any set of 
objects is, at the same time, also to create a boundary, everything beyond which 
does not belong (Jenkins 2008, 102). 
 
Collective identities, as Triandafyllidou (1998), Herb and Kaplan (1999), Jenkins (2008), and 
others have concluded, are simultaneously both internally and externally defined by interactions. 
Jenkins (2008) cited Mann’s (1983) characterization of categories and classes to describe the 
different labels internally and externally created. Internally generated labels and collective 
identities are groups. Externally defined labels are categories. Categorization has power. Those 
who create categorizations create collectives that may be treated a certain way based on their 
categorization (Jenkins 2008). For example, a census may divide a population according to 
income and then allocate resources based on the size or distribution of low or high-income 
populations. In the case of self-determination, collective identity is a tool of self-interest. In light 
of this, Jenkins (2000) argued that collective identities must be problematized and deconstructed 
to ascertain the self-interests and agendas self-determination rhetoric hides.  
 Complex networks of competing loyalties often characterize identity, ethnicity, and 
nationalism in these societies. Furthermore, the way in which a group defines its national identity 
can reveal their goals and willingness to integrate or separate from an existing state system. 
Nationalism is the expression of national identity, the sentiment that drives the desire for 
recognition or self-determination, and is loyalty to one’s nation group or collective (Brown 2008; 
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Kedouri 1960; Smith 1989; Breton 1988; Nairn 1977; Billig 1995). Nationalism can be a belief 
in primacy (Hall 1993), the search for identity and recognition combined with loose civil 
attachments (Geertz 1963), a method for teaching patriotism (Kedouri 1960), a mobilizing 
ideology (Nairn 1977), a feeling of belonging (Triandafyllidou 1998), a classifying discourse 
(Verdery 1993), or an anti-colonial struggle (Young 1976; Chai 2008). It can be a centripetal or 
centrifugal force. Unification through a sense of national identity or civic nationalism can 
provide the collective identity that multiculturalism lacks (Brown 2008). Also called liberal 
nationalism (Miller 2000; Margalit and Raz 1990; Tamir 1993), civic nationalism promotes 
loyalty to the state rather than individual ethnic or sub-national groups. If loyalty to the state 
supersedes ethnic loyalty, intra-state conflict is less likely. However, the formation of civic 
nationalism usually involves the creation of a strong, privileged ethnic core that can result in a 
reactionary ethnic minorities and an upsurge of majority counter-nationalist sentiment (Brown 
2008). In some cases, civic nationalism is defined as patriotism, where an individual’s loyalty is 
to their state rather than their nation or identity group (Connor 2004). In New Caledonia, the 
“common destiny” discourse mobilized to promote civic nationalism, act as federative values, 
but have not been successful at transcending divisions between ethnic communities (Carteron 
2009). Therefore the imagined political community or civic nation is characteristic of a sovereign 
nation rather than a multinational state. As Smith (1989) described, sub-national groups may 
become active and assertive, identify with a particular homeland, and gain economic unity and 
determination that results in a successful push for rights and equal citizenship. However this 
process ultimately culminates in the incorporation or assimilation of the ethnic groups after legal 
rights are granted. Ultimately, civic nationalism fails to protect minority rights and can result in 
counter measures by sub-national groups.  
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Critical to the process of nation-building (and thus the incorporation of multicultural 
policy during and after this process) are the “ways in which nations sharing a belief in their 
cultural-historical distinctiveness and right to political autonomy construct senses of ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ […] since nation-building ultimately requires a selective approach to history in the 
service of promoting a distinctive national ideology” and the creation of “imagined 
communities” (Murphy, 2002, 193-194). These cultural and historical differences between 
communities create boundaries that form “imaginative geographies” (Said 1978, 54). Dalby 
(1991, 7) describes the role of otherness as an implicit component of discourse: “it involves the 
social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as 
different from ‘our’ person, group, etc. Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological, and 
a crucially political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage 
point of the person specifying the difference.” These geopolitical representations of the other are 
used to influence public opinion and decision-making (Lacoste 1993). However, the formation of 
the other identity or the consolidation of sub-national identities is also a crucial strategy for 
gaining recognition or autonomy. Through ethnonationalism, sub-national groups can form a 
definitive collective identity that promotes ethnic difference as a cause for autonomy from the 
state (Niezen 2003). Organizing individuals into particular groups and assigning them specific 
characteristics like “indigenous” or “citizens,” creates an imagined geography that gives the 
organizer significant power over the rights these groups receive. For example, indigenous 
movements in New Caledonia, Guyana, and French Polynesia focus on emphasizing the 
distinction or difference between indigenous people and French citizenry (Trepied 2012). As a 
result, indigenous groups in these countries have called for independence and the formation of a 
nation-state or the granting of special rights based on their status as indigenous peoples under the 
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mandate of UNDRIP.  
Plural societies are societies divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, 
ethnic, or racial lines into distinct sub-societies represented by their own political parties 
(Lijphart 2012). The prevalence of plural societies in the wake of, and because of, colonialism 
presents unique challenges for unifying a country. As previous studies have shown, federalism, 
democracy, electoral systems, and other forms and methods of representational governance are 
promoted as a means of mitigating societal divisions. Within the legislative realm, self-
determination may take the form of systematic non-representation in the national government, 
the rights of indigenous peoples, indigenous peoples relying on treaties with states, autonomy for 
minorities, cultural self-determination, and economic self-determination (Clark and Williamson 
1996). Indigenous sovereignty or self-determination from an internal context can include 
devolution or accommodation by incorporating elements of self-governance within existing state 
institutions, the right to determine, practice, and alter social organization, the right to be 
consulted on decisions directly related to indigenous people or their culture specifically, or 
through the collective right to participate in decision-making (Nimni 2009; Lenzerini 2006; 
Barker 2005; Klabbers 2006; Progress 2010; Barelli 2011). Other forms of self-determination are 
oriented around recognition and land rights: redefining territorial borders or place naming (Clark 
and Williamson 1996). Regardless of the system, sub-national groups are more likely to turn 
away from independence movements if they have access to multiple forms representation and 
participation that promote shared decision-making between dominant communities (Murphy 
2008; Fraenkel and Grofman 2006). Multiculturalism and internal and external self-
determination can be realized through democracy, federalism, electoral systems, citizenship, and 
the application of minority rights.  
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Implementing Self-Determination through Territorial Autonomy 
Territoriality is a significant part of carrying out sovereignty or control over the physical 
and thus political, social, and economic landscapes. Sack (1986) maintains that territory is a 
social construct embedded in economic and political contexts. It can have a number of impacts 
on power relations between the state and sub-national groups serving as a force of domination or 
self-determination. For example, territoriality can lead to boundary construction, enforcement of 
access and movement through those boundaries, create impersonal relationships by classifying 
space, and build or strengthen the ties between territory and the activities that take place within it 
(Sack 1986). One type of territoriality is homeland construction. Sub-national groups may define 
a homeland in an effort to create a distinct national identity or have greater control and self-
determination through the occupation of, or connection to, a place. This tie is strengthened by the 
creation of a national identity based on a connection to a homeland – making the group 
indivisible from the physical location and legitimizing their right to inhabit it. 
Control over territory is one strategy for gaining autonomy or sovereignty for sub-
national and indigenous groups. In some cases this process is accomplished through the 
formation of a homeland. This territorialization of identity occurs through small-scale homeland 
construction. “Place serves as a constantly re-energized repository of socially and politically 
relevant traditions and identity which serves to mediate between the everyday lives of 
individuals […] and the national and supra-national institutions which constrain and enable those 
lives” (Agnew and Duncan 1989, 7). According to Kaiser (2002) homelands are created through 
localized place attachments, commemoration, maps, and symbolic national landscapes – 
essentially visibly and symbolically marking a group’s claim to a place. Homelands can also be 
created through occupation and control over a territory (Kaplan 1994).  But these places are not 
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stagnant. They are subject to migration and population flows that complicate networks of 
interaction and community development (Diener 2007). These changes create fluctuating 
“imaginative geographies” and “ sites of multiple belonging” (Said 1978, 54; Diener 2007, 461).   
Whether framed in terms of homeland formation or political boundaries, for many, 
nationalism is intimately tied to the creation, maintenance, and control of territory. Nationalism 
is alternately defined as the process of border maintenance or creation; access to representation 
in state institutions; a territorial ideology; or a territorially defined imagined community 
(Conversi 1995; Grosby 1995; Agnew and Brusa 1999). Historically, identity politics in Europe 
have been tied to notions of space and territorial boundaries. The creation of nation-states 
ensured that national identity became synonymous with citizenship and well-bounded concept of 
territory (Mansbach and Rhodes 2007). It was not until post-WWII in Europe and in other parts 
of the world that these links were problematized. Colonial governments were faced with the 
problem of trying to unify distinctly multinational states or implementing a political system that 
would account for power sharing and force cooperation. The nation-state concept was not easily 
or successfully mapped on to these multinational landscapes because of strong competing 
identities and tribal groups.   
Mikesell and Murphy (1991) combine the territorial and non-territorial aspects of 
nationalism and self-determination. Combining non-territorial factors like recognition, access, 
and participation (RAP) with territorial components like separation, autonomy, or independence 
(SAI) result in different forms of political systems. These factors frame sub-national goals, 
policy demands and ultimately political structures. States that are unwilling to cede territorial and 
total independence try to weave aspects of RAP/SAI into existing state systems. This may be 
useful for overseas dependencies, since they are an extension of the mainland state rather than a 
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disparate and completely autonomous population. In a relational model, it is critical to 
implement governing sites that effectively manage the relationships among self-governing 
populations living in networks of complex interdependence (Murphy 2008). At a macro level, 
Kymlicka (1995) concludes, self-government for minorities requires representation in 
intergovernmental organizations and reduced representation in federal institutions. Kymlicka 
(1995) is responding to the need for protection from the national government, but his argument 
ignores the need for even a modicum of power in order to achieve inclusion in international 
organizations. In addition, Murphy (2008) points out that Kymlicka’s (1995) argument does not 
solve the issues of interaction and cross-jurisdictional issues that indigenous and non-indigenous 
groups must deal with (i.e. transportation, resources, or environment). 
 
INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Prior to WWII issues related to minority and indigenous groups were considered a 
domestic affair (Niezen 2003). Since WWII and the growth of the human rights movement more 
domestic issues of war and peace have become international concerns. The growing coalition of 
indigenous groups signified a new type of resistance. The transformation caused international 
organizations, like the United Nations, to implement a body of human rights policies and 
standards. Meanwhile, indigenous groups embedded in international networks have found visible 
and coordinated modes of lobbying on a global scale more effective than attempting change at a 
local scale within their countries. The push for independence among indigenous people in New 
Caledonia is unique compared to many other indigenous movements because of the political and 
demographic strength of the Kanak. In addition, some Kanak leaders have tapped into 
international support networks, brought the UN in as a counterweight to French power, and 
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pushed for closer ties with other international organizations in the South Pacific. In this way, the 
pro-independence Kanak have employed internal and external methods for achieving self-
determination.  
After WWII the concept of sovereignty underwent a significant transition. In this post-
assimilationist period, sovereignty for indigenous people became the right to self-government, 
territorial integrity, and cultural autonomy. Indigenous groups were no longer viewed as a mere 
minority population “Refuting minority status was a refutation of the assimilationist ideologies 
that constructed indigenous peoples as ethnic minorities under the governing authority of the 
nation-state and a claim of the attributes of sovereignty customarily associated with nations” 
(Barker 2005, 18). “By taking on the self-definition of peoples with group and individual rights 
to self-determination, indigenous leaders were claiming a difference from minorities and a status 
akin to the status of nations” (Barker 2005, 19). This practice is largely due to the ongoing 
colonial legacies of exploitation and disempowerment under globalization. Sovereignty is 
historically contingent. Self-government is the right to determine, practice, and affect one’s own 
political institutions. For indigenous groups, self –determination means decolonizing paternalist 
political and social institutions and reformulate them to integrate customary practices. 
Indigenous groups are changing domestic and foreign affairs in their states by setting themselves 
up as capable of representing their own communities and able to self-govern in some areas.  
Indigenous people have been defined “legally/analytically (the “other” definition), 
practically/strategically (the self-definition), and collectively (the global in-group definition)” 
(Niezen 2003, 19). Definitions typically include “descent from original inhabitants of a region 
prior to the arrival of settlers who have since become the dominant populations, maintenance of 
cultural differences, distinct from a dominant population; and political marginality resulting in 
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poverty, limited access to services, and an absence of protections against unwanted 
‘development’” (Niezen 2003, 19). Indigenous people must be different enough that they warrant 
development attention, but not change too much if they want that attention to continue (Kowal 
2008). Ethno-nationalism is nationalism based on a national identity defined by cultural 
characteristics and a desire for autonomy from the state. Unlike ethnonationalism, indigenism “is 
grounded in international networks” (Niezen 2003, 8). In the case of New Caledonia, pro-
independence Kanak use both ethno-nationalism and indigenism to achieve their goals and frame 
their argument for independence.  
Minorities are sometimes viewed as an impediment to the unity and prosperity of the 
dominant population (Niezen 2003). Perceptions and practices that result in greater competition 
for political recognition and power as a distinct society reinforce that discourse. For many 
indigenous movements the primary hindrance is competition over resources and “how to 
reconcile ‘competing’ indigenous claims with states for territory, resources, and cultural 
diversity” (Holder and Corntassel 2002, 141). Niezen (2003, 93) contended that the goal of 
indigenous people on a global scale was recognition of “human rights abuses under existing 
international law and the need to enshrine their rights to self-determination and ‘peoples’ in 
emerging human rights standards.” Carteron (2009) argued that the “living together” and 
“common destiny” discourses mobilized by different factions, act as a unifying force, but have 
not been able to transcend divisions between ethnic communities in New Caledonia. Other 
factors that can impact the influence of indigenous groups on governance are the type of 
electoral system, demographic strength of indigenous electorate, access to key legislative 
committees, the will of parties to include and facilitate indigenous interests, and the skill and 
determination of the representatives themselves (Murphy 2008). 
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From a legal standpoint, protection of indigenous people takes the form of ensuring 
cultural diversity (Wiessner 2011). Protection against legal and physical encroachment, 
protection of language, rituals, territory, and the development of media to encourage promotion 
of cultural heritage are particular aspects of this effort to protect indigenous cultures. While 
recognition and self-determination remains the goal of most indigenous groups, its interpretation 
differs greatly. For some, self-determination signifies control over land, resources, and livelihood 
(Niezen 2003). For example, Ecuador's Confederation of Ecuadorian Indigenous Nationalities 
has focused on the primacy of a pluri-national state and control over territory (Jameson 2011). 
For others it is a way to seek justice or an opportunity to freely express cultural and linguistic 
difference. Increasingly political resistance connects indigenous leaders with domestic and 
international law that provides legitimacy for local expressions of self-determination through 
laws and electoral practices (Niezen 2003). The existence of these laws and institutions 
recognizes indigenous groups as sovereign entities. A potentially marginalizing strategy of 
cultural preservation has also been implemented on a global scale. The internal and external 
definitions of indigenous groups formed for consumption by dominant society (as a means of 
lobbying) both constrain and enable indigenous groups. Indigenous worldviews maintain that 
citizenship takes place at multiple levels; “collective and individual rights are mutually 
interactive” (Holder and Corntassel 2002, 129). Group rights are indicative of struggles at the 
individual level that question the right of authority and collective governance.  
From a global moral certainties perspective, the international movement for indigenous 
rights aims to: “(1) affirm local claims of difference using treaty rights, regional autonomy, and 
self-determination, (2) restore and reinforce ways of life (based on personal ties of kinship, 
friendship, and obligation) through the struggle for cultural and political recognition within 
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bureaucratic organizations, (3) use language and symbols from nation-states to clarify continuing 
claims of self-determination based on political integrity and autonomy of ancestors which 
preceded the formation or imposition of nation-states in and around ancestral territories, and (4) 
embrace a universal vision of human rights to protect and develop other sources of identity and 
power” (Niezen 2003, 215). Both the definition of nationality and the strength of identification 
affect attitudes towards minority rights (Pehrson et. al. 2011). When indigenous groups are 
viewed as the historical/cultural center of state identity or given equal rights there is greater 
support for indigenous rights.  
While a number of constitutional reforms have been implemented in Latin America and 
elsewhere, numerous indigenous population continue to be marginalized. Scholars have argued 
that reforms are the product of elite placation, undercut more radical factions, and may arise 
from economic pressure on indigenous populations (Hale 2002; Brysk 2000; Yashar 1999). The 
superficial nature of these reforms may be the reason for their long-term failure. Indigenous 
movements have instead attempted to gain access to rights by creating “political imaginaries” 
(unification against a dominant elite), incorporating customary laws into justice systems, 
teaching “interculturality” or cross cultural understanding, and using identity creation and 
membership as means of arguing for distinct status or power (Jackson and Warren 2005, 548, 
564). These efforts are not always successful, however. In Paraguay, indigenous people are 
framed as public enemies, in Guatemala indigenous movements are racially contextualized, and 
in Columbia indigenous peoples remain cut off from the more valuable traditional lands. 
Negative scripts caused by visible and violent indigenous insurgents have also hindered more 
moderate indigenous rights movements. Therefore, Jackson and Warren (2005) argue that 
successful indigenous movements combine cultural and historical revival with land rights and 
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local control over territory. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR THE NEW CALEODNIAN CASE STUDY 
 
COLONIAL HISTORY 
 
An outpost for British and French missionaries, by 1853 the small island nation of New 
Caledonia was formally seized by France (Berman 2006). Congruent with colonial practices 
elsewhere; French policy subverted traditional notions of indigenous Kanak life and established a 
Western European model. The French colonial geopolitical program in New Caledonia 
incorporated assimilation, economic control, and minoritization through the mission civilisatrice 
and le code d’indigénat (Rumley 2006). The goal was to create an economically and politically 
powerful French settler majority that would undermine and control indigenous populations. Both 
the French State and the Catholic Church enforced legislation and other policies designed to 
subsume the traditional Kanak identity. Customary emphasis on land-clan relationships was 
destabilized through private property ownership, the formation of reservations, and the 
promotion of individualism (Leblic 1991). As a result, customary ties were broken down and the 
Kanak marginalized in a country they once dominated. At the same time a powerful French elite 
and landowning class arose. These factions and the tensions between them would form the basis 
of violence in the 1980s that would shape the political future of New Caledonia for decades.  
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Mission Civlisatrice 
French colonial rhetoric justified intervention in its colonies through the mission 
civilisatrice. The goal of the civilizing mission was assimilate indigenous populations and 
incorporate them into the French state. France framed overseas indigenous populations as 
savages, whose social order needed to be civilized by ‘well-meaning’ western cultures (Bullard 
2000). A central tenet of mission civilisatrice, the civilizing mission, was moralization. 
Moralization was a paternalistic attempt to brainwash subjects, altering the identity of ‘savages.’ 
Torture was used to erase a person’s identity and then enforce a new set of values considered 
inherently true. For the Communards (penal colonists in New Caledonia) and the Kanak, this 
system endorsed gendered moral codes, patriarchal social structures, and the exclusion of women 
from political power.  
Stage one of the civilizing process attempted to create a “dehumanized ‘savage’ 
population” (Bullard 1998, 321). France set out to civilize and moralize Communard political 
savages and Kanak indigenous savages in New Caledonia. Any person who would not assimilate 
or conform to French norms and values was considered a savage. Kanak rebellions strengthened 
the argument that this population of savages was incapable of self-government. Kanak attempts 
to preserve a non-submissive identity and their refusal to trade also “proved” their savage 
identity even while promoting a “resistant identity” (Bullard 2000, 65). The penal systems 
designed to civilize the Communards was extended outside the community boundaries to govern 
all aspects of social life and assimilate the population. The Kanak were portrayed as immoral and 
unable to exhibit true reason or humanity. The perceived moral inferiority of the Kanak was seen 
as the basis of their savagery. Perversity was a marker of their spirit’s degradation, their loss of 
contact with natural law, and their inability to recognize the truth of Christianity. The very 
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characteristics and traditions that made them Kanak and their inclination to fight the bonds of 
colonization were turned against them to justify greater and harsher control by the French 
administration.  
In Kanak custom, the transfer of land is always in the form of a gift (Leblic 1991). When 
new groups or individuals would move to a new place the land, on which they would settle, was 
gifted to them by those who have lived there for a longer period of time. Not understanding 
Kanak land management strategies, Europeans believed indigenous peoples were poor land 
managers and began implementing European forms of land management, redistributed land to 
European settlers, and subsequently displaced Kanak populations. Kanaks were represented as 
“uncivilized” people who were unable to effectively utilize their land and thus undeserving of 
control over it (Berman 2006, 18). In stage two of the civilizing mission, displaced Kanaks were 
resettled on reserves where further migration was actively prevented and many were cut off from 
their homelands and source of identity (Leblic 1991). Implicated in the oppression of their own 
people, Kanak chiefs were paid a portion of the “head tax” that was required when a Kanak 
individual wanted to move outside a reservation (Berman 2006, 18). Clans and social networks 
were simultaneously disturbed or destroyed, preventing Kanaks from maintaining ties to their 
homeland or forming new ties in the reserves they were forced to move to. By the end of stage 
two, loyalty to one’s chief was viewed as disloyalty to the French state and a violation of the 
process of civilization (Bullard 1998). The French aimed to break customary ties and foment 
new ties to the French state through political and civic loyalty as in a nation-state system. 
Stage three of the civilizing mission culminated in the French capturing and beheading 
Kanak leaders: symbolically and literally severing those uncivilized ties within the customary 
social structure (Bullard 1998). Equally important ties to traditional lands were also severed. 
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Because of their perceived savagery, the French felt justified in removing Kanaks from 
unproductive land and halting their immoral traditions (Bullard 2000). Land was confiscated 
from indigenous groups and people were moved to newly created reservations (Dornoy 1984). 
This process of “colonial collecting” and cutting indigenous ties to homelands deprived the 
Kanak of their culture (Bullard 1998, 323). French control over resources, including land, 
resulted in degradation of agricultural land, forced indigenous labor, and the importation of 
additional involuntary laborers from other French colonies (Rumley 2006).  
In stage four of the civilizing mission, now submissive savages were prepared for 
progress (Bullard 1998). Kanak chiefs willing to assimilate became intermediaries imposed by 
French officials and served as local administrators (Dorn0y 1984). The Kanak who married 
Europeans became part of a hybrid community and those that did not were increasingly 
marginalized and disciplined (Bullard 2000). The deconstruction of Kanak identity was not the 
solely the colonial government’s purview. It was influenced and perpetuated by the Christian 
Church as well. Catholic and protestant missionaries repressed and annihilated many aspects of 
Kanak culture, implemented private land ownership and individualism and reinforced gender 
patriarchies (Berman 2006). Individual agriculture initiatives and private property destroyed 
customary ties to ancestral spirits and the land. Strict regulations on marital relations and the 
association of sex with sin served to regulate Kanak population growth. It was a population 
control strategy to prevent independence through electoral politics. 
 
Code de l’indigénat: legal framework 
 Bridging the historical gap between the implementation of mission civilisatrice and the 
later policies of association, the code de l’indigénat was a legal framework that classified the 
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Kanak population as non-citizens with no political rights (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). 
This framework restricted their job prospects (creating a slave labor force), migration, and land 
ownership. In conjunction with the code de l’indigénat policies, the French practice of 
association prevented funding for local education (Hargreaves 1967). This created further 
segregation within the indigenous population and between the Melanesians and French who 
managed to achieve some form of education. Without an educated elite, there was little hope for 
an independence movement that could unite the now scattered and demoralized Kanak. “The 
educated Kanak was in effect trapped between the head and the body, as if in a noose 
camouflaged by the white hunter, choking, angry, rebellious, and ready to talk back eloquently to 
his captor” (Chappell 2010, 50). This system was highly effective in controlling indigenous 
people and provided a low cost labor source while maintaining divisions among the Kanak 
population itself. The code de l’indigénat was finally abolished in 1946, but its legacies and the 
tensions created by inequalities and degradations under French colonial administration would be 
the building blocks of revolt in the 1980s (Chappell 2013).  
 
EXPORTING THE FRENCH NATIONAL REVOLUTION: WWII 
Social Darwinism impacted Vichy France’s imperial episode just as it influenced the shift 
from assimilation to association. Social Darwinist determinism and a reductionist understanding 
of the other, as primitive societies and races, resulted in harsher forms of colonialism, directly 
and indirectly fueling indigenous nationalism, and contributing to decolonization (Jennings 
2001). The policies exported in conjunction with the French National Revolution reinforced an 
already ruthless colonialism and introduced themes of authenticity, tradition, and folklore that 
promoted opposition to imperial France. Anti-colonial sentiment sparked by harsher policies 
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combined with a celebration and rejuvenation of traditional customs and culture sparked the 
emergence of a strong nationalist sentiment in a number of French colonies. These sentiments 
had various impacts on domestic independence movements in French colonies. Kanak educated 
in France during the 1960s and 1970s would be exposed to the results of anti-colonial 
movements and associated rhetoric sparked by the nationalist sentiment during the National 
Revolution.  
Vichy ideology promoted national rebirth and authenticity while simultaneously rejecting 
the republican discourse and ushering in ultra-assimilation and departmentalization in the 
postwar era (Jennings 2001). Petainism was the ideological heart of the Vichy regime. Petainism 
allowed colonial administrators to strip indigenous rebels of their citizenship, relegate them to a 
subservient status, and rescind any liberalizing reforms. Officials created a landscape in which 
their own reductionist ideologies, folklore nostalgia, and language of particularism were turned 
against them. While simultaneously undertaking the restoration or reinvention of local tradition 
this reinvention of place created complex spaces of interaction and resistance. These spaces of 
resistance were fueled by the “imaginative power of nationalism” a core component of the 
National Revolution (Jennings 2001, 227). Vichy’s colonial project emphasized a return to and 
nostalgia for authentic French traditions. The exportation of these messages was ironic. 
Indigenous people identified with the desire to rediscover their own traditions to authenticate 
resistance to foreign domination, while the true goal of the National Revolution was to promote 
French identity and unity.  
For colonizers the exportation of the National Revolution justified their 
“weltanschauung,” or global world-view: permitting inequality and exploitation (Jennings 2001, 
30). For the colonized the National Revolution signified a move towards harsher colonialism and 
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catalyzed national liberation and independence movements. In the case of New Caledonia, the 
second emergence of nationalism occurred after WWII. Harsh restrictions on political and 
economic activity by De Gaulle were met with Kanak cultural resurgence and the formation of 
pro-Kanak political parties and French educated Kanak nationalist leaders.  
 
POST-WWII POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN NEW CALEDONIA 
 The post-WWII political landscape in New Caledonia was characterized by increasing 
autonomy followed by a sharp return to increased French control. After WWII, the French 
government awarded French citizenship to the Kanak population (Leblic 1991). This was an 
attempt to further dissolve the indigenous Melanesian identity and replace it with a stronger tie to 
metropolitan France (Leblic 1991). Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz (2008) argue that in the 
European tradition citizenship is more neutral than nationality. France may have found it easier 
to try to prevent revolution by assigning indigenous Melanesians French citizenship, instead of 
attempting to successfully impose a sense of French national loyalty. Despite their status as 
citizens, Kanaks felt like servants of the Republic (Chappell 2010). As citizens of the greater 
French government, Kanak social structures (like chiefdoms and councils of elders) collapsed 
and became essentially meaningless in the new state system (Leblic 1991). “Deprived of signs 
and forms of identity, cut off from their collective roots, they become an individual among 
others, isolated from the market, [and] condemned to further exploitation or accelerated 
marginalization” (Leblic 1991, 1). These policies combined with the marginalization and 
systematic disintegration of Kanak identity resulted in much of the violence in the 1980s. 
Chappell (2013) offers a comprehensive and concise analysis of the rise of the Kanak nationalist 
movement and how it led to the violence of the 1980s.  
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 Outnumbered by the indigenous population, and wanting to avoid being outvoted in a 
democratic system, the French state implemented a dual government in New Caledonia. The 
Melanesian population was divided between a tribal and special electorate and a civil European 
bloc. A General Council would preside over the European-Melanesian population and 
Melanesians were governed by a Kanak assembly. Shortly after, the General Council and Kanak 
assembly were combined into a single body. Although the Kanak population remained the 
majority, they received less General Council seats than the European population. This trend 
changed drastically with the rise of the multiracial Union Calédonienne (UC) political party. 
Formed by Lenormand and Pidjot, it comprised labor unionists, autonomists, and convict 
descendants against the clientalist oligarchy. Dramatically successful, UC won the majority of 
municipal elections in 1953 and Lenormand was elected president of the General Council. UC 
pursued socioeconomic planning to benefit all of society and create a shared Caledonian identity 
(Chappell 2013).  
 By 1956 the now socialist French government implemented the loi cadre giving overseas 
territories greater autonomy. Under this new legislation a French High Commissioner controlled 
defense, finance, foreign relations, public order, and international transportation. However, new 
domestic power was granted to a Governing Council containing six cabinet members led by a 
vice president and chosen by a Territorial Council elected through universal suffrage. This meant 
greater autonomy for the majority indigenous population, but greater marginalization of the now 
minority European population. Concerned with the perceived separatist leanings of the UC and 
the power of this multiracial organization, conservative members of the settler population in New 
Caledonia called for the Governing Council’s dissolution. By the end of June 1957 they 
succeeded. More concerned with control over nickel, de Gaulle accepted Conservative 
  
   
51 
 
allegations that the majority of the Territorial Assembly was illiterate Kanak. In preparation for 
the 1958 ratification of the new French constitution, the UC and conservative Caledonians alike 
chose to remain an overseas territory. The UC was promised a re-enforcement of the rights under 
the loi cadre and in return moved for proportional representation in the new Governing Council 
cabinet. Members of UC opposition refused to become part of the cabinet, resulting in a UC 
dominated Governing Council. Although they had refuted any separatist or independent motives, 
the Gaullist opposition and the new High Commissioner misinformed the French state claiming 
UC independent sentiments would lead to civil war. While High Commissioner Péchoux 
continued to undermine the loi cadre, Lenormand was imprisoned and then stripped of civil 
rights on charges of not attempting to prevent a crime (Chappell 2013).  
With the enigmatic voice of the UC out of the way, and a large influx of immigrants from 
neighboring and African French territories, Melanesians were quickly being undermined. The 
perceived mismanagement of New Caledonia by UC resulted in the loi Jacquinot relegating the 
cabinet in the General Council to a purely consultative role. Seeking internal autonomy rather 
than outright independence, the UC retained a majority control of the Territorial Assembly in 
1967. Consequently, the French National Assembly passed the Billotte laws in 1969 dividing 
New Caledonia into four departments each governed by a sub-prefect – essentially creating 
direct French control over New Caledonia. De Gaulle’s promises of autonomy in exchange for 
allegiance during WWII failed in the face of his desire for economic control and international 
power (Chappell 2013). 
 National prestige and false threats of internal violence were not the only reason for the 
resurgence of French control over New Caledonia. Valuable nickel was sold to Japan, exported 
to France, and accounted for 90% of the territory’s exports. Société le Nickel (SLN) controlled 
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the majority of mines and the only processing plant in the territory. By 1982 the French state 
purchased Banque Rothschild and thus held a controlling interest in SLN. Unskilled migrant 
workers from Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia competed with Melanesians for 
employment in the mines. Local oligarchs created smaller mining operations to feed SLN’s 
processing plant, Doniambo, located in the capital of Nouméa. The Vietnam War in 1965 led to 
an increase in nickel production and the expansion of SLN. The French state continued to 
subvert domestic attempts to negotiate with other nickel companies (like Canadian INCO) to 
ensure that New Caledonians would not think they could procure foreign investment on their 
own. In addition to economically and politically marginalizing the Kanak and in direct 
contradiction to UN Resolution 2621, France encouraged migration to New Caledonia to 
ostracize the indigenous population (Chappell 2013). 
 Greater opportunities for education in France resulted in both European and Melanesians 
attending University in France. The student revolutions taking place in France in May 1968 
served to shape the ideologies of several important figures in the Melanesian nationalist 
movement. At the beginning, future independence leader Naisseline’s ideology was framed in 
terms of decolonization and socialism. Others, like the future leader of the Kanak socialist pro-
independence party Tjibaou, promoted a cultural renaissance to overcome the effects of 
colonization. Naisseline and others would go on to form a group known as the Foulards Rouges 
(red scarves). The red scarves were students inspired by the anti-imperialist demonstrations in 
France and the work of Karl Marx. The release of an anti-French, anti-colonization tract resulted 
in the arrest of Naisseline and numerous other red scarves. The outcry from the arrest sparked a 
riot in September 1969.  The UC reacted negatively to the demonstration and the Foulards 
Rouges: denouncing their actions and platform (Chappell 2013).  
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 The anti-colonial struggle was fracturing in the late 1960s. Melanesians and Europeans 
working towards the same anti-colonial goals formed their own activist groups divided along 
ethnic lines. Although the conservative business elite was not explicitly anti-independence they 
were opposed to rule by Melanesians and political leftists. The Rassemblement Calédonien 
supported some aid to Melanesians, but quickly aligned with the Union des Démocrates pour la 
République and Henri Lafleur in support of the business elite. Soon after, Lafleur left to form the 
pro-decentralization, anti-independence Mouvement Libéral Calédonien. Also defecting from 
UC, Louis Kotra Uregeï formed the first indigenous party, called l’Union Multiraciale de 
Nouvelle-Calédonie. In response to the fragmentation of independence parties and the decline of 
UC, Jacques Lafleur formed the Rassemblement pour la Calédonie (RPC). Its platform was 
based on multiracial loyalty to France and capitalist development. By 1978 the RPC had united 
with other Gaullist parties to form the pro-departmentalization Rassemblement pour la Calédonie 
dans la République (RPCR) (Chappell 2013). 
 Like the anti-independence parties, the pro-independence faction fragmented. Group 1878 
began as an organization that called for the restoration of Melanesian lands or compensation for 
lands lost, nationalization of mines, redistribution of wealth and the confiscation of small 
businesses, and the establishment of a Kanak citizenship that could include non-Kanak. Group 
1878 and several Foulards Rouges groups later formed the Parti de Libération Kanak (PALIKA) 
political party. PALIKA advocated for a Maoist interpretation of grassroots governance based on 
consulting with the people and politicizing their struggle. Their primary goals included returning 
Kanak lands, reintegrating traditional customary authorities, and creating a Kanak culture. As 
long as other ethnic groups in New Caledonia supported the idea of a Kanak socialist liberation, 
there was a place for them in the new state as well. Mining industries would also be nationalized 
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and the revenues divided between tribal development and the central government (Chappell 
2013).  
 In 1975 Premier Chirac told New Caledonian delegates they had a choice between 
departmentalization and independence. With this ultimatum, nationalists saw independence as 
the only means of escape from the French Republic. But, business elites were troubled by the 
possibility of marginalization and Kanak control over the domestic government if independence 
occurred. Leaders like Naisseline and Lenormand continued to argue that multicultural 
governance and the imposition of equality with respect for cultural diversity was the only way 
forward. The UC however, argued for total independence on the basis of first occupancy and 
victimization under colonialism. In the late 1970s tensions over land rights and pollution caused 
by mining increased and a number of protests and small-scale conflicts broke out. While New 
Caledonia was being supported by French taxpayers SLN was making billions from nickel. Then 
in the mid-1970s SLN asked for a 25-year tax exemption to expand the industry and build a 
processing plant in the Northern Province (Chappell 2013).  
 With the French government dominated by Mitterand’s socialist faction and the 
marginalization of Gaullist political parties in the legislature, the pro-independence coalition 
entered the 1980s with a glimmer of hope. In November 1984 the pro-independence parties 
(except LKS) formed a new coalition: Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste 
(FLNKS). Angered by Overseas Minister Dijoud’s attempted land reform the FLNKS factions 
became increasingly hostile. In 1978 Dijoud proposed a plan for land reform that would include 
ten years of development aid from France, job training and the incorporation of Kanak culture in 
education. At the last minute, however, he said that the plan required independence to be held off 
for ten years or the territorial assembly would be dissolved. His plan was passed much to the 
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anger of pro-independence parties. Land seizures, labor strikes, roadblocks, and other forms of 
protest by pro-independence factions resulted in counter measures by the settler population. The 
FLNKS essentially took control over a large portion of the state and created the Republic of 
Kanaky. Tensions were exacerbated by the expectation of a conservative shift in French politics 
in 1986 because the FLNKS felt it was running out of time (Chappell 2013).  
 The return to the political right in France in 1986 led to increased militarization and less 
tolerance against independence parties. Divisions within PALIKA over land reform divided the 
party. One faction promoted a classless society, greater distribution of wealth, and the 
nationalization of mining and agriculture. Naisseline’s faction argued for greater cooperation 
with other groups and promoted socialism rather than Marxism. This group would go on to form 
the Libération Kanak Socialist (LKS) party. The socialism of the UC and pro-independence 
faction more broadly promoted indigenous reciprocity and Christian sharing and compassion, but 
completely rejected colonialism (Chappell 2013).  
 Mitterand sent Edgard Pisani (a third world affairs specialist) to negotiate a more peaceful 
resolution to the imbalance in the Territorial Assembly and violence. Pisani asked FLNKS 
leaders to leave the meeting prior to negotiations. At an FLNKS meeting, Tjibaou asked militants 
to stand down so that negotiations could occur. When two of his brothers were returning to the 
Northern Province after this meeting they were gunned down at a settler roadblock. The event 
was considered another assassination attempt on Tjibaou. Despite confessions to the massacre, 
the settlers were freed and the ruling of self-defense held. Despite the potential for resolution 
between a centrist plan offered by Pisani and agreed to by Tjibaou, violence in the interior 
between militant FLNKS and settlers led to increasing instability (Chappell 2013). The situation 
was not helped by the eventual release of the settlers involved in the roadblock shooting.  
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 By the end of 1985 Pisani had divided New Caledonia into four regions run by elected 
councils whose presidents answered to the high commissioner. A referendum would also be held 
in 1987 on the issue of self-determination.  In the 1985 elections, the FLNKS gained control of 
three of the four regions (even though they did not gain a majority overall). With the return to 
conservative power in 1986 (under Chirac) the new Overseas Minister (Pons) planned to reduce 
regional powers and increase the power of the high commissioner. In response, the FLNKS 
coalition lobbied for the inclusion of New Caledonia in the UN Non-self-governing list. On an 
international scale this would necessitate a decision on independence at some point. As the 1987 
referendum approached the military presence in New Caledonia (particularly in the rural bush) 
increased to 8,000 troops. The regions were condensed from four to three Provinces and the 
Southern Province expanded. Eligibility for the electorate who could vote on the 1987 
referendum was set at three years residency and the choices were independence or incorporation. 
98% voted to remain part of France, but 83% of Kanaks boycotted the vote. More violence 
between Kanak and police in 1987 and attempts to develop tribal lands resulted in a combined 
effort by Kanak militants to seize police weaponry and hostages to force negotiations before and 
during Presidential and Territorial Assembly elections. Violence between the FLNKS, settlers, 
and the police broke out (Chappell 2013).  
 The Events came to a pinnacle in Ouvea, a Loyalty Island, where Kanak seized a police 
station and took twenty-seven hostages. Their leader demanded the repeal of Pons’ statutes and 
the cancellation of the Territorial elections. Under pressure from political opponents, Chirac and 
Mitterand called for the military rescue of the hostages rather than continue negotiations. The 
military rescue resulted in the deaths of nineteen Kanak and the recovery of twenty-three 
hostages. The remaining Kanak, with those captured from a local village that had been 
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interrogated for information were sent to prisons in France (Chappell 2013).  
At the same time political tensions were mounting, the Vietnam War created a nickel 
boom in New Caledonia (Henningham 1992). Demand for machines of war and the metals that 
create then led to a high demand for locally mined nickel. In an effort to maintain control of the 
region and its resources France encouraged European settlement as a means of marginalizing 
Melanesians. However, increasing European settlement did not undermine or water down over a 
century of domination fueled anti-colonial sentiments. Labor repression and drastic reductions in 
nickel prices following the end of the Vietnam War resulted in questions about the role of France 
and ongoing issues of inequality (Dornoy 1984). The violence of the 1980s was the result of 
renewed French political control fed by repealing the self-governing powers in an effort to better 
control the nickel industry from 1959 to 1969, massive French immigration (pushed by the state) 
to marginalize the indigenous population, and young French-educated New Caledonians were 
returning to a country they saw being recolonized by France (Chappell 2013). Polarization and 
segregation have been continuous themes throughout New Caledonian history. During the 1970s 
and 1980s polarization and segregation came in the form of divergent views regarding the goals 
of Kanak nationalists. Europeans viewed nationalists (indépendantistes in French) call for a “re-
centering” of New Caledonia in the broader context of Oceania as a type of “reverse racism that 
would turn the colonial hierarchy upside down instead of as an invitation to build new kinds of 
alliances” (Chappell 2013, 4-5). Kanak nationalists sought the reclamation of their national 
identity and customary lands.  
A rising wave of pro-independence rhetoric and anti-colonial violence culminated in the 
1988 Matignon Accords (Berman2006). While Dornoy (1984) argues that this marked the advent 
of the Kanak nationalist movement, Rumley (2006) concludes that it is less about ethnic 
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resurgence and more about a reaction to French colonialism and repression. Influenced by black 
power movements in the 1960s and indigenous students returning from an education in 
metropolitan France, a new wave of nationalist movements began in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Henningham 1992). In response to growing unrest, France implemented a series of social and 
economic reforms that they hoped would draw attention away from nationalist concerns. They 
created institutions for land reform, economic development, and the protection of Kanak culture. 
France saw its colonies as a necessary means of showing their global power and in a show of 
strength they continued to subsidize European-level standards of living (Chappell 2013). 
 
MATIGNON ACCORD: PEACE AFTER CIVIL WAR? 
Despite granting French citizenship to Caledonians after WWII, promises of subsequent 
assimilation were not fulfilled; in large part due to the lack of educational and economic 
opportunities afforded Kanaks (Chappell 2010). Violence in the 1970s and 1980s was a result of 
continued marginalization within the nation, loss of land and identity, and unequal opportunity 
under French citizenship. In the 1980s there was a greater push for devolution from the left as 
opposed to the status quo assimilationist rhetoric promoted by the right (Muller 1991). In 1989, 
the goal of devolution and redirected focus on the regionalization of the TOMs in the South 
Pacific was to end the isolationism that had been entrenched through colonial rule (Muller 1991). 
Both factions of the French Republic, however, agreed that the introduction of technological 
advancements and urbanization would motivate the indigenous populations to refute their unique 
identity and become French. While the right continued to argue that TOMs were merely 
“feudalistic remnants not yet reconciled to the advent of a federal Europe” the left remained 
committed to political self-determination and regionalization (Muller 1991, 296).  
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 Anti-colonial, pro-independence violence in 1988 and the re-election of French President 
Francois Mitterand eventually culminated in the Matignon Accord of 1988 (Chauchat and 
Cogliati-Bantz 2008). The aim of the Accord was to increase economic aid to indigenous Kanak 
regions, readjust the economic and social disparities between the indigenous and non-indigenous 
populations, return customary lands, increase Kanak participation in political systems, promote 
Kanak culture, create a Caledonian elite, and establish rural development programs (Horowitz 
2004; Berman 2006). Tjibaou and Lafleur agreed to a new referendum (in ten years) with a more 
limited electorate (Chappell 2013). The country would be divided in three, albeit more 
autonomous, regions and 75% of aid would go to the poor more unequal northern and loyalty 
provinces. This key sharing or clé de repartition was an effort to rebalance the economic 
inequalities created by colonialism. France agreed to divide its aid unequally between the three 
provinces. French aid for the operating budget of each Province is divided into 50% for the 
South Province, 32% for the North Province, and 18% for the Loyalty Islands. The equipment 
allowance is divided into 40% for the Southern Province, 40% for the Northern Province, and 
20% for the Loyalty Islands (Chauchat 2011). Paris would also directly administer New 
Caledonia for one year (Chappell 2013). The agreement was simultaneously an attempt by 
France to maintain control over its territory and gain indigenous complacency through modest 
devolution. 
 In addition to stabilizing the legislative branches in New Caledonia and the country’s 
autonomy, the Agreement established three Provinces (Province Nord, Province Sud and 
Province des îles Loyauté) with regional councils that would share powers on a territorial basis 
(Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). The sematic use of province instead of region was 
deliberate. For the French, provinces are related to geography, culture, local people, and are 
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generally community based (Marrani 2006). In contrast, regions imply the largest level of local 
governance and are used to destroy local community. In terming the new regional divisions 
“provinces” the French were asserting the importance of maintaining a certain level of traditional 
culture and heritage in increasingly independent factions of New Caledonia. Whether this was a 
tactic used to mollify Kanaks incensed over colonial oppression or a legitimate 
acknowledgement of the significance of indigenous notions of the relationship between 
community, governance, national loyalty and identity is unclear. 
 This federal model enumerated Caledonian powers and left all unlisted powers under the 
purview of the Provinces (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). While, the state dealt with 
external relations of the territory, like immigration, the justice system, and the military, the 
territory was responsible for raising taxes and administering the local civil service (Marrani 
2006). Each province was governed by a provincial assembly and chaired by a president. All 
three provincial assemblies together composed the national Congress that ruled on affairs of the 
state and is chaired by a President. In addition, Kanak chiefs formed a special ancillary council 
designed to account for Kanak interests and the High Commissioner remaining the Head of the 
Executive branch (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). It seemed as though this more 
decentralized model would better represent the Kanak people through the process of 
decolonization and provide a platform for independence, a new identity, and sense of nationalism 
tied to heritage and customary culture. Partial decentralization of power was aimed at showing 
Kanak people how to effectively govern at the local level and was part of the process of 
independence (Marrani 2006).  
Government territorial arrangements can both encourage regional identities by 
partitioning the national space into units that have the ability to generate degrees of loyalty or 
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disloyalty or by promising devolution of power (Agnew 2001). Although codified in the French 
Constitution, the focus on consensus and common interest found in the Matignon Accords stems 
from more traditional Pacific culture (Brown 2013). The French government divided the country 
into three provinces to encourage local government and local alliances and they began to, at least 
they claimed to, hand over more power to these regional governments and indigenous inhabitants 
themselves. Agnew (2001) argues that after the agreements are made, the colonial government 
will often renege on its promises and subsequently provoke resentment from elements in regional 
populations. While the government did in fact implement the articles of the Matignon 
Agreement, they used other tactics, like dual citizenship and the economy to maintain a power 
imbalance between the French and indigenous populations.  
 Despite increased self-determination and greater Kanak participation in the political 
system, territorial-land disputes, issues over indigenous rights, and fear surrounding loss of 
identity continued. The signing of the Matignon Agreement and the pro-independence movement 
intensification also resulted in many Kanaks seeking to rediscover their traditional cultural 
identity (Horowitz 2004). According to Chappell (2010), cultural recognition is an essential 
component for independence. Remerging Kanak traditions and the desire by many to reestablish 
a unique Kanak identity seemed to grow parallel to the independence movement. So too did 
efforts at establishing a singularly Kanak sense of nationalism founded in a traditional spatial 
identity. 
 The Accord resulted in greater development aid in the poorer provinces and renewed talks 
between the FLNKS and the French state (Chappell 2013). The Consultative Customary council 
(now Customary Senate) was formed and enshrined the indigenous identity. The referendum 
provision in the Matignon Agreement signaled the agreement’s termination and a subsequent 
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vote on independence to be held in 1998. Before the expiration of the Matignon Agreement, a 
new set of agreements was reached between the French government and the dominant political 
parties in New Caledonia.  
 
THE NOUMEA ACCORD: FRAMING FUTURE POSSIBILITIES 
Nearly a decade after the Matignon Accord the governing elite of New Caledonia (FLNKS 
and RPCR) and France would again agree to postpone the decision on independence. The 1998 
Noumea Accord delegated greater autonomy to the New Caledonian government and agreed on a 
referendum on independence after 2018 (Berman 2006). Parts of the Accord were later added to 
the French Constitution. On November 1998, the Caledonian population ratified the Accord by 
72% (Editors 2002). Subsequent French legislation (Editors 2002, 2): “1) created a shared 
sovereignty and new relationship between France and New Caledonia, 2) called for a new 
citizenship for New Caledonians, 3) called for elections in 1999 to replace the current Territorial 
Congress, 4) began the irreversible transfer of administrative powers, 5) recognized indigenous 
culture and identity, and 6) set up a fifteen to twenty year transition period preceding the 
referendum on independence.”  
The general structure of the domestic government was also revised. The new system 
includes three provincial assemblies that elect their own regional president and from which 
representatives are elected to the national congress for a term of five years. The national congress 
includes thirty-two representatives from the Southern Provincial Assembly, fifteen from the 
North, and seven from the Loyalty Islands. The eleven member executive government replaced 
the French High Commissioner and proposes laws for the Congress’ consideration (Editor 2002). 
The Accord established mechanisms to ensure the self-determination of New Caledonia and 
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argued for the UN approval of the French decolonization plan to ensure the successful and 
peaceful path to independence (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). The Accord sets up “a 
paradigm of constant negotiation and reinterpretation about the project of ‘decolonization’” 
allowing for a broad interpretation of the UN’s call for the return or reintegration of former 
colonies (Brown 2013, 172). The goal of the Agreement is the empowerment of the government 
and Congress through the gradual transfer of powers from France to New Caledonia (Chauchat 
and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). Furthermore, at any time after 2014, Congress would have the right to 
call for a referendum to vote on independence. The Noumea accord ensured that all powers, 
except for foreign policy, defense, law and order, justice, and currency, would be irrevocably 
transferred from Paris to Noumea (Brown 2013). While the organization of the political system 
from the state level to the territories, provinces and local communes was nothing new in New 
Caledonia, the power and responsibility granted to the different levels was (Marrani 2006). As 
more power shifted to local levels, more control of that power shifted from French New 
Caledonians to Kanaks.  
First, in the Preamble, which the FLNKS attributes to Kanak members of the 
RPCR, France makes some surprising concessions: that its formal annexation of 
New Caledonia in 1853 did not constitute a legal agreement with the indigenous 
people; that the Kanak had their own valid civilization, which was marginalized 
and traumatized despite the progress colonization may have brought; that it is 
time to face up to "the shadows of the colonial period" and establish a new 
relationship with full recognition for Kanak customs and identity; that a New 
Caledonian citizenship should be created to allow the resident communities to 
pursue a common destiny; and that local voting rights should be limited to people 
of long-term residence. These ideas challenge the French claim to have 
decolonized in 1946 and legitimize a distinctly postcolonial Caledonian 
nationality, albeit a hybrid one still affiliated with France (Chappell 1999, 385). 
 
For the Kanak specifically, the agreement resulted in the creation of a Customary Council 
and Customary Senate to oversee and approve Kanak identity-related issues (Palayret 2004). 
Kanak customary law and languages also had equal status with French civil law and language 
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(Chappell 1999). Customary norms of negotiation and consensus are again found in the context 
of the Noumea Accord (Brown 2013). Kanak leaders promoted independence as the culmination 
of the success of the Nouméa Accord and associated negotiations.  
While some view the Noumea Agreement as a broad recognition of Kanak legitimacy 
and key to preserving Kanak identity, others consider the agreement a pretext for delaying 
independence while the Kanak population become a minority among European-Caledonian 
nationals (Carteron 2009). The Noumea Accord served as tool for indigenous leaders to protect 
the interests of indigenous people, even against the concept of a common destiny (Trepied 2012). 
Others have argued the Accords are merely an attempt by the French to re-colonize New 
Caledonia through targeted economic development or strategic bribery (Rumley 2006). The 
French state itself, presented its own stance as an arbiter, a neutral party that other groups and the 
international community could trust (Brown 2013). Like the Matignon Accords, much of the 
concessions in the Noumea Accords were designed to placate the Melanesian population. 
Examples include transferred ownership of nickel mines in the northern province to Kanak 
leaders, professional training for Melanesians, and the continued redistribution of customary 
lands (Connell 2003). The anti-independence leaders emphasized France’s willingness to 
negotiate for greater autonomy while still providing significant aid (Brown 2013). However, elite 
control over the nickel economy, international fluctuations in prices, overall dependence on this 
singular resource, and French aid has done little to alleviate widespread inequalities created by 
colonial and postcolonial practices. In addition, land redistribution had the unfortunate effect of 
solidifying a rural Melanesian poor (Connell 2003). This resulted in significant migration to the 
Southern Province and the periphery of Noumea in particular (McClellan 1999). 
The outcome of the Nouméa Accord will be decided by the three referenda to be held in 
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2018, 2020, and 2022. Loizides (2014) contends that referenda are met with mixed results in 
post-conflict and ethnically divided communities. “Successful referenda in South Africa in 1992 
and Northern Ireland in 1998 have been viewed as facilitating the respective peace settlements 
by engaging broader segments of the society in the peace process and limiting the role of violent 
opposition groups (Strauss 1993; Guelke 1999; McGarry & O’Leary 2009). But referenda might 
also have unintended side effects and inflame already unstable ethnic relations as suggested in 
East Timor and Kyrgyzstan. In the case of the 1999 referendum in East Timor, Paris (2004: 219) 
criticises the United Nations administration for organising a premature referendum on 
independence before providing security on the ground. Thousands of East Timorese were killed 
and about 400,000 displaced (Paris 2004: 219; Schulze 2001: 78), while in Kyrgyzstan the 
constitutional referendum of 2010 led to an estimated 400–500 dead and about 100,000 Uzbek 
refugees (Huskey & Hill 2011)” (Loizides 2014, 234). These examples point to the importance 
of timing and the specific wording of referenda. In a study of situations where the outcome of the 
referendum is opposite what was expected, Loizides (2014) found that early public participation 
promotes a better peace process. Furthermore, mandate referenda that “prepare the public for a 
peace settlement, incorporate early feedback into the negotiations, strengthen their credibility 
across ethnic antagonists and safeguard the peace process from subsequent and often 
unavoidable reversals in public opinion” are more likely to result in a successful peace process 
(Loizides 2014, 237).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the constraint of powers outlined in the Nouméa Accord, New Caledonia is 
increasingly stretching its international relations. Both Caledonians and the Kanak have used 
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international and regional bodies to promote their own pro- and anti-independence agendas. The 
Melanesian Spearhead Group was even established in an effort to support the pro-independence 
movement in New Caledonia in the 1980s (Brown 2013). While the Caledonian leader, Philippe 
Gomès attempted to use New Caledonia’s path to decolonization to have it accepted into MSG 
thereby legitimizing it in the eyes of a groups created to support the indigenous population. 
Although this attempt failed, Roch Wamytan succeeded in garnering funding for MSG in 
exchange for adding French as one of the group’s official languages. While French DOMs and 
New Caledonia already receive non-reciprocal rights congruent with EU membership, New 
Caledonia has also received specific provisions New Caledonia can export goods to the EU while 
maintaining domestic protections, they do not have to adopt the euro, as French citizens they can 
gain EU passports, and they can vote on representatives for overseas seats in the European 
elections. France’s overseas collectives receive three seats in the European Parliament, one of 
which is specifically held jointly by the French collectives in the Pacific (Brown 2013).  
The EU has promoted French Overseas Collectives as a bastion of European influence in 
the Pacific and as a counterpoint to Japanese and Chinese influences (Brown 2013). Towards this 
effort, France has been developing closer military ties with neighboring Australia and New 
Zealand. Through the FRANZ agreement, these countries have agreed to cooperate on disaster 
relief and military maneuvers. Joint military exercises have also included the United States. In 
addition, France moved the Pacific headquarters of their military from Polynesia to New 
Caledonia in 2008. This strategic significance is combined with the perception of French stability 
and democracy maintained in what is viewed as the melanesian arc of instability. This allows the 
EU to project a form of laissez-faire soft power in the Pacific that nevertheless gives it a strong 
foothold in this region (Brown 2013). 
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The case of New Caledonia is critical to the overall re-imagination of sub-national, 
particularly indigenous, questions in the peripheral French space. Although the Nouméa Accord 
successfully recognized the rights of the indigenous people, the implementation of those rights in 
the context of citizenship remains to be seen. Furthermore, the effort towards fostering a 
common destiny is undermined by calls for new rights based solely on Kanak identity – counter 
to the notion of living or building together. This effort has been expanded through the promotion 
of customary law and a demand for greater power for the Customary Senate (Trepied 2012). “In 
this new ‘customary-indigenous’ perspective, official recognition of the Kanak people is no 
longer seen as a stage in a long struggle for independence, nor an arrangement that is inseparable 
from the project of citizenship and decolonization, but simply as the local application of 
international principles for protecting indigenous peoples, independently of the question of 
independence” (Trepied 2012, 14).  
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
  Representatives from the Territorial Congress form the core governing body that will 
determine the timing of the three referenda and the questions asked. It will be the responsibility 
of these fifty-four individuals to oversee the implementation of the chosen outcome of the 
referenda. Data for this research is composed of semi-structured interviews conducted with eight 
congressional representatives who are leaders within four of the five party coalitions in the 
Territorial Congress. Additional information about the views of these politicians and six others 
representing all five political party coalitions were collected from popular New Caledonian 
newspapers Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes, Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie, news blogs L’Eveil 
Calédonienne and Calodoshpere, and the French-Caledonian television program Nouvelle-
Calédonie 1ere. Party statements and press releases, Congressional documents, and public 
speeches from the eight representatives, five other current representatives, and one former 
representative supplemented this data. My methodology is three-part. First, I used grounded 
theory to identify the dominant narratives (in the interview and textual data) underlying the 
independence debate. Second, axial coding and constant comparative analysis (which are part of 
grounded theory), discourse analysis, and chord diagrams were used to map and analyze how 
these narratives are defined and framed by different politicians. Finally, I evaluate the extent to 
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which these frames, and the narratives they characterize, support independence, independent-
association, association, or a third accord. Taken together, these three questions offer a view of 
the current supporting structures underlying the current political decision-making climate and 
offer a prediction about the best compromises for the future.  
 The grounded theory methodology used here is an inductive approach. As such, the end 
product is a theory or series of theories that are directly generated from the information gathered. 
The particularity of grounded theory is the connection between data and theory: “the concepts 
out of which the theory is constructed are derived from data collected during the research process 
and not chosen prior to beginning the research” (Corbin and Strauss 2014, 6). The purpose is to 
disconnect the researcher from their preconceived ideas and notions and let the data guide their 
findings. While it is difficult to ignore one’s preconceived ideas, the process of grounded theory 
forces a researcher to immerse themself in the data. They must think about where it is leading 
them rather than where they want it to go. In grounded theory studies interviews and other types 
of textual data are commonly employed. Interviews were the core component of analysis because 
unlike news stories or surveys, politicians could direct the discussion in the way that was most 
important to them. I wanted to know how the most influential actors in the independence debate 
were framing the independence debate itself. Interviews with those individuals allowed me to 
gather information about their narratives directly from the source. New articles and other textual 
materials provided additional secondary sources of narratives that could further validate my 
conclusions and fill holes in my data collection. Using a grounded theory methodology supported 
by interviews and secondary textual sources allowed me to ascertain and explore the current 
narratives presented by politicians about the independence debate with as few filters as possible.  
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DATA SOURCES AND INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION 
The independence debate is not just a political concern. Full sovereignty or any change in 
New Caledonia’s relationship with France will impact the country’s relations within the South 
Pacific, its economy, and its society. As a result, organizations, academics, and others have 
contributed to or are part of the negotiations over the future of the country. The spectrum of 
information and opinions that could be collected from all actors involved in the debate is 
staggering. Loizides (2014, 243) argues that political leaders are “critically important in 
contested peace processes” because they can either “mobilise voters for peace or alternatively 
frame potentially promising peace settlements as catastrophic.” I have chosen to limit my focus 
to the politicians who will ultimately be responsible for framing the question or questions asked 
in the referenda and many of whom will be responsible for carrying out the result of those 
referenda. Therefore, interview subjects were chosen from among the fifty-four congressional 
representatives elected in May 2014 based on their party affiliation and standing.  
Within the Territorial Congress of New Caledonia there are fifty-four representatives 
selected from the three Provincial Assemblies. These fifty-four representatives belong to and 
align with five primary party blocs (CE, FPU, UCF, UC-FLNKS, and UNI-PALIKA). Within 
these blocs are numerous and often-changing political parties. From these five blocs, I was able 
to personally interview politicians who are either the founder or president of their particular 
political party or party bloc. These politicians are the most influential and, in some cases, 
longstanding politicians in New Caledonian politics. Table 1 lists the representatives 
interviewed. Interviews allowed me to ask politicians about their opinions and views on a certain 
issue, the independence debate, but they also allowed the interviewee to talk about what is 
important and central to them in the context of the independence debate. Therefore, I was able to 
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glean insight into exactly how different politicians and factions comprehend this issue. 
Interviews, in addition to speeches and news articles, easily fit into the grounded theory process 
of identifying and analyzing themes. Many of the names were provided by Dr. Mathias Chauchat 
who has studied New Caledonia’s politics and law at the University of New Caledonia for over 
two decades. Literature from other academic experts on New Caledonian history and politics 
corroborated the significance of actors like Philippe Gomès, Pierre Frogier, Charles Washetine, 
Paul Neaoutyine, Roch Wamytan, Daniel Goa, Louis Kotra Uregei, and Isabelle Lafleur.  
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Table 1. List of Research Subjects and Data Sources. 
Congressional 
Representatives 
Data 
Sources 
Provincial 
Congress 
Affiliation 
Type Political Party Party 
Coalition 
Philippe Gomès Speeches South Loyalist Calédonie 
Ensemble 
CE 
News 
Articles 
Party 
Documents 
Grégoire Bernut Personal 
Interview 
South Loyalist Entente Province 
Nord 
Front pour 
l’unité 
News Article 
Pierre Frogier News 
Articles 
South Loyalist Rassemblement-
UMP 
Front pour 
l’unité 
Party 
Documents 
Harold Martin Speeches South Loyalist Avenir Ensemble Front pour 
l’unité News 
Articles 
Gaël Yanno News 
Articles 
South Loyalist Mouvement 
Populaire 
Calédonien  
Union 
Calédonie dans 
la France 
Philippe Blaise Personal 
Interview 
South Loyalist Mouvement 
Républicain 
Calédonien 
Union 
Calédonie dans 
la France News 
Articles 
Isabelle Lafleur Personal 
Interview 
South Loyalist Rassemblement 
pour la 
Calédonie  
Union 
Calédonie dans 
la France News 
Articles 
Daniel Goa Personal 
Interview 
North Nationalist Union 
Calédonien 
UC-FLNKS et 
Nationalistes 
News 
Articles 
Party 
Documents 
Jacques Lalié Personal 
Interview 
Loyalty 
Islands 
Nationalist  Unir et 
Construire dans 
le Renouveau 
UC-FLNKS et 
Nationalistes 
News 
Articles 
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Table 1. List of Research Subjects and Data Sources. 
Roch Wamytan Personal 
Interview 
South Nationalist Construisons 
notre nation Arc-
en-Ciel 
 
UC-FLNKS et 
Nationalistes 
Speeches 
News 
Articles 
Party 
Documents 
Sylvain Pabouty Personal 
Interview 
South Nationalist Dynamique 
Unitaire Sud 
UC-FLNKS et 
Nationalistes 
News 
Articles 
Louis Kotra Uregei News 
Articles 
Loyalty 
Islands 
Nationalist Parti Travailliste UC-FLNKS et 
Nationalistes 
Charles Washetine Personal 
Interview 
Loyalty 
Islands 
Nationalist Parti de 
Libération 
Kanak 
UNI-PALIKA 
News 
Articles 
Paul Neaoutyine News 
Articles 
North Nationalist Union Nationale 
pour 
l’Indépendance 
UNI-PALIKA 
 
Personal interviews were conducted with five nationalists and three loyalists from all but 
one of the primary political party blocs: Charles Washetine, Daniel Goa, Roch Wamytan, 
Jacques Lalié, Sylvain Pabouty, Grégoire Bernut, Philippe Blaise, and Isabelle Lafleur. This list 
differs from my proposed list of interview subjects for a number of reasons. At first, the list 
composed for my dissertation proposal was based on my knowledge of politicians and their 
importance. According to Dr. Chauchat’s suggestions on his input regarding the influence of 
each politician, I included several individuals who were not on my original list, including: 
Washetine, Lafleur, Gomès, and Goa. Dr. Chauchat also advised that these individuals, among 
the others I have listed in Table 1 represent the dominant views on the independence debate. 
Second, the list was compiled prior to the May 2014 Territorial Congress elections. Meaning that 
not all of the representatives on my initial list were re-elected and new actors have taken the 
  
   
74 
 
stage in this debate. With a revised list based on the key actors, I proceeded to contact interview 
subjects.  
Prior to arriving in New Caledonia I had trouble obtaining email addresses for contacting 
potential interviewees. As a result, I arrived in New Caledonia with only one scheduled 
interview. Even after my arrival it was difficult to contact individuals who relied much more on 
word of mouth recommendations and generally disliked the use of email in favor of phone 
contact. I was limited by my lack of local knowledge and was unable to contact many potential 
interviewees until late in my stay. Since Territorial Congress representatives are members of the 
national and provincial congresses (and often hold other local offices like Mayor) it was difficult 
to set a meeting time with some of them. While most offices and politicians were surprisingly 
approachable one I had contacted them about an interview, a number of individuals from leading 
loyalist political parties required official documentation and letters of reference (including a 
waiting period fro processing) before they would even agree to discuss the possibility of an 
interview. As a result I was able to meet with a number of highly placed nationalists, but 
primarily met with less established loyalists (with the exception of Lafleur). Finally, a number of 
politicians I had hoped to interview are members of the Signatory Committee. This Committee 
and other invitees meet once a year to discuss amongst the factions and the French government 
the future of the Nouméa Accord. The committee was originally composed of the partners in the 
Nouméa Accord: France, nationalists led by FLNKS, and loyalists led by Rassemblement. The 
first Signatory Committee was held in Paris on May 2, 2000. The French delegation was led by 
the Secretary of State for Overseas France: Jean-Jack Queyranne. The nationalist delegation was 
led by Roch Wamytan who was President of the FLNKS at the time. The loyalist delegation was 
represented by Jacques Lafleur who was President of Rassemblement (RPCR) at the time. The 
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Signatory Committee was mandated by the Nouméa Accord. Its goals included translating the 
tenets of the Accord into local contexts, preparing the texts necessary for the implementation of 
the Accord, and following up on the implementation of the Accord. Successive meetings 
included a greater number of political parties as factions shifted and divided in New Caledonia. 
The annual Signatory Committee meeting held in Paris in 2014 took place mid-October. This 
was a little over halfway through my fieldwork. While I was still able to obtain interviews with 
some of the politicians who attended, several of them stayed in France after attending the 
meeting and their offices had no expectation of their immediate return. Despite these setbacks, 
the personal interviews I conducted do represent each of the primary political blocs except for 
CE, whose founder and stance on the independence debate are well documented in other sources. 
The personal interviews were also conducted with representatives who are leaders in their 
political parties, are part of the newer generation and the 1980-generation, and offer a sample 
from each of the three provinces.  
The setbacks listed above meant that I was unable to conduct interviews with all of the 
politicians I targeted. My initial goal was to interview two representatives from each political 
party represented in the Territorial Congress. Armed with a greater understanding of the 
convoluted and ever-changing networks of political parties in New Caledonia, I revised this goal 
to target at least two representatives from each of the major parties and their affiliated blocs. This 
includes: CE, FPU, UCF, UC, FLNKS, UNI, PALIKA, and PT. The UC-FLNKS and PT are 
generally affiliated and considered the UC-FLNKS and Nationalists and UNI and PALIKA are 
part of one bloc. At the very least, I hoped to interview one representative from each of the 
groups. I succeeded to some extent. I gained interviews with representatives of all but three of 
the eight parties listed above. As a result, I turned to other sources that could provide additional 
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information about these party’s and their members’ stance on independence. I researched local 
newspapers, party documents, and speeches given by the members of my potential interviewees 
list.  
In particular, I targeted local newspapers and broadcasts that had conducted interviews 
with the individuals on my list. I found a number of these types of articles outlined in news 
documents attributed to all of the representatives listed in Table 1. A complete list of the news 
documents analyzed can be found in Appendix B. For subjects I had already interviewed, these 
documents and news reports validated, reinforced, or clarified my findings from the personal 
interviews. For those I was unable to interview, it provided a way for me to identify and analyze 
their narratives as part of the broader independence debate. While the reported views and views 
expressed through speeches and party documents of Gaël Yanno, Paul Neaoutyine, Pierre 
Frogier, Harold Martin, and LKU exist in conjunction with the personal interviews I conducted 
with their party counterparts, Gomès exists separately. Due to a scheduling miscommunication, I 
was unable to personally interview any representatives from his party. The views attributed to 
Gomès and CE are thus based on numerous news articles, speeches, and other party 
documentation.  
Narrative data pertaining to the objectives of these individuals is solely based on 
information provided by news articles and government documents, press releases, and party 
literature. The news articles detailing the views of these representatives were collected from 
various New Caledonian newspapers (Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes, Demain en Nouvelle-
Calédonie), news blogs (L’Eveil Calédonienne, Calodoshpere), and the French news program 
Nouvelle-Calédonie 1ere. These sources represent the most widely read or viewed news sources 
and various political factions in New Caledonia.  
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Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes is the only daily New Caledonian newspaper and has been 
in print since 1971. In the early 2000s the paper was bought by French media company Groupe 
Hersant Média. In 2012 the paper was sold to a company led by Bernard Taipe and control was 
later transferred to three local owners: media mogul Jacques Jeandot controls 59%, the 
Montagnat mining family controls 21%, and former supermarket chain owner Charles Lavoix 
controls 20% (Palmieri 2013). Nouvelle-Calédonie 1ere is publically owned, but operated by 
Reseau France Outre-Mer. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie is a weekly newspaper available 
online every Thursday.  Isabelle Lafleur founded DNC in 2006 and serves as the director of 
publication. L’Eveil Calédonienne is an online news and print news platform. Its motto is 
“awakening daily; news in real time; all you need to know without necessarily asking; anything 
you do not necessarily read elsewhere” (Contact 2015). The newspaper favors political issues 
and debates since its start in October 2013 (de La Bourdonnaye 2013). The director of 
publication is Thierry Squillario a longtime journalist in New Caledonia. Calodoshpere is a 
popular New Caledonian blog that presents news articles exclusively online.  
All of the news documents collected were instances where the news station had 
interviewed the individual and printed the transcript, hosted debates between politicians, re-
printed political speeches, or quoted a politician. The news sources were dated from 2005 to 
January 2015. I chose to focus on recent articles because some of my research subjects have been 
newly elected to the Territorial Congress and because I wanted to analyze politician’s most 
recent stances on the referendum and independence given the short proximity to its occurrence. 
Their views from a decade ago may be slightly different than those expressed more recently as 
they try to swing votes for or against independence given the current social, political, economic 
climate. A majority of articles are from 2009-2014 during the previous an current Congressional 
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terms. The articles were selected by searching under politician’s names in the archives and 
online databases for each news source. Additional supplementary materials included: 1) 
documents from the political parties themselves (including party charters, election fliers, and 
public statements), 2) official presidential statements given by Martin and Gomès from 2008-
2011, 3) speeches given by Wamytan to the United Nations in 2013 and 2014, 4) the Charter of 
the Kanak People by the Customary Senate, 5) summaries from the Signatory Committees from 
2010-2014, and 6) the document produced at the behest of the Signatory Committee outlining the 
possible outcomes for the Nouméa Accord (entitled, Reflections on the Institutional Future of 
New Caledonia). A full list of the ancillary documents and the news articles can be found in 
Appendix B. These materials provide another layer of depth to my analysis of politicians’ views 
on the independence debate. It was important to include this material for important politicians 
who were not represented by personal interviews and to verify that all of the narratives presented 
by politicians were accounted for. This leads to better and more comprehensive and grounded 
theories at the end of the research, because as many views as possible are taken into account and 
verified.   
Party charters, election fliers, and public statements posted on political party websites 
indicate that party’s specific platform. Fliers and public statements are geared towards specific 
issues or debates at the time of their publication. The Charters rarely change and are written 
when the party is founded. These documents outline the core values and beliefs of a party. The 
official Presidential statements are equivalent to a State of the Union address given in the United 
States. Typically they are more moderate in their speech, but the President will describe their 
plans for the future of the country. The speeches Wamytan gives to the UN are geared towards 
garnering UN support for the independence process in New Caledonia. This request is couched 
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in terms of carrying out the tenets of the Nouméa Accord and ensuring a fair outcome of the 
referenda, which includes a balanced electorate. The Charter of the Kanak People was a 
document drafted by the Customary Senate and Customary Councils with the participation of 
Kanak communities. Its objective is: 
It is a matter of correctly setting up the rights of the autochthonous Kanak here in 
the country. At the level of the project for a new society, the new modern society 
must respect diversity by accepting the rights of the autochthonous people and it 
will have to spread out in all the branches of the organisation of the new modern 
society. It will be possible to call it, a societal readjustment of the systems of 
values (Charter of the Kanak People 2014). 
 
The Charter is comprised of three chapters that 1) outline the core characteristics of the 
Kanak culture, 2) describe the basic structure, organization, and history of the Kanak civilization, 
and 3) reviews the Kanak right to self-determination. Following the 2011 Signatory Committee, 
signatory demands led the French Prime Minister to establish the Steering Committee on the 
Insititutional Future of New Caledonia (SCIFNC) (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). The 
Committee’s objective was to determine the possible outcomes of the referenda in the context of 
the Nouméa Accord. Jean Courtial (a French Councillor of State), Ferdinand Mélin-
Soucramanien (a French law professor), and Stéphane Grauvogel (a delegate of the French 
Overseas Deputy General) explored and outlined the three possible questions that could be asked 
in the referendum. These questions indicate the three main options for the future governance of 
New Caledonia. Based on the Nouméa Accord, the options include: full sovereignty 
(independence), sovereign state partnership (independent association), and extended or self-
perpetuated autonomy (autonomy within the French Republic or provisional autonomy) (Courtial 
and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). The report was made available in 2014.  
In total, information was collected about the objectives of seven loyalists and seven 
nationalists. They represent all of the five party coalitions currently represented in Congress - 
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three are from the Loyalty Islands Provincial Congress which provides seven representatives 
total; two are from the North Province Congress which provides fifteen representatives; and nine 
from the South Province Congress which provides thirty-two representatives. Pierre Frogier is 
the only person included that is not currently serving on the 2014-2019 Territorial Congress. 
However, Frogier has long been an influential part of the Caledonian government and is 
currently serving a term as one of the New Caledonian representatives to the French Senate.  
While the personal interviews I conducted offer a sample of the different party blocs, 
geographic jurisdictions, experience levels, and historical contexts politicians in the Territorial 
Congress represent, there are some limitations caused by this list. The lack of personal interview 
from a representative of CE makes my analysis of this party’s narratives less comprehensive than 
the parties represented entirely or in part by personal interviews. The views of Gomès and CE 
are heavily represented in the news, but a personal interview may have gleaned additional insight 
on topics not covered in the news interviews. Most of the topics I discussed with interview 
subjects were available online or in media accounts. However I believe that some politicians 
further clarified their views or may have been more open with me than they were in news 
articles.  
In addition, fieldwork was essential to the end result of my research. The three research 
assistants who helped with interviews and interpretation came from a variety of backgrounds and 
mentalities. One was from a very old Caldoche business family, another was Kanak and grew up 
in the tribal North, and the final assistant had a French mother and a Kanak father. Their 
perspectives during and after interviews (and their discussions with me) helped me shape and 
better guide the interviews. Their feedback made the questions I asked more pointed and specific 
to their knowledge of each politician. This background information combined with their 
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sometimes-personal connection to an interview subject made the interviews more relaxed, 
collegial, and ultimately more informative because interview subjects were comfortable with the 
situation. Had I not conducted fieldwork in New Caledonia, I would not have gained an 
appropriate appreciation for the context of my research. The urban slums, rapid construction, and 
overall tone of the country would have escaped me. I believe that interviewees would have been 
much more reticent to communicate via skype or even email. Many members of the older 
generations still prefer face-to-face interactions and contact.   
Interview questions focused on the politician’s history, the program for their political 
party, defining common destiny and self-determination, the roles of national identity, ethnicity, 
multicultural governance, control over land, and mining, French aid and dependence, citizenship, 
identity, immigration, and the economic and political future of the country. While these form the 
basic topics discussed, interviewees were free to expand on issues of particular interest to them. 
For a complete list of interview questions see Appendix A.  
 
Background on Interviewees 
Philippe GOMÈS was born in 1958 in Algeria. He was President of the Southern 
Province for five years following Pierre Frogier. At the same time, he also served as Mayor of 
the La Foa municipality from 1989-2008. He was also a Member of the Government under the 
third, fourth, fifth, and sixth Governments of New Caledonia under Harold Martin from March 
2011-December 2012.  
Pierre FROGIER was born in New Caledonia in 1950. He studied law and was later a 
professor of Law in Dijon France in the early 1970s. Shortly after he started a career in politics 
he became a member of the Territorial Government Council and retained a government seat in 
  
   
82 
 
1982. Frogier was elected President of the Southern Province and Mayor of the Mont-Doré 
municipality in 1987. From 2001-2004 he served as the President of the Government of New 
Caledonia. Since 2011 he has served as one of the New Caledonian Senators to the French 
Republic.  
Harold MARTIN was born in Nouméa in 1954 to one of the original European families 
who settled in New Caledonia. Like many of his contemporaries, he studied in France in the 
1970s, specializing in corporate farming and livestock. He has been the Mayor of Païta since 
1995 and served as President of the Government of New Caledonia from 2007-2009 and 2011-
2014. He was also the President of the Territorial Congress from 1997-1998, 2004-2007, and 
2009-2011.  
Paul NEAOUTYINE was born in eastern New Caledonia in 1951. During the 1970s he 
studied economics in Lyon France and was a member of the Group 1878 and Foulards Rouges or 
Red Scarves. In 1989 he was elected Mayor of Poindimié. He is currently the President of the 
Northern Province Assembly 
Louis Kotra UREGEI was born in 1951 in Nouméa. After studying in France in the early 
1980s Uregei returned to New Caledonia and founded the Union of Kanak Exploited Workers 
(USTKE) or Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Kanaks et des Exploités in 1981. In 2007 he 
founded a labor party: Parti Travailliste de Nouvelle-Calédonie. By 2009 he had been elected to 
the Provincial Assembly in the Loyalty Islands and then to the Territorial Congress.  
Gaël YANNO was born in 1961 in Nouméa and studied economics in Paris in the 1980s 
and later public accounting. While maintaining a professional career in accounting, Yanno was 
elected to the South Province Assembly and Territorial Congress in 1989 until 1999. He created 
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the Popular Caledonian Movement party or Mouvement Populaire Calédonien in 2013 and was 
elected President of the Congress of New Caledonia in 2014.  
Charles WASHETINE was born on the island of Maré in 1956. He studied the sociology 
of education in France in the late 1980s before returning to Maré. He considers himself an 
educator first. He has been a member of both the Provincial Assembly in the Loyalty Islands and 
the Territorial Congress since 1999. By 2000 he became the official spokesperson for PALIKA.  
Daniel GOA was born in 1953 just outside of Hienghène in the Northern Province. He 
studied in France in the late 1960s and early 1970s during the anti-imperialist movements. His 
experiences in the metropole led him to join the Foulards Rouges movement and opened his eyes 
to the injustices occurring in New Caledonia in 1973. By the late 1970s he became more 
involved in the communist party. In 1980 he returned to his home to aid in the search for a new 
chief of his tribe and formed a development office designed to recruit new members into the UC. 
He has held some type of political office almost continually since the 1990s and in 2012 was 
elected the President of the UC party.  
Jacques LALIÉ was born on the island of Lifou in 1954. He studied political science and 
economics in France where he participated in the activist association that eventually became the 
Foulard Rouges. In my interview he said that the Foulards Rouges started out as a political 
support group whose goals included changing the colonial system and ending the marginalization 
of Kanak. He said when he was growing up it was normal for the Kanak to be referred to as dirty 
Kanak and Caledonians would only share the scraps of what they had eaten to the indigenous 
population. While living in France, Lalié was strongly influenced by the Marxist debates among 
University students from French colonies while studying in France. His father was part of the 
RPCR coalition chaired by Jacques Lafleur in an effort to improve conditions for the Kanak. But 
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Lalié took this a step further by approaching Kanak recovery through a communist lens. In 2004 
he founded the Unir et Construire dans le Renouveau party as a reaction to the failures of the UC 
on the Loyalty Islands.  
Roch WAMYTAN’s path started somewhat similar to the famous Jean-Marie Tjibaou. 
He was born in 1950 in Nouméa and trained to be a priest in New Caledonia. When his seminary 
closed he went to France to continue studying theology and philosophy, but switched to 
economics. After returning to New Caledonia he continued working with his grandfather Roch 
Pidjot who was a member of NC in public administration. In 1989 his grandfather became the 
President of UC and Wamytan became a councilor in the town of Mont-Doré, then a member of 
the South Province Assembly, and eventually joined the Territorial Congress. Eventually he 
served as President of the Territorial Congress from 2011-2012 and 2013-2014. He was also a 
Member of the Government from 1999-2001 and 2002-2004. 
Like Jacques Lalié, Sylvain PABOUTY’s political initiative stems from a reaction to the 
effects of colonialism. He views his civic participation as an obligation, an obligation to advocate 
for the Kanak people based on his personal experience. Since his parents moved to Nouméa in 
the 1950s and 60s for work, Pabouty has a keen understanding of the need for Kanak voices in 
the South Province. He argues that social problems are linked to urbanization and are more 
glaring in the South where migrants typically move to. Like many others, he studied in France 
during the 1980s and received a degree in economic and social administration. His party, DUS, is 
primarily composed of former PALIKA activists.  
Phillipe BLAISE’s family has a long history in New Caledonia – spanning five 
generations. In addition, his father was a politician and militant during the 1980s. Blaise studied 
business in France before returning to the banking industry in New Caledonia. In 2006 he first 
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got involved in politics to protest the freezing of voting rights. Although he started his political 
career in the RUMP, he founded his own political party after Frogier agreed to raise the Kanak 
independence flag in 2011. His party, the MRC is part of a coalition with Yanno’s MPC and 
Lafleur’s RPC.    
Isabelle LAFLEUR was born in Nouméa in 1954. She is the daughter of famous loyalist 
Jacques Lafleur who signed the Matignon Accord with Jena-Marie Tjibaou. She studied law in 
France in the early 1970s and remained in France until the early 1990s. She entered the political 
sphere in 2009 and after the death of her father in 2010 became the President of the RPC party. 
Unlike others in her party bloc, Lafleur considers herself French, not Caledonian or Caldoche. 
Despite being born in New Caledonia she studied and then lived in France from 1973 to the early 
1990s. She is also the only loyalist interviewed who stated they are open to the option of 
eventual sovereignty for New Caledonia.  
Grégoire BERNUT was also influenced by his politically active family. He studied 
economics for ten years in France before returning to New Caledonia in 2000. His first 
involvement in domestic politics was in 2004 as a special councilor for the Southern Province. 
Since then he has worked in both the private and public spheres. Most recently, in 2014 he was 
elected to the Territorial Congress.    
Each politician is a member of a party that exists in an ever-changing series of party 
coalitions. Some coalitions are built on particular issues or platforms, while others stem from 
historical or ethnic allegiance. Table 1 offers a list of all of the current coalitions in the 
Territorial Congress to which these politicians belong. In Figure 1, left and right represent the 
liberal and conservative factions respectively. However, referring to them as liberal and 
conservative is slightly misleading because European and European inherited systems are 
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generally more leftist or liberal than American politics. Therefore I use the terms left and right. 
Economic policy is presented on a scale of socialist to liberal. Here liberal means a more 
capitalist interpretation of the economy and socialist means greater government or public control 
of the economy. Generally, pro-independence parties align on the leftist political sphere and are 
more socialist oriented on economic policy (see Figure 1). Among the political parties, PT and 
PALIKA support labor groups and labor rights so they tend to be more left and economically 
socialist than centrist parties like the FLNKS and UC. Among loyalist parties, CE may be the 
most centrist, with AE and RUMP promoting more liberal economic policies (see Figure 1). 
Members of the UCF coalition, which includes, MPC, MRC, and RPC tend to be less-centrist 
politically and far more conservative.  
The loyalists consider themselves a French nationalist movement and a father figure to 
the Kanak, arguing that Kanak devolution is inevitable. Meanwhile nationalists consider loyalists 
to be part of an ‘axis of evil’, the enemy, unconstitutional, the ‘opium of the people,’ and 
‘republican farandoles.’ Farandole is a French provincial dance that includes patterned steps and 
a series of steps where dancers join hands in a chain or a circle. The dance is linked to the 
carmagnole popular during the Reign of Terror and associated with the French Revolution. In 
addition, nationalists accuse loyalists of using scare tactics, promoting fear by equating 
independence with chaos and violence. Nationalists consider themselves to be the truly 
nationalist bloc, a coalition of parties trying to build New Caledonia through common destiny 
and as a joint project. Loyalists accuse nationalists of being selfish, uncompromising, 
ideological, violent, obstructing freedom, perpetuating social conflict, separatism, and hindering 
development. Loyalists emphasize that nationalists are violent to non-Kanak, consider non-
Kanak to be second-class citizens, and believe they are ethnically superior.   
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Figure 1. Political Parties on a political and economic scale.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Categorizing information is a way of organizing and making sense of the world. 
Discourse analysis is the process of deconstructing these categorizations and can be used to 
understand how categorizations influence political claims and decision-making (Dalby 1991; 
Dodds 2005; Mamadouh and Dijkink 2006).  Muller (2008) argues that discourse is shaped by 
the individual and acts as a collective participatory framework that shapes meaning. Discourses 
are part of a relational or supportive network that presents discourse as a context-driven 
statement that can be expressed through a variety of mediums (Foucault 1980). Taken together 
the networks create “discursive formations” and “bodies 
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of knowledge” (Tyner 2004, 13). Simply, this form of analysis examines the way in which 
language is used to accomplish various political projects (Tyner 2004). Formal geopolitics is the 
creation of theory and strategies to guide and justify the creation of regions with imagined 
attributes in everyday politics (O’Tuathail and Dalby 1998). To understand the motives and use 
of particular discourses in statecraft it is critical to identify and examine the “situated reasoning” 
that forms their foundations (O’Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 6). One approach to discourse analysis 
is the semiotic analysis of meaning and significance in text and the identification of storylines 
embedded in transcripts from interviews, focus groups, and surveys (Dittmer 2005; Hardwick 
and Mansfield 2009). 
 
Grounded Theory and Discourse Analysis 
 The methodology that structures my approach to analyzing interview transcripts, news 
articles, and other forms of textual data is grounded theory. More specifically, I utilize both 
grounded theory and discourse analysis to identify and explore politicians’ narratives regarding 
the independence debate. Kohlbacher (2005, 12) describes the method of grounded theory as a 
form of content analysis where, “categories [are] the center of analysis: the aspects of text 
interpretation, following the research questions, are put into categories, which [are] carefully 
founded and revised within the process of analysis (feedback loops).” This type of grounded 
theory is organized into three core steps (2005, 13):  
“a. Summary: attempts to reduce the material in such a way as to preserve the 
essential content and by abstraction to create a manageable corpus which still 
reflects the original material. For this the text is paraphrased, generalized or 
abstracted and reduced. 
b. Explication: involves explaining, clarifying and annotating the material. As a 
first step a lexico-grammatical definition is attempted, then the material for 
explication is determined, and this is followed by a narrow context analysis, and a 
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broad context analysis. Finally an ‘explicatory paraphrase’ is made of the 
particular portion of text and the explication is examined with reference to the 
total context. 
c. Structuring: corresponds more or less to the procedures used in classical 
content analysis and is also viewed as the most crucial technique of content 
analysis, the goal of which is to filter out a particular structure from the material. 
Here the text can be structured according to content, form and scaling. The first 
stage is the determination of the units of analysis, after which the dimensions of 
the structuring are established on some theoretical basis and the features of the 
system of categories are fixed. Subsequently definitions are formulated and key 
examples, with rules for coding in separate categories, are agreed upon. In the 
course of a first appraisal of the material the data locations are marked, and in a 
second scrutiny these are processed and extracted. If necessary the system of 
categories is re-examined and revised, which necessitates a reappraisal of the 
material. As a final stage the results are processed.” 
 
This classical approach to coding diverges from the tenets of the grounded theory approach to 
coding I employ in this analysis. As Kohlbacher (2005) goes on to state, Mayring’s (2002) more 
rigid and structured approach to coding leaves little room for flexibility and adaptation as one 
progresses throughout the text. Instead, Glaser and others have advocated for a more open and 
inductive approach to coding that focuses on a “theory-based category system” that “can be 
changed during extraction [or structuring] when relevant information turns up but does not fit 
into the [existing] category system” (Kohlbacher 2005, 14). This is an important disctinction, 
because the goal of this analysis is to be as inclusive as possible: to represent all of politicians’ 
narratives on the independence debate. Not to reject narratives or frames that do not fit well into 
the mainstream party rhetoric. Instead I highlight these areas of divergence in addition to more 
mainstream and collectively supported narratives.  
During the summary process the body of text - interviews, news articles, and other 
documents, in this case – is consolidated through a looping process of reduction. This body of 
data will be collectively referred to as first-person narratives. Even though the texts are in 
different forms, they can be analyzed using the same methods and examined as a comprehensive 
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whole in case study research (Kohlbacher 2005). Kohlbacher (2005, 15) described this process in 
terms of Mayring’s (2000) “inductive category development.” According to this approach, the 
researcher first determines a general research topic or question. The next step is deciding how the 
categories will be defined and then inductively identifying them based on the information found 
in the material (Kohlbacher 2005; Kondracki and Wellman 2002). Throughout this stage, the 
categories and the research themes are continually refined to exist in agreement with each other. 
Categories are changed or revised based on the information found in the text and the research 
themes are changed to reflect those categories. Categories are collected and organized into 
themes to prevent redundancy and force comparisons to be made between codes (Elo and 
Kyngäs 2007). The end result is a series of inductively composed ‘grounded’ categories that will 
then be analyzed relative to the research questions. In this way, the research questions are based 
on information already identified in the texts and can result in true ‘grounded’ theory.  
 To identify the dominant narratives underlying the independence debate, I employed 
Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) inductive grounded theory approach using constant comparative 
coding: recording both descriptive and analytic codes that represent the dominant themes present 
in the textual data. This process, which results in grounded theories, allows me to identify 
politician’s narratives, framing of narratives, and examine how these frames impact the 
independence debate because I am analyzing their words and views directly. Categories are 
identified through the process of coding, where common themes, concepts, ideas, people, and 
agencies within a set of data that can be classified and compared are discovered (Hsieh and 
Shannon 2005). First, the texts are read. As I read through the interview transcripts, New 
Caledonian news sources, speeches, party documents and other materials, I made notes in the 
margins – essentially summarizing the material in each section. From these notes, codes emerge 
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from the text. After each document had been transcribed and translated, I began the process of 
open coding: identifying the main themes within each document, speech, or interview question. 
A set of common themes began to emerge. Categories are created as I discover links and 
connections between codes that can be consolidated into one theme. This process involves 
constant comparison and looping whereby the categories are constantly refined and the research 
questions subtly changed to reflect what is being discovered. The goal of grounded theory is to 
end with, rather than begin with, a series of theories. The theories are derived from the constant 
comparison of codes identified within the text being studied.  
At this point, I began tracking the themes or categories through axial coding. Axial 
coding is the practice of identifying central categories or themes that can be connected to 
different subcategories that relate to them. Axial coding is like creating a web. The primary 
category is at the center of the web and the sub-categories are all connected to it. Like a web, 
sub-categories also express relationships between themselves, they too can be connected. 
Identifying and analyzing these webs and their components is a way to discover causal 
relationships between variables or themes and explore the impact of context. This is the second 
part of the “summary” stage of content analysis (Kohlbacher 2005, 13).  
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Table 2: Identification of the Electorate Category and Framing. 
Text Frame (Code) Implication Category/The
me 
The un-democratic nature of 
the electorate is a challenge 
to the fundamental values of 
New Caledonian society and 
is dangerous. 
 
Current electoral body 
divisions in favor of 
Kanak are un-democratic 
and dangerous 
 
Sliding in 
favor of all 
inhabitants 
Electorate 
Who votes is central to the 
exercise of the right to self-
determination of a colonized 
people. 
 
Voters should be those 
that have the right to self-
determination 
Frozen in 
favor of 
Kanak 
Electorate 
The May election results 
were made with 
questionable lists showing 
that this system [the 
provincial electorate] has 
become a weapon against 
the colonized people, a 
system that claims to be 
democratic, but which 
turns against independence 
and autonomy. 
 
Current electoral body 
divisions are un-
democratic and a weapon 
against the Kanak 
Frozen in 
favor of 
Kanak 
Electorate 
 
The narratives I identified and refined through open and axial coding include: different 
definitions of self-determination, reasons for pro- or anti-independence affiliation, relations with 
France and the UN, electoral politics, and definitions of identity, common destiny, victims, 
rebalancing, and citizenship. Rebalancing is a core discourse in elite political narratives. It is 
used as a broad term for creating political, economic, and social equality between ethnic groups. 
The term common destiny was first used in the Nouméa Accord in 1998. The term’s meaning 
has been transformed and expanded in the ensuing decades. However, in the Nouméa Accord, 
and at its core, it seems to indicate the ideal of a future sense of collective belonging among all 
of the inhabitants of New Caledonia. For example, the independence movement might be coded 
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as anti-colonial, pro-Kanak, separatist, an indigenous rights movement, or anti-France. Each of 
these particular codes has different connotations and therefore frames the independence 
movement in different ways that can impact public opinion. Each theme with its associated codes 
is tied to the person and party who said it. All of these themes, codes, and relationships were 
catalogued in excel spreadsheets. The spreadsheets list excerpts from the original text, categories 
(narratives), associated codes (frames), the author (or politician who was interviewed), the 
politician’s political party, stance on independence, the source, and the source’s date. Table 2 
provides an example of the coding process: taking information from interview transcripts, news 
sources, and other texts, coding it, and then organizing those codes into categories. The category 
identified above refers to the electorate. Each of the text samples refers to a politician’s view on 
the current divisions within the three different electoral bodies. Specifically, they are referring to 
the provincial electorate: the voters that determine the Territorial Congressmen and a percentage 
of whom are part of the referendum electorate. Therefore all of these text samples are part of a 
broader electorate category or narrative. However, each view of the electorate is slightly 
different. These different views are summarized into frames. The frames are the codes that I have 
noted in the margins of my text materials. This process was continued through all of the 
documents and transcripts collected. Gradually, these networks of categories and frames formed 
what Tyner (2004) calls discursive formations. The final column, implications, refers to the next 
stage in my analysis: discourse analysis.  
The goal of coding is to structure information in a logical framework that can then be 
analyzed (Cope 2005). Grounded theory sets up the structure, themes, and linkages to be 
explored further using discourse analysis. This is where I transition from identification of 
narratives (research question 1) to an analysis of the way in which those narratives are framed 
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(research question 2) and then how those frames influence potential outcomes of the accord 
(research question 3). The framing step shown in Table 2 and the process of interpreting the 
importance or significance of that framing is part of discourse analysis. Burck (2005, 249) 
describes the process of discourse analysis in three steps:  
“The researcher first examines the text in relation to how language is used to 
‘construct’ the ideas or information. Second, the researcher looks for variability – 
the inconsistencies of meaning in the constructions and the assumptions they 
reveal. The third component is to highlight the implications of a particular 
account, to examine what the discourse achieves.” 
 
The significance of politicians’ narratives and how they are framed is examined through 
discourse analysis. After frames are identified through coding and constant comparison, their 
meaning, genesis, and implications are explored using discourse analysis. This process targets 
research questions two and three: identifying and exploring the framing of narratives and better 
understanding how these frames influence the outcomes of the independence debate.  
Continuing with the electorate example from Table 2, stage one of discourse analysis 
involved identifying how the electorate is defined. In this case, understanding the history and 
sentiment behind the electoral divisions. The three electorates were part of an agreement between 
France, the loyalists, and the nationalists in 1988 and 1998 to end the violence and tensions of 
the 1980s. The second stage is where I note the specific language used by politicians. For 
example, some referred to the electoral divisions are un-democratic, dangerous, and as a weapon 
or tool of marginalization. These discrepancies in loyalist and nationalist views reveal different 
understanding and the goals of each group. Both are using the electorate as a point of debate to 
try and tip the balance of the physical voting population in their favor. They use terms like 
democracy to perhaps appeal to the Westernized French government or United Nations. Both the 
Republic and the international organization are viewed as partners in this fight by the loyalists 
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and nationalists respectively. Additionally, both sides make the assumption that the electoral 
divisions are democratic to begin with. They are not. They were put in to place to be unfair on 
purpose to remedy the negative colonial legacies and marginalization promoted by the French. 
So the Kanak would have a greater self-determination and power in the territorial and provincial 
governments.  
The final stage of discourse analysis examines the implications of these views or 
narratives. Table 2 outlines the implications for these views of the electorate. The nationalists 
view of the electorate as undemocratic implies that they want to keep the electoral bodes frozen, 
preventing any new voters from being added. Loyalists’ view of the electorate as undemocratic is 
based on the French ideals of equality and the universal right to vote. As a result they are in favor 
of expanding the electoral bodies or making them ‘sliding.’ This process was conducted for each 
code and category: identifying specific language and category definitions (frames), 
understanding their context and links with other codes and categories, and then determining the 
implications of those definitions and categories for the independence debate. 
Less complex or frequently cited narratives (categories) were consolidated into separate 
groups and sorted based on their codes and the politicians’ affiliation or party. More complexly 
networked narratives were consolidated and then mapped out in a series of interrelated concept 
maps. Once the narratives and frames were consolidated or outlined on concept maps, I 
examined the definitions of the major themes, how they were co-defined, and how they created 
networks of discourse that support pro- or anti-independence outcomes. The discourse of 
(re)balancing is used by both loyalists and nationalists to promote association with France or full 
sovereignty. Chapters Five through Seven explore these discursive formation of (re)balancing 
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that pervades contemporary political rhetoric and shapes current economic, social, and electoral 
policy.  
The last stage of this project is analyzing the implications: the extent to which these 
discursive code formations (or narratives and objectives) and the knowledges they produce 
influence specific options for the resolution of the independence debate and effective 
multicultural governance. How does the framing of these narratives and the narratives 
themselves promote or hinder certain outcomes? The themes derived from open and axial coding 
represent the goals each politician and party has for the outcome of the Nouméa Accord. After 
the discursive frameworks were identified, I explore how the narratives might impact the options 
offered in the referenda (i.e. full sovereignty, independent-association, association, or another 
accord). For example, the self-determination narrative is framed in three ways, as a: shared right, 
Kanak right, and right for all. This narrative and associated frames were identified using 
grounded theory and axial coding. Discourse analysis was used to further define and understand 
each frame. The right for all means represents the belief that self-determination is a right that 
should be available to all inhabitants of New Caledonia, including recent immigrants. This view 
is tied to notions of French liberty, minority-making techniques, and state power. The right for 
all mentality is one of the driving factors behind creating a sliding electorate or expanding recent 
immigrants inclusion on the special electorate. This could result in an electoral shift in favor of 
anti-independence groups if these individuals are added to the list.  
 
Using Chord Diagrams 
Chord diagrams are an essential part of visually representing the connections between 
goals and themes and which goals support each of the five outcomes. The diagrams are a way of 
  
  
  
97 
 
mapping how narratives are defined, connected, and which ones support each outcome. Chord 
diagrams and circle graphs have traditionally been used in mathematics, physics, and medical 
sciences. Very few qualitative or textual analysis studies have incorporated chord diagrams. The 
use of chord diagrams in textual analysis has been limited to social media projects that explore 
connections between topics and map networks of communication. Kim et. al. (2013) used chord 
diagrams as part of a dashboard that maps the geographic location of radical Islamic groups and 
the locations of their followers using twitter. De Pinho (2013) used chord diagrams to map the 
frequency and type of student communication on group projects. 
In this study, chord diagrams are another form of concept mapping and analysis. Unlike 
traditional outward moving concept maps or thought clouds, chord diagrams show internal 
connections between concepts. I use chord diagrams to show how themes and goals are linked by 
networks that ultimately support or do not support the five possible outcomes. The chord 
diagrams were generated using the online feature of circos. Circos’ online platform allows users 
to upload data tables that generate the appropriate chord diagrams. The chord diagrams include 
several features. The most apparent feature is the visible links between terms. In Figure 2, these 
links are shown in different colors. Each term (theme, code, goal) composes a portion of the 
circle. The colored bands directly below the terms represent theme color. For example, one of the 
themes in Figure 2 is the “Role of UN” which is lime green. The relationship between this theme 
and those it is connected to (rebalancing and self-determination) are indicated by the chord 
diagram. The disconnected, but linked, brown and dark green chords indicate that the role of the 
UN is defined in terms of or is influenced by rebalancing and self-determination. The brown 
chord connected to the “Role of UN” bar indicates that different definitions of self-determination 
change views of the “Role of the UN.” In this case, the UN is viewed as a protector who can 
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ensure self-determination occurs for the Kanak (indicated by the light green chord) and the role 
of the UN is defined by its ability to ensure the right to self-determination for indigenous groups 
via UNDRIP (indicated by the brown line). The lime green chord means that the way in which 
the UN’s role is defined impacts definitions of self-determination.  
 
Figure 2. Connections between dominant themes. 
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Figure 2 outlines the connections between all of the primary themes identified in the data 
for this study. These nine categories represent the major concerns of politicians and the defining 
narratives of the New Caledonian political sphere in regards to the independence debate and the 
future of the country. The chord diagram shows how the narratives are interrelated and co-
defined and serves as a type of inverted concept map.  
The concept maps I initially compiled to determine how each narrative is framed also 
revealed the interconnections and links between narratives and frames. Connections are created 
when the frames attributed to that narrative are defined by other narratives or frames. This 
creates a complex network of co-definition that makes up the networks of discourse that support 
each narrative. For example, how a politicians defines citizenship influences the divisions 
between the three electoral bodies. To be a member of the special or referendum electoral bodies, 
a person must be a citizen. Figure 2 shows this connection with the light burgundy citizenship 
chord connected to the electorate.  
Figure 2 demonstrates that the rebalancing narrative (dark green) is connected, defines or 
is defined by, all of the other narratives identified. The concept of rebalancing is a pervasive 
discourse throughout the materials I gathered. In vivo codes referring to rebalancing are less 
numerous in the data than other in vivo codes. However, the context underlying other narratives 
and codes found in the text refer back to this idea of balance and attaining balance politically, 
economically, and socially. Ironically, both factions argue for a (re)balancing that would cause 
an imbalance in power between provinces, ethnic communities, classes, and voting populations. 
The prevalence of the rebalancing theme makes it useful for structuring the opening Chapters of 
my analysis. Particular attention is paid to how the three types of rebalancing represent layers of 
competing narratives and frames. The term itself is used as a method of structuring the narratives 
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and frames I identified. However, as the following chapters will show, it is also a term that 
should be understood in its historical context and as a buzzword deployed by politicians.  
The Matignon and Nouméa Accords laid the groundwork for a future decision on full 
sovereignty in New Caledonia. However, these agreements also began a process of reconciliation 
and reparations meant to alleviate the problems caused by French colonial practices and to 
prepare the country for possible independence. This process is best framed in terms of 
rebalancing. The term rebalancing, or rééquilibrage, and its connection to reducing the 
inequalities caused by colonialism is not new to the Caledonian political lexicon. The concept is 
pervasive and a part of numerous other debates central to the question of independence (see 
Figure 2). Interviews suggest that there are three main areas of inequality that must be 
rebalanced: economic, social, and political. While loyalists and nationalists agree on the need for 
and importance of rebalancing, they differ on how to achieve it. Chapters Five through Seven 
identify the nine narratives found in the data gathered. Using the concept of rebalancing as an 
overarching structure, these chapters will outline and define the way in which these narratives 
are framed and explore the connections visualized in Figure 2. The (re)balancing discourse is a 
complex web of competing visions defined by the legacies of colonialism, economic 
dependence, national identities, inequality, and third party actors.  
  
  
  
101 
 
CHAPTER 5  
POLITICAL REBALANCING 
 
Figure 2 shows the conenctions between narratives identified in interviews and other 
materials from leading politicians in New Caledonia. Of all the narratives, rebalancing has the 
most connections to other narratives. Therefore, this term, and its frames are a useful starting 
point for identifying and deconstructing other narratives and frames. Many of the other frames 
are part of the rebalancing narrative because they are strategies for achieving a new balance 
between internal communities and New Caledonia and France. The concept of rebalancing 
originated with the Matignon Accord.  
The Melanesian community, originating in Territory of New Caledonia - the first 
victim of the imbalances resulting from the colonization - must be the main 
beneficiaries of measures implemented to restore to a greater cohesion and enable 
it to achieve a better geographic and economic balance (Matignon 1989).  
 
Initially it referred to economic restructuring and French aid. Specifically, Jacques Lafleur’s 
shares in SMSP were transferred to the Northern Province, the key sharing program 
implemented, and a Kanak training program called 400 cadres was created (Fisher 2013). 
Negotiators of the Matignon Accords recognized the imbalance and economic inequalities 
created by colonialism (Rich, Hambly, and Logan 2008). Development and wealth was centered 
around the capital and rural areas dominated by Kanaks were impoverished. Rebalancing would, 
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ideally, be achieved by dividing the country into three provinces and ceeding political and 
economic control to Kanaks in the Northern Province and Loylty Islands. Ten years later in the 
Nouméa Accord, the term refers to the transfer of sovereign powers: 
The Transfer of Sovereign Powers - Justice, public order, defense, money, and 
international affairs remain the responsibility of the state until the new political 
organization resulting from the consultation of interested populations provided for 
in Article 5. During this period, New Caledonia will be trained and associated 
with the exercise of responsibilities in these areas in order to rebalance and 
prepare for this new stage (Nouméa Accord 1998). 
 
Several of the objectives outlined by politicians can be framed in terms of the struggle for 
political (re)balance destabilized by unequal colonial relationships. The Kanak have made 
significant gains in political representation and recognition. Kanak nationalist parties dominate 
Provincial Assemblies in the North and Islands while maintaining a small but significant 
presence in the South Province Assembly. The Nouméa Accord also granted power to a 
Customary Senate responsible for consultation on issues related to Kanak culture. Despite these 
gains, some Kanak still believe the political scales are unbalanced and push for greater political 
power. At the same time some loyalists resent the minority rights and special privaledges gained 
by the Kanak population.  
Until now, political rebalancing has been part of the decolonization narrative established 
by the Accords. Today, political rebalancing is defined by views on self-determiantion, 
decolonization, the transfer of powers, the referenda on independence, and the electoral bodies. 
Politicians’ interpretations of these themes correspond to their stance on political rebalancing in 
favor of Kanak or Caledonian populations. In the midst of this tension, the UN is considered an 
impartial protector of indigenous rights for nationalists and a watchdog to loyalist parties 
frustrated with seeming favoritism.   
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SELF-DETERMINATION AS A RIGHT 
During decolonization, self-determination was exclusively defined as the right to 
independence (Barelli 2011). By 2007, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
redefined who has the right to self-determination and what self-determination means: 
Article 3 - Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
 
Article 4 - Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have 
the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and 
local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions. 
 
UNDRIP (2007) states that all people have the right to self-determination: 
Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, as well as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
affirm the fundamental importance of the right to self-determination of all 
peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
 
However, only indigenous groups affected by colonialism and geographically distant from their 
colonizers can express self-determination through full sovereignty (Berg 2009; Niezen 2003; 
Palayret 2004; Weller 2009; Kolvurova 2010).  
Loyalists and nationalists agree that self-determination implies the right to decide on the 
future of one’s country. They even agree that it is an inherent right. But there is strong 
divergence on who has this inherent right. Loyalists maintain that the inherent right to determine 
one’s future should be available to everyone living in New Caledonia: 
One man, one vote […] You need to ask people what they want. We are talking 
about self-determination. Self-determination means that one day you can vote 
(Blaise Interview 2014). 
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[S]elf-determination is the right to arrange themselves. In the current state of the 
situation, I believe that somewhere, we have more or less reached self-
determination […] So while we see today in relation to your question of self-
determination stops at a big word, because it is the right of peoples to arrange 
themselves. Because today, in my opinion, we have almost reached that. Since 
today the key to our future is in our hands and the hands of France (Bernut 
Interview 2014). 
 
Loyalist blocs UCF and FPU view self-determination as a shared right for all inhabitants of the 
country seeking a voice on the future of their country. The inclusive approach to political 
rebalancing stems from the French concept of universal suffrage, liberty, and equality, common 
destiny as equal rights for all, and the minority view of Caledonian victimization and Kanak 
privilege following the Accords. In later sections, I explore the extent to which this inclusive 
vision of self-determination underpins the loyalists’ argument for an inclusive special electorate 
and comprehensive citizenship 
Nationalists believe political rebalancing will be achieved through the exclusive right to 
self-determination. The view that self-determination is a right that should be restricted to the 
Kanak or the Kanak and other victims of history is the result of French colonialism and 
victimization and supported by a restricted citizenship that creates the frozen electorate. 
Nationalists range from the more exclusionary frame that promotes self-determination as a right 
only for Kanak or Melanesians to sharing the right with other “victims of history” and those 
excluded through colonialism.  
Since over 30 years now one has agreed to share this right to self-determination 
that belongs to us, the colonized people, others are not colonized, they are part of 
the history of colonization but we were really colonized by a people that is the 
French people. And that is the challenge to Kanak people is how to share with 
others who are there already for a long time, there are some who are there from 
the beginning of colonization, so how to ensure to share this right then with the 
others (Wamytan Interview 2014). 
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[T]he issue of independence is above all a right. All peoples have the right to 
decide what they want for their future (Washetine Interview 2014).  
 
This sharing is on behalf of the Kanak, giving them power over inclusion – a direct response to 
the perpetual view of France as a colonizer and perpetrator of historical victimization of Kanaks. 
Anti-colonial self-determination and indigenous self-determination is characterized by groups 
with distinct ethnic and historic claims to a pre-colonial territory (Halperin, Schefer, and Small 
1992). For Kanak, the right to self-determination is therefore a method for Kanak to regain the 
dignity that was lost during colonization and a principle of decolonization after WWII and 
international agreements under the United Nations. These two frames are interwoven by Roch 
Wamytan (Interview 2014): 
Self-determination is a right because of the fact that we were colonized by another 
country, another people came from faraway Europe who did not ask permission, 
they took possession of New Caledonia. Then they colonized New Caledonia, and 
since 1946, at the level of the United Nations there has been a decision to give 
freedom to the people who were colonized by European powers. 
 
For members of UC-FLNKS, DUS, and UNI-PALIKA the right to self-determination is shared 
among others who have been victims of colonization (Kanak, Communards and their 
descendants the Caldoche, and other forced laborers brought to New Caledonia during French 
colonialism) and is therefore something that is owed – particularly to the Kanak.  
[I]n 1983, 30 years ago now, during the negotiations at Nainville-les-Roches 
(France) between representatives of the French State, the Independence Front and 
the ‘Rally for Caledonia in the Republic’, the Kanak People, wishing to exercise 
its right to self-determination, nevertheless agreed to include in the referendum 
electorate those considered to be ‘victims of history’, in other words the 
descendants of settlers, convicts and ‘Communards’. It is for this reason that the 
electorate for the referendum on self-determination was extended to those to 
whom the Kanak were willing to reach out to build the future country together 
(Wamytan Special Committee 2013, 5). 
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The question was about that the Kanak people have the right to be decolonized, 
but what about the other people who live in NC. The decolonization of Kanak 
people doesn't mean the other people have to leave. All these people built the 
country (Goa Interview 2014). 
 
All peoples have the right to decide what they want [desire] to do for themselves, 
for their country, for their land [homeland], for their subsoil [underground], their 
environment ... and their right there to share it with others, those who came 
[later]. They were considered to have been somewhat victims of colonization, 
because they lived in the same exclusion (Washetine Interview 2014). 
 
This shared approach to political rebalancing results in a restricted definition of the special 
electoral rolls and future citizenship. Which is why the referendum itself is described as a Kanak 
right, the ultimate expression of self-determination. The Labor Party (PT) however, views self-
determination as a uniquely Kanak right:  
This story [ the Acccords] will inevitably lead to independence and the Kanak 
will claim their rights, others will go along. ‘[…] The electorate is frozen more 
restrictive than provincial referendum, and it is favorable to Kanak’ (Policy 
Explanations 2013). 
 
Here LKU is arguing that the Accords must lead to full sovereignty because the Kanak have the 
upper hand in the restricted referendum electorate. Moreover, he is saying that the other 
communities in New Caledonia must accept the restricted electorate and its bias in favor of the 
Kanak.  
Loyalists believe political rebalancing is only possible through the inclusive right to self-
determination. In reference to the negotiations preceding the Events in the mid-1980s, Blaise 
says: 
We came with the vision, one man, one vote. The Kanaks came with the vision, 
only Kanak people can vote. And in their speech they were victims of history, 
which is a way to say we have a lower dignity. So we couldn't strike an agreement 
and a few months later we have the events: violence, deaths (Blaise Interview 
2014). 
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An inclusive right to self-determination is the result of perceived Caledonian victimization, 
French values of liberty and equality, and the idea of holding a common destiny through a shared 
right to decide the country’s future. This view is supported by a sliding electorate and inclusive 
or expanded citizenship. Indeed, loyalist leader Blaise views an exclusive or restricted right to 
self-determination and the right to vote on Provincial elections as undignified.  
 
The Role of the United Nations: Watchdog or Guardian of Self-determination? 
Nationalists view the UN as their protector or guardian who has granted them freedom of 
self-determination. 
Decolonization and freedom is a right granted and ensured by the UN […]At the 
UN level there has been a decision to give freedom to the people who were 
colonized by European powers (Wamytan Interview 2014).   
 
[Néaoutyine stated] I want to reassure those who allow themselves to be 
overwhelmed by the irrational fear of an uncertain future by reminding them that 
the Nouméa Accord, the political decolonization process guaranteed by the 
French and regularly monitored by the United Nations, will culminate in a 
genuine democratic act. Caledonian citizens will be able to choose freely and 
consciously, in time, the future that we want for our country (The Vows 2014). 
 
For some nationalists, UNDRIP and the UN’s commitment to indigenous self-determination is 
taken to mean that independence will surely result from the referenda. In some ways this view is 
supported by the perspective that the Kanak as the original victims of colonization and only truly 
indigenous people in New Caledonia should outnumber other communities in the referendum 
electorate. The UN also serves a secondary, and more practical role as a counterbalance to 
French power by monitoring the progression of the Nouméa Accord.  
Since the Committee of signatories of 2007 in Paris, and for seven years we raised 
this issue of the electoral roll, but facing the silence or shortcomings of the French 
State we came before the United Nations five times in one year to claim each time 
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the strict respect of the Nouméa accord concerning the establishment of electoral 
roll of the provincial special electoral body and that of the self-determination 
referendum so as to avoid the many maintained ambiguities which are found 
sources of fraud. The last Committee meeting of the signatories in Paris from 
October 3rd has decided to postpone again the issue at stake. Now, we find 
ourselves in an impasse. The time has therefore come Mr. Chairman, five years 
from the end of the third decade for eradication of colonialism and four years 
from the referendum provided by the Nouméa accord to solicit the United Nations 
and, in particular, the Committee of 24, a formal mediation with France so that 
the referendum on self-determination scheduled for 2018 happens in conditions of 
transparency and sincerity and that no one can challenge the ballot results 
(Wamytan Statement to the UN 2014, 2). 
 
Wamytan, in particular, has a close relationship with the United Nations. He was one of the most 
outspoken advocates for returning New Caledonia to the list of Non-Self Governing Territories, 
which led to the renewal of emancipation efforts in the country after 1986. Since then, the UN 
has been an observer of the decolonization process. The UN monitors France’s involvement and 
receive regular reports on the transfer of powers and progression towards the referenda. As a 
result, the members of UC-FLNKS and UNI-PALIKAs view this international organization as a 
protector of self-determination and indigenous rights: an ally that can balance the power of 
France.  
No one has forgotten, in fact, how this same UN was slammed in March [2014], 
when its delegations that visited Noumea focused on the restricted electorate and 
the process of decolonization. Philippe Gomès, member of the second district, had 
called the move a ‘farce’, Jean-Claude Briault, a member of the Martin 
government at the time, deemed it ‘inappropriate’ while Pierre Frogier, president 
of Rassemblement-UMP, called it an ‘affront’ (Squillario 2014). 
 
[Yanno stated] this [UN] mission brings tension and confusion, when we need 
clarity and serenity (Squillario 2014). 
 
Loyalists view the UN as a watchdog that exists to stir up ‘tension’ and ‘confusion.’ Since 
France is a sovereign state the UN has a narrow jurisdiction over domestic issues. Their 
involvement is limited by the goodwill of the French government. New Caledonia’s place on the 
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list of Non-Self-Governing Territories means that the UN does have some authority to oversee 
and make recommendations for the administering power and the local government. However 
loyalists believe that the UN is overstepping its bounds by sending observer missions to the 
country. Furthermore, Wamytan’s call for UN intervention on the electoral issue has been meet 
with little success. The UN has no basis for demanding France had over the allegedly missing 
information about the 1998 Nouméa Accord referendum roster. As a result of these juxtaposed 
views the UN seems to have remained a silent sympathizer to the indigenous-nationalist struggle 
without making any huge moves to counter French policies in regards to their handling of the 
referenda or electoral rolls.  
 After the UN Special Committee’s second visit to New Caledonia early in 2014, their 
recommendations included (Report of the UN Mission 2014, 23-24): 
The mission also stresses the importance for all concerned to guarantee the full 
implementation of the Nouméa Accord by urgently undertaking genuine efforts to 
address current shortcomings in its implementation, particularly concerning the 
restricted electorate provisions. 
 
The mission calls upon the administering Power to take all measures necessary to 
address the concerns expressed with regard to the question of the promotion of the 
systematic influx of foreign immigrants into the Territory. 
 
The mission considers that for the future of New Caledonia it is essential that the 
recommendations contained in the 2011 report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
rights of indigenous peoples, in particular those concerning Kanak participation in 
the political arena and governance (see A/HRC/18/35/Add.6, paras. 72-76) and 
those relating to social and economic disparities (ibid., paras. 84-88), be urgently 
implemented. 
 
The UN mission paid particular attention to the electoral debate by urging all actors involved to 
undertake ‘genuine efforts’ to fix the problems associated with membership in the referendum 
electorate. One of their conclusions was critical of “misleading” and “insufficient” “information 
and awareness-raising campaigns targeting voters with respect to the right to vote” in the 
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provincial elections and the referenda (Report of the UN Mission 2014, 22). While the UN 
document is careful to blatantly point fingers, it does identify the shortcomings of the French 
government on protecting New Caledonia from the massive influx of Pacific and European 
migrants. Particularly since it has long been a French practice to marginalize Kanak by 
encouraging immigration. The UN is a steadfast supporter of the indigenous right to self-
determination and responsible governance. However, this international body is also subject to the 
dictates of its members and France is part of the powerful UN Security Council.  
 
DECOLONIZATION, THE NOUMÉA ACCORD, AND TRANSFER OF POWERS 
The Matignon and Nouméa Accords are decolonization contracts between the French 
Republic, nationalists, and loyalists. However, only nationalists link self-determination to the 
concept of decolonization. They view the process of decolonization as part of the greater effort 
towards rebalancing the country: socially, politically, and economically. Again there is a 
pervasive theme of being owed, of righting the wrongs done by colonization. Rebalancing as part 
of the decolonization and self-determination narrative is achieved through freezing the provincial 
electorate, completing the transfer of all sovereign powers from France, and giving the Nouméa 
Accord full constitutional status (FLNKS 2001). For many, the natural conclusion of 
decolonization is independence or full sovereignty. Lalié (DNC 2014) even goes so far as to say 
that decolonization and independence will lead to greater Kanak control of the country. Goa 
(LNC 2013) states that decolonization should only be a bi-lateral discussion between the French 
Republic and Kanak nationalists – excluding loyalist Caledonians.  
Much of the debate over the future of New Caledonia stems from different interpretations 
of the Nouméa Accord and how it frames the goals of decolonization. Signed to end a civil war 
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and create a project of peace in 1998, this document is still highly contested over fifteen years 
later.  
The Matignon-Oudinot and Noumea Accords are decolonization agreements, 
which had the effect of restoring and maintaining peace in New Caledonia. 
Strictly speaking, they are not peace agreements as some senior French officials 
have claimed. These agreements were intended to place the Kanak back in a 
central position, and prepare the country to exercise its right to self-determination 
by fostering the emergence of a common consciousness within a New Caledonian 
citizenship arrangement. This in turn has its foundation in the definition of a 
special electoral body for provincial elections and the special electoral body for 
the poll on the passage of the territory to full sovereignty (Wamytan Special 
Committee 2013, 6). 
 
We signed [the Nouméa Accord] with our European conceptions, trying to build a 
multicultural society that would be a based on universal principles that could fit 
anyone whatever their skin color, religion, or ethnic origins (Blaise Interview 
2014). 
 
To the members of UC-FLNKS and UNI-PALIKA independence is the natural result of the 
decolonization process and the ultimate goal of the Nouméa Accord.  
So today the Noumea Accords, it is the agreement of intelligence [cleverness or 
understanding]. And this is a decolonization Agreement, and as it is a deal of 
intelligence, it means that one day we will all agree on decolonization (Lalié 
Interview 2014). 
 
For nationalists, self-determination is unequivocally defined as an inherent right. Its logical then, 
that nationalist Kanaks would seek full sovereignty as a means of control. Control that has been 
in short supply under French colonization. As a result, independence is equated with 
emancipation, liberation, and protection from exclusion. It is also defined as power to control 
decision-making.  
The Matignon Accords have pointed this out to many they should be able to, like 
the Kanak were colonized, they can be independent. But it's true that it's a little 
complicated because they are the people who came [arrived later]. They arrived 
from France, particularly from the penal colony, they have arrived from Asia for 
work, Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, and also Pacific peoples who arrived here. And 
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sometimes it's a bit complicated to share their idea or project of an independent 
country. And that's all the challenge of independence project led by Kanak. 
 
Independence and a break with French rule, is for some nationalists, an opportunity to create a 
human-centered society:  
The target of independence has to be a project for the society. People in the center 
of the project. Even though we are in 2014 and we have a lot of international 
companies here, it is important that human beings are at the center of the project 
and we have to do the project around the society (Pabouty Interview 2014). 
 
Victimization and French colonialism has strongly influenced views of the Nouméa Accord and 
its implementation. It is presented as a process towards full sovereignty, something that is 
unfinished and owed, yet irreversible.  
We were made to swallow twenty years of Nouméa Accord so we want 
independence immediately (Néaoutyine 2014). 
 
While this view does not directly alter the definition of the special electorate, it does influence 
how nationalists’ view a future New Caledonian domestic government. If decolonization means 
independence, and independence is defined as protection from exclusion, control over decision-
making, and a human-centered society, it follows that a future government would include greater 
representation for Kanaks and broader integration of customary forms of governance.  
Loyalists believe that the Nouméa Accord opens the possibility for outcomes other than 
independence:  
Some here want to have no referendum and find another solution, such as is found 
in 1998, which was the Noumea Accord that installed, all that leads us here, and 
allowed in 1988 to no longer have civil war (Lafleur Interview 2014). 
 
According to the UCF, the Accord was responsible for giving a voice to Caledonians and its goal 
was to build a multicultural society. For the FPU and CE the Nouméa Accord sets a precedent 
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for peaceful dialogue, consensus among factions, and mutual recognition. This vision is shaped 
by a perceived favoritism towards minority rights and the Kanak community under the Matignon 
Accord. The Nouméa Accord, loyalists therefore argue, created the foundation for a multicultural 
society with universal rights and inclusive mutual recognition of all populations living together 
in New Caledonia – a rejection of minority privilege. A multicultural society parallels loyalists’ 
vision of common destiny as living together with an inclusive citizenship. At the domestic 
government level, this view promotes a system of representation that embodies the multicultural 
population.  
 In an effort to foster political rebalancing between France and New Caledonia, the 
Nouméa Accord codified a process of devolution. Over two decades, France would cede all 
powers except for the five sovereign powers to the domestic government in New Caledonia. The 
referenda will mark the final decision on the remaining powers. There are two main views on the 
transfer of the remaining sovereign powers. The loyalists almost unanimously believe the 
transfer should be frozen. France would retain control of the five sovereign powers and continue 
to control the media. Loyalists argue that French control of the media prevents it from becoming 
a puppet of the New Caledonian elite and dangerously corrupted. There is a fear that the media 
will be used as tool to influence public opinion against association with France. Some loyalists 
who are open to the possibility of eventual independence advocate for the prolonged and slow 
devolution of the remaining powers – giving New Caledonia time to develop and support these 
institutions and gain essential training and experience handling them. Not surprisingly, 
nationalists argue for the immediate completion of the power transfer. While the powers that 
have already been transferred are irreversible, nationalists argue that to freeze the transfers now 
is equivalent to not upholding the Nouméa Accord. They fear that a third accord or continued 
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association will play in to France’s historical efforts to promote New Caledonian dependence on 
France. The Matignon and Nouméa Accords combined with French citizenship and an artificial 
standard of living were French attempts to maintain and encourage this dependency.  
 
ELECTORAL BODIES: FROZEN OR SLIDING 
The right to vote is a method of ensuring multicultural inclusion and equality for sub-
state groups (Reilly 2001). It can also be a form of marginalization. In New Caledonia, the right 
to vote for provincial elections and the referenda is strongly linked to victimization, France’s 
colonial role, definitions of self-determination, citizenship and the Nouméa Accord. For 
nationalists, political rebalancing means creating equilibrium in immigration that reinforces a 
frozen electorate. Loyalists view the frozen electorate as an affront to the Republican ideals of 
equality and liberty and argue for a more inclusive voting body. 
The Nouméa Accord and subsequent Organic Law of 1999 established three voting blocs 
in New Caledonia: 1) the French municipal, legislative, and presidential elections; 2) the 
domestic provincial and congressional elections; and 3) the referendum on independence (Brown 
2013). All New Caledonian citizens and French nationals are members for the first electoral roll. 
According to the French Electoral Code, individuals must be registered in their home 
municipality or the one where they live (Maclellan 2006). To vote on the provincial and 
congressional assemblies, an individual must be part of a special electorate. The Electoral bodies 
compose a complex network of eligibility requirements based primarily on date and length of 
residence in New Caledonia with automatic inclusion given to all Kanak (Maclellan 2006; 2013) 
(see Table 3).  
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Table 3: Electoral Rolls and Eligibility Criteria. 
 1998 
Referendum 
Electorate 
Full Electorate 
(General List) 
Special Electoral Roll 
(Caledonian citizens) 
2018-2022 Restricted 
Special Electoral Roll  
1998 Referendum 
on the Nouméa 
Accord 
French and 
European 
Institutions 
 
 
Provincial and 
Congressional  
Elections in New Caledonia 
2018-2022 Referenda 
 
E
li
g
ib
il
it
y
 R
eq
u
ir
em
en
ts
 
Resident of New 
Caledonia since 
November 6 
1988 
Universal Suffrage 
 
 
 
Eligible to participate in 
Matignon Accord 
Referendum (November 8  
1988) 
Prove 20 years residence 
in New Caledonia prior to 
December 31 2014 
Registered on 
electoral roll on 
November 9 
1988 (for 
Matignon 
Accord) 
Annex Table: 
Members of the 
full electorate but 
NOT the Special 
Electoral Roll 
Registered before the 1998 
referendum AND have ten 
years residency by 1998 
Eligible for Nouméa 
Accord Referendum 
(November 8 1988) 
  Turned 18 years old after 
October 31, 1998 AND: 
Customary Civil Status 
One parent 
that met the 
requiremen
ts for the 
1998 
Nouméa 
Accord 
referendum 
One parent 
registered on 
the Annex 
Table and has 
ten years 
residence in 
New 
Caledonia by 
the date of 
the election 
    One parent born in New 
Caledonia AND main 
moral and material 
interests in the territory 
   If born before January 1 
1989: must be a resident of 
New Caledonia from 
1988-1998 
   If born on or after January 
1 1989: must be 18 years 
old by the date of the 
referendum AND have one 
parent who is a member of 
the electoral roll for the 
1998 Nouméa Accord 
referendum 
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The restrictions on citizenship and voting rights are highly contested. The restricted 
provincial electorate began to balance the Kanak and non-Kanak voting population and created a 
60-40 split in favor of loyalists. Additional restrictions clarified in 2007 further narrowed the 
referendum electorate, creating more of a 50-50 split between the two factions. In both 
situations, recent immigrants are marginalized and the indigenous population’s political power is 
promoted. Nationalists would say this is a fair solution to France’s historic push for immigration 
and intentionally creating a Kanak minority. A lack of electoral restriction is viewed as an 
underhanded attempt to avoid fulfilling the principles of UNDRIP and self-determination. 
Loyalists argue that the voting restrictions go against the very principles of the French Republic 
and the concept of liberty and equality. 
On March 15th 1999, the French Constitutional Court ruled that French citizens in New 
Caledonia, regardless of their date of arrival – but having lived there for at least ten years – could 
participate in provincial elections. Independence leaders believed that the special electoral roll 
would be frozen after 1998 (Maclellan 2006). Meaning that all future voters would have to be 
descendants of those present in 1998. However, some argued that the ten-year residency 
requirement applied to any election date, even after 1998: congruent with the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling. Therefore, individuals who could prove habitation in New Caledonia since 2004 
would be able to vote in the 2014 congressional and provincial elections.  
 French nationals in New Caledonia who were excluded from the 1998 Nouméa Accord 
referendum argued that these eligibility requirements were illegal under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They wanted to be reinstated on the special electoral roll. 
In January 2005 the European Court on Human Rights upheld the restrictive eligibility 
requirements. The debate was eventually resolved in 2007 by the French Congress. The 
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Congress stated that the special electoral roll should be restricted to individuals that were 1) 
registered voters prior to the 1998 referendum and 2) met the ten-year frozen residency 
requirement. The residency requirement is frozen, meaning that individuals had to have been 
residents for ten years since 1988. Individual who do not meet these requirements are part of the 
“Annex Table.” Each year however, magistrates from Paris rule on individuals hoping to move 
from the Annex Table to the Special Electoral List (Maclellan 2013). This includes young people 
who have turned 18 and others who have gathered evidence to prove their registration and ten-
year residency. The most recent debate regarded this process. 
First, pro-independence parties argue that approximately 1,800 young Kanaks, who 
obviously fall under the eligibility requirements, are only registered on the general roll and not 
on the special electoral role (Maclellan 2013). Second, pro-independence parties led by Roch 
Wamytan challenged approximately 6,720 voters who nationalists believe should be removed 
from the special electoral roll (Chappell 2014). In response, anti-independence parties have 
sought an end to voting restrictions and the creation of a sliding citizenship that would un-freeze 
the ten-year residency restriction (Maclellan 2013). Wamytan’s challenge was taken to the 
French court of appeals, the European Court of Human Rights, and the UN. The result was three 
provincial commissions (that included a judge, French state official, and local politicians) tasked 
with reviewing each case for exclusion and inclusion on the roll. The political divisions in each 
commission resulted in widely varying results in each province. Most exclusions were validated 
in the North and few in the South. In the end it was a moot issue because the four loyalists 
representing New Caledonia in the French Parliament merely dismissed the issue and the French 
court of appeals dismissed all pending cases. A commission led by the UN Decolonization 
Committee was called in by Wamytan in June 2014 reiterated that the Nouméa Accord is 
  
  
  
118 
 
interpreted differently (Chappell 2014).  
Some resolution finally came about during the 2014 Signatories Committee in Paris. 
Each provincial commission would be revised to include one or two judges and one loyalist and 
one nationalist elected official (Chappell 2014). The commission would also continue to include 
a local mayor and French official, but in a purely consultative role. In addition, the requirements 
for consideration on the restricted special electoral roll (for the referenda) was further clarified 
(See Table 3). If a person cannot claim twenty years residency or was eligible for the Nouméa 
Accord referendum in 1998, they must meet one of the following criteria: they must be born in 
New Caledonia and have at least one parent who was eligible for the 1998 Nouméa Accord 
Referendum, or; they must have their primary moral and material interests in New Caledonia and 
have at least one parent who was born in New Caledonia. Membership in the restricted special 
electoral role and the special electoral roles are heavily based on residency, economic connection 
to, and sense of belonging in New Caledonia.  
 Loyalists believe that the provincial electorate and the electoral body that can vote on the 
referendum should be sliding.  
Because for us French people, hail to the French revolution and the rights and it is 
a sacrifice to accept that some French citizens cannot vote for the provincial 
elections and the referendum which are very important because they provide the 
congress which decides taxes and for everyday politics, so it is hard to accept that 
(Blaise Interview 2014).  
 
In fact the electorate, it is very simple. It is a demand of the pro-independence 
leaders all the time. Because the problem was actually the separatists in the 1980s. 
They were afraid of mass immigration waves that threatened to overwhelm them, 
drown them. It is a reality. This was a danger. The result is that the Noumea 
Accord was signed on the basis of a sliding electoral body. That is to say 10 years 
in order to vote. Except that the organic law that was signed just after 1999 was 
drafted in such manner that it [the electorate] may not be slippery. And that led, in 
2007, to an amendment to the French Constitution. And then, after that were 
events that led to the recent applications for removal (Bernut Interview 2014). 
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A sliding electoral body would allow more Caledonians and their children the right to vote on the 
referendum. The primary electoral narrative presented by the loyalists is one of exclusion. Some 
even claim that electoral exclusion is a form of Kanak victimization. Loyalists argue that the 
2007 provincial electoral body excludes a number of Caledonians and other who should be 
allowed to vote on the referendum. The current definition of the electoral body is viewed as 
unjust and disrespectful, sparking a violent reaction among constituents and has created a 
‘festering wound.’ This festering wound is exacerbated by attempts by nationalist parties to 
remove approximately 7,000 Caledonians from the provincial register. Loyalists like Poadja 
consider this attempt undemocratic and dangerous. They claim it is based on a biased 
interpretation of the Nouméa Accord perpetuated by Kanak afraid of marginalization. 
[Poadja said, the] undemocratic nature of the electorate is a challenge to the 
fundamental values of New Caledonian society and is dangerous (Mainguet 
2012). 
 
Narratives of fear, exclusion, and democratic injustice are not limited to loyalist rhetoric. 
The sliding electorate is linked to fears of French government manipulation and nationalist 
concerns about France undermining democracy. France is portrayed as both a colonizer and a 
villain in this situation. A villain who intentionally disrupts and hinders the decolonization and 
independence process by siding with Caledonians on the electoral debate. Nationalists accuse 
France of intentionally withholding information about the 1998 electoral registers leading to a 
loss of trust and confidence between the two.  
[T]he May election results were made with questionable lists showing that this 
system [the sliding electorate] has become a weapon against the colonized people, 
a system that claims to be democratic, but which turns against independence and 
autonomy (Wamytan 2014). 
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Congruent with UC-FLNKS, DUS perceives France as a neo-colonial power that: perpetuates 
inequalities, victimized and minoritized the Kanak, and continues to hinder independence by 
failing to freeze the electorate based on the agreed terms of eligibility.  Linked to the electoral 
debate and the cause of much of it is the immigration of metropolitans and others to New 
Caledonia. Nationalists do not hesitate to accuse France of actively promoting immigration and 
thus the minoritization of Kanak. Immigration is considered a deliberate form of colonial 
settlement, a barrier to full sovereignty, and submerges Kanak independence. One form 
immigration takes is the importation of French public servants who contribute to wage 
inequalities and are accused of hindering local employment in the public sector.  
The history of decolonization has also shown the need for vigilance when we see 
what the colonial system has been capable of: excluding indigenous peoples from 
the right to vote, colonial settlement, real-fake colonial referenda, rigging of 
elections, etc. (Wamytan Special Committee on Decolonization 2013). 
 
Regarding the right to vote, including the right to vote for the self-determination 
referendum, they [the UN] apply the principle of the affected or concerned 
people. That is to say that the population is not the colonized people here. But it 
depends on the entity, the entity here is New Caledonia, New Caledonia decides if 
the notion of ‘population concernée’ is to be applied. If New Caledonia decides 
that no, it's only Kanak people who should be expressed because it is they who 
have been colonized, the UN says ok (Wamytan Interview 2014). 
 
According to nationalists, the sliding electorate threatens decolonization by undermining 
the spirit of the Nouméa Accord (as outlined by Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014), 
perpetuating inequality, and excluding Kanak who should be allowed to vote on the referenda. 
Goa and Wamytan even go so far as to compare the electorate to the Lemoine Statutes. France is 
accused of perpetuating a slippery electorate that promotes restricted suffrage, rigged elections, 
and real-fake referenda. They reference the actions of Machoro and protests against false 
systems. Eloi Machoro was a militant independence leader during the 1980s (Maclellan 2006). 
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The Statutes, named after the Overseas Secretary of State Georges Lemoine, further delayed 
independence and reiterated French control despite giving marginal concessions to the Kanak 
(Fisher 2013). In response to the Lemoine Statues Machoro used a traditional ceremonial axe to 
break a ballot box in Canala and raised support for boycotting the elections (Maclellan 2006). 
Machoro’s act marked the beginning of the Events.  
For the nationalists, France has been a key player and hindering force to the resolution of 
the electoral debates. The French government is repeatedly accused of manipulating the situation 
to perpetuate a colonial dependent relationship.  
The UC with other independence parties set in place this project to check the 
validity of the electorate, the people who can or cannot vote according to the 
Noumea Accord. There are 6,700 people were taken off the list. This was rejected 
by the courts and is now in appeal.  It is still the same spirit from Nainville les 
Roche that outside people shouldn't be able to vote in the future because there is 
not a Caledonian society or people. There are 3 parts, people for independence 
and those against and the state who is a moderator. But if they do not freeze the 
electorate then the state is not impartial (Goa Interview 2014). 
 
The continued refusal of France to turn over voting lists and registers from 1998 has spread fear 
among nationalists.  
There are three parts: people for independence, those against it, and the state who 
is a moderator. But if they do not freeze the electorate then the state [France] is 
not impartial. The loyalists have the right to speak and be part of the decision just 
like in Nainville-les-Roches. One of the key issues is the electorate and for the 
moment it is not respected by the state so they are not impartial. We wrote to the 
Overseas Minister to ask for an answer about the electorate and transfer of 
competencies and communes and we didn't get the answer we wanted so we are 
waiting. In November we hope to have an answer because the President of France 
is coming then and we will have a protest. The UC, if the state doesn't freeze the 
electoral body, we will vote once, but not the other two times. Normally there are 
three referenda, but we will only vote once. If the electorate doesn't respect the 
agreement, the result of the referendum will not be a fair vote. Machoro broke the 
ballot box because the vote shouldn't take place if it is not fair. If the first 
referendum is based on a false result/electorate the other two do not have to 
happen, we will go back to the state and be a colonized people again (Goa 
Interview 2014).   
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France will do everything possible to prevent our countries attaining full 
sovereignty: attempts to neutralize and to destabilize pro-Independence political 
parties and national liberation movements, killings of pro-Independence leaders, 
manipulation and destabilization practices tried and tested in former French 
colonies. ‘Françafrique’ is an example (Wamytan Special Committee 2013, 12). 
 
Without these lists it may be impossible for nationalists to succeed in gaining a 50/50 split in the 
referendum special electorate. Which would mean that it would be even more difficult for them 
to convince and even greater population of loyalists or people on the fence to vote in favor of an 
option that includes full sovereignty. It is clear to nationalists that France continues to act like a 
colonial overlord, promoting what Wamytan calls a red line policy against independence. The 
red line policy is “the policy of the French Government, which aims to make the Kanak a 
minority in order to maintain its sovereignty and interests in New Caledonia and Oceania” 
(Wamytan Special Committee 2013, 2). 
These [Matignon and Nouméa] agreements are important steps on the road to 
emancipation and decolonization. But there remains a long way to go against a 
State which pursues a principle with its overseas territories: the red line of 
prohibited independence […] This red line of forbidden independence also clouds 
the issue of the establishment of the lists of citizens eligible to take part in voting 
for the elections due in May 2014 (Wamytan UNGA 2013, 2). 
 
In particular, Wamytan and other nationalists are critical of the annual decisions on who is added 
or removed from the special electoral roles. In response to the 1,900 Kanak excluded from the 
special electoral list and addition of 3,000 foreign born during the April 2013 annual ruling on 
the lists, he said to the UNGA:  
It is therefore essential that France keep its word and that the lists be drawn up in 
a completely transparent and equitable way in order to avoid the risk of electoral 
malpractice. The State cannot remain restricted to a constant position of 
neutrality, always maintaining an equal distance between the parties; its role as a 
major player in decolonization must be played transparently and fairly in the 
process of preparing the electoral rolls (Wamytan UNGA 2013). 
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France’s actions are critically viewed by nationalists who claim the state continues to be 
unsupportive, ambiguous, anomalous, and fraudulent despite their claims to be an impartial 
arbiter of the transition to the conclusion of the Nouméa Accord. Nationalists’ preoccupation 
with the electoral lists is the result of increasing political marginalization due to an increase in 
internal and external immigration. As loyalists advocate for a sliding electorate, nationalists are 
actively trying to freeze and even reverse the expansion of the electoral body. They argue that 
the freezing of the electorate outlined in the Nouméa Accord was not respected. Instead 
nationalists and Kanak have been abused and wronged: they are once again victims.  
The question of the electorate, in principle, must finally define it, to prevent a 
French immigration can, whenever upset a balance that has already been arrested. 
It is this constantly French immigration, which makes it difficult to make at some 
point that this country can access the full sovereignty. It's hard at one point to tell 
who is a citizen, build citizenship and common destiny. This is difficult because 
every time if not stop this immigration, one can admit immigration but should not 
she have the right to vote because it upsets a delicate balance (Pabouty Interview 
2014). 
 
The first big argument was over the electorate in 1998. […] they won’t go to the 
referendum if the electorate is not frozen. If all the time people from outside come 
to the country and vote, they will mess up the vote, they want to freeze the 
electorate. So they received a call from France saying that it is ok, the electorate is 
frozen, we can go to the Noumea Accord and the referendum (Goa Interview 
2014). 
 
[A] lot of people were brought from outside and from France to work here and 
they are under a long term contract that cannot be broken (except in extreme 
cases) – so those people from France are here for the long term and New 
Caledonians have to wait for them to resign to get those jobs. They would like a 
revolution of their mentality. The people coming from other places are having a 
counter effect on the political favoritism of people here. Since 1995 around 
30,000 French from the metropole came here and 15,000 Polynesians and those 
people are coming here and having jobs in administration and they are 
entrepreneurs (Lalié Interview 2014). 
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Nationalists claim that immigration is a deliberate French strategy to marginalize indigenous 
populations. They point to previous examples in other French overseas territories. This is one of 
the reasons nationalists continue to call on the help and oversight of the UN: an international 
body that is their only recourse for counterbalancing French power.  
In addition, the Kanak People is being suffocated by a large-scale immigration 
policy from the French overseas territories and from France. The Kanak People is 
increasingly becoming a smaller minority in its own country. The migratory flow 
has increased significantly since the signing of the Matignon and Noumea 
Accords […] This immigration is mainly into the Southern Province where the 
specter of partition is taking shape through settlement mostly by Europeans. The 
scenario is well known, it failed in the New Hebrides (Vanuatu) in 1980 but 
worked for the island of Mayotte in the Comoros Islands in 1975. The UN has 
also been criticizing France since 1975 for the illegal occupation of Mayotte. 
Over 20 resolutions were passed for that purpose, so far with no tangible results. 
This mass immigration harms the decolonization process and the right to self-
determination and Independence of the colonized people, the Kanak people, and 
that of the New Caledonian citizens to whom the Kanak People has reached out to 
build a free and independent country. The goal is clear, it is to populate New 
Caledonia (in line with Prime Minister Mesmer’s circular in 1972) in order to 
submerge the Kanak demographically and thus deprive them of access to 
Independence (Wamytan Special Committee 2013). 
At present, we entertain doubts and are assuming, and this needs to be verified, 
that the colonial settlement, which is still ongoing from mainland France, is a 
‘deliberate’ form of colonial settlement. This would mean that some people, who 
arrive, especially for positions in the public service, are encouraged to come to 
New Caledonia because they meet the criteria to be able to vote in the poll on the 
accession of the territory to full sovereignty. However, according to the Plan of 
Action for the Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism, 
‘Administering Powers should ensure that any exercises of the right to self-
determination are not affected by changes in the demographic composition of the 
Territories under their administration as a result of immigration or the 
displacement of the peoples of the Territories’ (Wamytan Special Committee 
2013).  
 
In the past, political balance has been upset by rampant immigration. This immigration, which 
they argue was intentionally encouraged by France, has made the Kanak a political minority 
within their country. The freeze itself would promote voting rights for those living in New 
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Caledonia prior to 1998, born in the country, or those holding customary status. These 
requirements are part of the nationalists’ effort towards a political rebalancing.  
The pro-independence parties advocate for restricted voting rights, in part, because of 
French –orchestrated migration during the nickel boom in thee 1970s and subsequent intentional 
marginalization of Kanak voters (Chappell 2014). A frozen electorate is a method for reversing 
the imbalances that immigration has created, subsequently removing some Caledonian from the 
register that do not meet the requirements. While the nationalist’s electoral narrative might seem 
overwhelmingly exclusionary, Wamytan (2013) reminds us that the right to vote on the referenda 
is an aspect of self-determination and that self-determination that is the inherent right of the 
colonized indigenous people in New Caledonia. According to UC-FLNKS, DUS, and UNI-
PALIKA, this right is one that has been shared with other “victims of history” including the 
Communards and their descendants. Some nationalists like Louis Kotra Uregei from PT believe 
the referenda are the gateway to independence and the electorate should exclude the debated 
Caledonians. For many, however, the goal is not to exclude all non-Kanak, just those who do not 
meet the criteria set out in the Nouméa Accord. 
 
RESTRICTED, OPEN, OR DUAL CITIZENSHIP 
Citizenship was redefined with the transformation of liberation movements into 
movements for self-determination (Banting and Kymlicka 2004). International and local 
discourses on human rights and views of the ‘other’ inform governance and self-determination. 
Perceptions of citizenship reflect and sometimes mirror those boundaries. Imagined spaces are 
created by grouping communities under common labels like ‘indigenous’ or ‘citizen.’ Labeling 
these groups gives the organizer significant power over the rights these groups receive. For 
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example, the UN decided that only indigenous groups geographically distant from their former 
colonizers have the right to self-determination in the form of independence. The UN has created 
an imagined space occupied by indigenous groups that meet these criteria. The UN, as an 
international organization, also has the power to get involved in sovereign state issues by giving 
these indigenous groups the right to exercise self-determination. Citizenship will then change 
depending on how self-determination is exercised by the indigenous group. 
Indigenous movements in New Caledonia, Guyana, and French Polynesia emphasize the 
differences between indigenous people and French citizens. Unique minority rights have been 
granted to indigenous populations as a result (Trepied 2012). The indigenous label gives Kanak 
special rights to independence and reparations outlined by the UN. Moving forward, the citizen 
label will determine a person’s right to work, vote, and participate in the future of New 
Caledonia.  
“During this period, signs will be given of the gradual recognition of a citizenship 
of New Caledonia, which must express the chosen common destiny and be able, 
after the end of the period, to become a nationality, should it be so decided, The 
entitlement to vote in elections to new Caledonia’s own local assemblies will be 
restricted to persons with a certain period of prior residence in New Caledonia. In 
order to take into account the limited size of the employment market, provision 
will be made to give priority access to local employment to persons residing on a 
long-term basis in New Caledonia […] At the end of a period of twenty years, the 
transfer to New Caledonia of the reserved powers, its achievement of full 
international responsibility status and the conversion of citizenship into 
nationality, will be voted upon by the people concerned. […] One of the 
principles of the political agreement is the recognition of a citizenship of New 
Caledonia. This reflects the chosen common destiny and would be organized after 
the end of the term of the agreement, in nationality, if it is decided. For this 
period, the notion of citizenship is restricted to the electorate, for elections to the 
institutions of the country, and for final consultation. It will also be a reference for 
the development of the provisions to be defined to maintain local employment 
[…] A reference to the name of the country will be placed on identity documents, 
as a sign of citizenship” (Nouméa Accord 1998). 
 
The Accords first introduced the concept of a New Caledonian citizenship (Marrani 
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2006). New Caledonian citizenship is localized and held concurrently with a French nationality 
(Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). Citizenship was organized “as a transitory solution between 
the one of ‘French citizenship-French nationality’ and that of ‘full citizenship-New Caledonia 
nationality’” (Marrani 2006, 25). Although “New Caledonian citizenship-French nationality” 
recognizes the particular rights of the indigenous population, they are still considered part of the 
French nation (Marrani 2006, 25). Kanak are viewed as an overseas French community within 
the greater French nation, despite significant recognition of their own cultural identity. French 
views of a collective overseas and metropolitan population have long been used to justify and 
reinforce continued territorial inclusion in the French state. French leaders have deployed the 
concept to refuse calls for greater autonomy and independence in New Caledonia. “In the case of 
New Caledonia, the conservative French view seems to be that ‘relinquishment’ by France of 
New Caledonia to full self-determination will imply a setback to French nationalism, a blow to 
national revival or have some kind of negative impact on French regional and global interests” 
(Rumley 2006, 241). This ideology rings hollow as a number of the loyalist leaders I interviewed 
view their Franco-New Caledonian identity as distinct from the French metropolitan identity.  
We people here in NC are different from the people in France. We have different 
values. It is quite funny when young people from NC go to France they feel like 
they are in a foreign country, almost like if you were in Canada. We speak the 
same language, we see the same movies, but we are not the same people because 
we don't live in the same society (Blaise Interview 2014). 
 
The Nouméa Accord has been criticized for giving second-class citizenship to French nationals, 
but not citizens, living in New Caledonia. Defining New Caledonian citizenship and membership 
is a critical part of the eligibility requirements for the provincial and restricted special 
electorates. The electorates are divided into those who have the right to express their opinion in 
the final referendum on independence, those who are New Caledonian citizens, and those French 
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nationals who live in New Caledonia and are or are not citizens (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz, 
2008).  
The right to citizenship and eligibility to become a citizen is complicated by recent 
immigrants, national identities, and electoral law. Table 3 shows that all members of the special 
electorate that has the right to vote on provincial and territorial elections are citizens. Citizenship 
is primarily based on how long an individual has resided in New Caledonia. In this case, ten 
years of residency were required by 1998. However not all citizens are part of the restricted 
special electorate that are able to vote on the referenda. The problem is that most recent migrants 
are not considered citizens and have no well-defined means of applying to become a citizen until 
the referenda are concluded. Debate among politicians over the fate of these recent immigrants is 
a source of contention. There is broad agreement among nationalists and loyalists that citizenship 
implies the right to vote in provincial elections and to hold local employment (see Figure 3). If 
citizenship is awarded to more recent immigrants they will flood the voting population and most 
likely further marginalize Kanak in the electorate. Tensions about citizenship are thus based on 
nationality (Kanak, Caledonian, or something else) and the immigrants living in New Caledonia 
who do not currently have the right to vote in provincial elections. Most nationalists favor a more 
restricted singular or dual citizenship. Congruent with their other policies, loyalists advocate for 
an inclusive citizenship.  
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Figure 3. Correlations between identity, citizenship, and electorates. 
According to Lafleur (Interview 2014), inclusive citizenship is based on the idea that 
independence and restricted citizenship will lead to isolation and without immigration there can 
be no development.  
So when the French come here, metropolitan, they no longer have the right to 
work is local employment. We closed in on ourselves. And to be successful, a 
country needs people, and for a cheaper life, because that is the big issue here, it 
must be numerous. If you have a market that is too small and cannot afford to 
support people, life will become more expensive. And that is very difficult to 
explain to Caledonians. To live on an island 20,000 km away from the metropolis, 
in a little world, you cannot negotiate prices on the outside. You are dependent on 
whatever happens. And the cost of living is increasing and people do not 
understand why. So I am afraid that this [restricted] citizenship closes the country 
even more and will not allow its development (Lafleur Interview 2014).  
 
The UCF and FPU promote a Caledonian citizenship that meets the goals of common destiny 
and self-determination as a right for all. Since common destiny is about all of the inhabitants 
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living together and they consider self-determination to be something that everyone should have a 
right to, they believe citizenship should be inclusive, not exclusive.  
So the idea of a common destiny, actually is related to the notion of citizenship. 
For us, the party from which I come, eventually citizenship it must be the 
common point between the gathering Pacific values, values Kanak and French 
values. These are also fully compatible, since freedom, equality, brotherhood with 
respect for elders, customs etc. are quite reconcilable (Bernut Interview 2014). 
 
You cannot be a respectable citizen without sacrificing your personal history. 
That is why I believe in New Caledonia sometimes we need to forget we a French 
and take the example of the English speaking countries because your vision is 
more universal because … France has lived too long as a mono-ethnic country so 
it does not have the software to adapt to this new reality in the world. But what 
happens in New Caledonia happens in a lot of places. It is more acute because 
there is a contrast between white or Asian people and the Kanaks, because they 
are living in a Neolithic civilization two centuries ago, but the problem is the 
same people will experience in a lot of countries (Blaise Interview 2014). 
 
Loyalists argue that citizenship should be based on unifying factors like a common memory, 
shared history, equal rights, and the will to live together rather than ethnicity or colonial impact. 
This type of citizenship, they argue, would be a better draw for much needed immigrants with 
technical and specialized skills. In response to Kanak criticisms of open citizenship, loyalists 
claim that “respectable citizens” sacrifice their personal histories for the greater good.  
All nationalists support a restricted citizenship – at least initially. They recognize that at 
some point a decision will have to be made on the percentage of the population that cannot vote 
on the referenda. But for now, there is widespread agreement that citizenship should be restricted 
to those allowed to vote in provincial elections, including other “victims of history.” On this 
topic, the UC-FLNKS and DUS are both inclusive and exclusive. They agree with others that the 
right to vote and to hold local employment should be among the defining factors determining 
citizenship.  
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In order to support or promote local employment, New Caledonia provides a 
measure of benefits for the citizens of New Caledonia, and people who can 
demonstrate a sufficient period of residence, aimed at promoting the exercise of 
employment, provided they do not infringe the individual and collective benefits 
enjoyed at the date of their publication of the other employees. Such measures are 
applied in the same way for the public services of New Caledonia and the 
municipal public service. New Caledonia can also take action to restrict the 
attainment or the exercise of a profession for people who cannot justify a 
sufficient length of residence (Organic Law Article 24 1999, 13). 
 
However they also believe that citizens should have or have cultivated a sense of belonging to 
the island territory. According to UNI-PALIKA, citizenship might be restricted to the victims of 
history, but it is also viewed as inclusive: sharing resources without aggregating communities, 
leading to a sense of belonging and patriotism. The biggest issue regarding citizenship is the 
inhabitants that are not eligible to vote in Provincial elections because they currently do not have 
any official status in the country.  
[I]f we stay within the framework of the Nouméa Accord it is planned like this: 
Caledonian citizens who can vote on the referendum and other citizens become 
nationals. For others it's part of the negotiations, the discussions for the final 
transfer [of powers] with the State and some communities will wish to remain 
French […] In fact, to simplify things, the subject of the discussion will be about 
the 25,000 [who are not already citizens]. If the referendum is held next year, and 
the result is positive, what will we do with the 25,000 people? And what do they 
want to do? Do they want access to the nationality of the country or keep French 
nationality and still live here? So you have to draft a statute for them. Because 
they are currently Caledonians here who have dual nationality, Australian, 
Algeria. Algeria has given [citizenship] to descendants of Algerian nationality, 
because Algeria recognized that there is a piece of their people in the Pacific 
(Wamytan Interview 2014). 
 
Some loyalists and nationalists are promoting the formation of a double or dual citizenship. 
Where, if independence occurs, citizens can choose whether they want to have Caledonian or 
French and Caledonian citizenship. In a few cases, nationalists instead promote a dual ethnic 
nationality rather than dual citizenship. Dual nationality could take the form of a Kanak 
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citizenship that acknowledges New Caledonian nationalist or tribal and clan affiliations. With the 
rampant increase in immigration from Europe and the Pacific it will be important to determine 
what status the 25,000 will have after a decision on the referenda is made. The inclusion of these 
non-Kanak populations in the provincial electorate will significantly change the political 
landscape. Most of these populations typically align with loyalists, further marginalizing the 
Kanak. But it is their fear of Kanak control and the possibility that Kanak nationalists in an 
independent New Caledonia would force them to assimilate to Kanak culture that drive them to 
align with anti-independence loyalists. If an agreement could be reached about the possible 
options for these inhabitants after the referenda, it might go a long way to allaying their fears and 
result in greater cooperation in the negotiations preceding the referenda.  
 
CONCLUSION: POLITICAL REBALANCING 
 Political rebalancing is one of the three overarching themes that represent the rebalancing 
discourse in political rhetoric. Together with economic and social rebalancing, political 
rebalancing epitomizes the sense of competition between ethnic and cultural communities in 
New Caledonia. The scars left by French colonialism and modern immigration have exacerbated 
tensions between Kanak and Caledonians, between Kanak and French, and among the other 
populations inhabiting these islands. Political rebalancing, like the other forms of rebalancing, is 
driven by perceived and real inequalities that exist between these communities. The political 
rebalancing theme can be divided into four narratives: self-determination as a right; 
decolonization, the Nouméa Accord, and the transfer of powers; frozen or sliding electorate; and 
citizenship.   
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Figure 4. Connections and co-definitions among select objectives. 
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While Figure 2 showed the connections between all narratives, Figure 4 shows 
connections between a selection of frames that define those narratives. The frames and narratives 
included here represent all of the instances where two frames, narratives, or a frame and 
narrative are linked in the text. The three types of rebalancing are separated so that the frames 
and narratives that define or are defined by them are more visible. Each narrative is defined by a 
series of frames that represent politicians’ interpretations of that narrative. A number of these 
frames are co-constructed, they are used to legitimize and validate a number of narratives or 
political stances. As with the previous Diagram, the solid colored bars represent the color 
assigned to a specific frame or narrative. For example, political rebalancing is represented by a 
light rose color. Since none of the chords are attached to the rose colored bar, the diagram is 
showing that political rebalancing itself does not define any of the other frames listed.  
Political rebalancing is defined by five other frames and narratives: views of the 
electorate, the victimization narrative, the Nouméa Accord, inequality, and national identity. The 
mustard, aqua, blue-gray, grey, and yellow chords linked to self-determination show that it is 
defined by the view of France as a colonizer, the goal of a Kanak identity, the victims of history 
frame, the Kanak victim frame, and the inclusion in the electorate. In turn, the hot pink self-
determination chords show that self-determination solidifies the Kanak victim narrative by 
supporting the right of an indigenous group to determine its future, contributes to the 
marginalization of French immigrants (victims) excluded from the referendum, determines who 
is a member of the electorate un international law, and is a right held by the victims of history 
(see Figure 4). The Nouméa Accord (black chords) plays role in defining the electorate, common 
destiny, economic, social, and political rebalancing, defining citizenship, and placing France in a 
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protector role to ensure the referenda are carried out. The electorate is also defined by nearly all 
of the other narratives because they all contribute to arguments for or against restricting the 
electoral bodies. The electorate (yellow chords) contributes to the French victim narrative by 
excluding recent immigrants, the perception of France as a colonizer because of their reluctance 
to turn over the voting registers for the referendum on the Nouméa Accord, the definition of 
citizenship after the referenda, political rebalancing, common destiny, self-determination, and 
victimization. The electorate, victimization, common destiny, and the Nouméa Accord contribute 
to definitions of citizenship. Regardless of the outcome of the referenda, the issues identified 
here will have to be addressed. Identifying the discursive networks and issues that contribute to 
the drive for political rebalancing is the first step towards understanding the contexts of these 
issues and ultimately negotiating the goals of both nationalist and loyalist factions.  
Limiting or expanding who has the right to self-determination is at the core of political 
rebalancing. The Nouméa Accord and views on the goal of decolonization both reflect and shape 
these definitions - which in turn, shape membership in the electoral bodies and citizenship. The 
Accord defines the transfer of powers and is a symbol of decolonization. Restricted or open 
visions of self-determination translate into restricted or open policies on citizenship and the 
electoral bodies allowed to vote on the Provincial assemblies and the referendum. Colonial 
legacies and ongoing inequalities have led nationalists to promote a more limited Kanak or 
shared right to self-determination. This narrow framing of self-determination is supported by a 
restricted definition of citizenship and special electorate that may lead to a referendum in favor 
of independence. Loyalists argue in favor of a multi society consensus where self-determination 
is a right for all that would result in a more open citizenship and expanded electorate. These 
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frames would be more likely to lead to a referendum that results in continued association with 
France. Parties’ stance on the transfer of powers is directly related to whether they want to move 
ahead with or stall independence. Divisions between factions and the framing of political 
rebalancing narratives are the result of colonial legacies. For loyalists, colonial legacies of 
inequality have emphasized the need to promote inclusion in all facets of the political sphere. 
This includes the electoral bodies and methods of inclusion represented by political, economic, 
and social rebalancing (see grey-brown chords in Figure 4). Nationalists believe restricted 
electorates, citizenship, and self-determination will right the structural and social violence 
committed during colonization by balancing the power between the original inhabitants and 
Caledonians. These frames must be taken into account in any negotiations for post-referendum 
divisions of power.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SOCIAL REBALANCING 
 
The goal of social rebalancing, according to political leaders, is mitigating inequality 
among New Caledonians. The nationalists broadly cite colonization and victimization as reasons 
for social rebalancing. They focus specifically on Kanak marginalization and victimization under 
colonialism and the resulting shared inequality. Loyalists talk about social rebalancing in terms 
of economic causes of income inequality and the high cost of living. In both cases, the concept of 
‘common destiny’ is used as a broad catchall method for social rebalancing. Based on the 
information I gathered, the primary split in definitions of common destiny can be summarized 
into the difference between the act of ‘living’ in a country together and the act of ‘building’ a 
country together. Nationalist bloc UC-FLNKS frames social balance in terms of social justice 
and legal pluralism. The processes of attaining social justice and enacting legal pluralism are 
critical components of building an effective multicultural state. Broadly, nationalists seek social 
rebalancing by building strong communities that are tied together by multicultural institutions.  
Loyalist leaders are more likely to point to the fact that the different communities are 
already living together and common destiny has been realized. Therefore, social rebalancing via 
common destiny can be expressed in terms of national identity. National identity has the 
potential to help create social balance by framing the different ethnic populations in terms of one 
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cohesive body united through civic nationalism that puts each community on equal footing. 
Towards this end, loyalist blocs UCF, FPU, and CE call for an end to minority preference and 
segregation.  They argue against what they view is the current system of race-based recognition 
that favors Kanak. Instead loyalists promote trust and solidarity between New Caledonian 
communities to combat social inequalities.   
 
CONFLICTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES  
Within the network that supports the social rebalancing theme is the national identity 
narrative. An essential part of nation building is the formation of a selective collective memory 
that promotes a shared “cultural-historical distinctiveness and right to political autonomy” that 
leads to an us versus them mentality (Murphy 2002, 193). This selective collective memory 
becomes the foundation of a distinct national identity and sense of nationalism. Citizenship and 
nationalism, in turn, influence groups’ objectives for self-determination (Brown 2008; Kedouri 
1960; Smith 1989; Breton 1988; Nairn 1977; Billig 1995). The type of nationalism expressed 
directly correlates to a group’s desire for full sovereignty, autonomy, and recognition. In New 
Caledonia, both loyalists and nationalists acknowledge the legitimacy of a Caledonian or plural 
national identity. For loyalists this means integrating Kanak, Pacific, and French values. But for 
nationalists this means integration, but with a Pacific/Kanak core. Smaller factions within the 
nationalist bloc promote a French-Caledonian national identity or a completely Kanak identity. 
Framing national identities is strongly linked to French colonialism and shared suffering. 
Different perceptions of who has suffered, how to go about healing those wounds, and how to 
peacefully integrate the population inform the framing and definitions of national identity. 
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A Common French-Caledonian Identity and Caldochitude 
French social cleansing between 1864 and 1897 resulted in the deportation of about thirty 
thousand political prisoners and convicts to New Caledonia. This included Parisian Communards 
and Algerian rebels (Chappell 2014). Geographically and emotionally disconnected from their 
homeland and not welcomed in New Caledonia, the Communards chose to focus their identity on 
the future, an identity “to be” (Bullard 2000, 209). By claiming to symbolically die of nostalgia, 
the Communards were able to continue to claim loyalty to France in the context of exile. This set 
them apart from the indigenous population. Eventually overcoming the fatal threat of nostalgia 
they created a modern French psyche with a profound sense of absence at its center that was to 
be filled with politics, productivity, or warfare (Bullard 2000). Amidst competition between 
farmers, ranchers, and the penal colonies, two-dozen white settler families created a business 
oligarchy. The second generation of French free settlers and Communards (the first generation of 
local born French) became known as the Caldoche (Chappell 2014). The Caldoche were the first 
to promote autonomy in New Caledonia in the late 1800s (Aldrich and Connell 1992). By the 
1950s, they had formed a progressive party, UC, to promote greater self-government, but not 
independence. The Caldoche identity has become more of a counter-identity, a political tool, 
used to counter the power of the Kanak identity and to rally Caledonians. Recently, the Caldoche 
identity has been superseded by an integrative and mixed Caledonian identity that better 
accounts for the contemporary ethnic landscape of New Caledonia.  
The Communards exiled to New Caledonia were joined by free settlers and, later, Asians 
and other Pacific Islanders. There were two very diverse perceptions of this mixed ethnic 
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environment. Conservatives argued for an ethnic melting pot where different communities would 
live together peacefully (Aldrich and Connell 1992). But, this idealistic view crumbled in the 
face of Caldoche settler violence and rampant racism. At the same time the Caldoche used 
arguments about the prevalence of métissage or mixed-race to undermine the concept of an 
original people. Defining a majority of the indigenous population as mixed called original land 
claims or first-people land claims into question. This allowed white settlers to argue they were 
the original owners of their lands and claim them without having to give reparations to 
Melanesians. Melanesians reacted to the mixed-race argument by refuting the touted success of 
assimilation. Instead they argued that ethnicity and culture are economically and politically 
defined rather than based on race or physical characteristics – thus retaining their cultural 
distinction.  
Countering the strong reemergence of a Kanak culture and in response to power 
limitations imposed by the Noumea Accords is the resurgence of a Caldoche identity. Despite 
varied attempts to form a cohesive identity, many Caldoche view it as a forced identity, with 
little depth and a lack of commonalities or consistency (Carteron 2009). They view themselves at 
not equal to the Pacific Community, but as representatives of a sub-French and European culture. 
The Caldoche identity was constructed, in part, on other traditions of French colonial resistance 
like la Negritude. La Negritude is actually the basis for the term la Caldochitude (Brown 2013). 
Angleviel (1999) suggests that New Caledonia’s ethnic landscape is dominated by creolization. 
The creole Caledonian identity comprises an ethnic mélange of European, Javanese, Vietnamese, 
and Wallisian-Futunan groups next to a strong Kanak identity. Caldoche view themselves as 
different from metropolitan French, but rely on métropole power against the Kanak and the 
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independence movement. Eric Douyère (1997) suggests this might stem from a fear of being the 
lone faction against rising Kanak political power. 
The ramifications of the assimilation or Caledonization argument are evident in the 
victimization narrative used by Kanak to support independence. Caldoche, recent European 
immigrants, Asians, and Polynesians argue that the current population should inform decision-
making in New Caledonia and that historical events are irrelevant (Aldrich and Connell 1992). 
Melanesians argue that colonization created inequalities in New Caledonia that can only be 
mitigated through the unequal distribution of power and special rights given to the “victims of 
history.” Interestingly, many Melanesians include the Caldoche population in the membership of 
victims of history because France exiled them to penal colonies in New Caledonia. The tension 
between the conservative Caldoche vision of a harmonious society and Melanesians’ fight 
against assimilation has led to increasing ethnic polarization and bled into the independence 
debate.   
The beginnings of a Caledonian identity are derived from the recognition of double 
legitimacy in the Matignon Accord. Double legitimacy is the belief that both the Kanak and the 
French convicts and political prisoners (and other forcibly moved to New Caledonia) have the 
right to self-determination and were victimized under French colonialism. A bridge was made 
between the Caldoche and the “New Caledonians whose ancestors and fathers are buried in this 
land” (Jouve 1997, 88). For the first time, convict ancestry was beginning to lose its stigma and 
the Caldoche population celebrated its culture through festivals, literature, museums, and other 
events (Chappell 2014). While members of Caldoche society redefined their identity in a more 
positive way, they continued to distance themselves from Kanak: promoting assimilation and 
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perpetuating racism. The hope today is that an emphasis on a Caledonian identity rather than a 
distinct Caldoche identity will encourage cooperation between the white population and other 
non-Kanak communities.  Members of the Caledonian identity are tied together loosely by their 
long history of settlement in New Caledonia. Today mixing is a part of the Caldoche identity and 
exemplifies a shift in ideology from racist to promoting mutual accommodation (Chanter 2006).  
 This alternative identity is in response to and in my opinion serves as a significant other 
in relation to the growing Kanak identity and threats to European-Caledonian political 
representation. According to Triandafyllidou (1998, 594), the identity of a nation is defined and 
redefined by the influence of “significant others.” These others can be “other nations or ethnic 
groups that are perceived to threaten the nation, its distinctiveness, authenticity and/or 
independence” (Triandafyllidou 1998, 594). As the process of independence progresses and 
Kanaks are given greater autonomy and are forming their own identity and nationalism, the 
Caldoche population and other minorities are fearful of their future in New Caledonia. By 
forming their own identity, even if it is somewhat forced and artificial, they are forming a unit 
that can collectively bargain for rights, and their own space in the New Caledonian landscape 
just as the Kanak have done and continue to do. While many Kanak nationalist leaders refer to a 
Caldoche population, loyalist leaders tend to talk in terms of a Caledonian population. This slight 
difference may be another symptom of the Caldoche fear of marginalization. Loyalists are quick 
to align the smaller Caldoche population (whom the Kanak have acknowledged have a legitimate 
right to vote on the referenda) with the broader and less distinct Caledonian population 
composed of more recent immigrants. The difference in categorizing these populations is slight, 
but significant in terms of collective bargaining and negotiation. Aligning the Caldoche and 
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Caledonian populations create a much larger bloc to balance Kanak influence. The divisions 
between the indigenous and Caldoche populations are a significant issue that will need to be 
addressed in the coming years.  
A small minority of loyalists argue that the Kanak, New Caledonians, and other minority 
populations are part of French identity. This approach exemplifies the national consciousness 
through shared language approach to national identity (Gellner 1964; Breuilly 1982). Bernut 
(Interview 2014) claims that the French language is the ultimate unifying variable and indicator 
of an overarching French identity. That is not to say that there are not differences between the 
metropolitan and Pacific French, as Bernut (Interview 2014) acknowledges:  
For me, the Kanak are French. It is clear to me. Plus they have a common point 
among all the Kanak languages spoken in the Territory, they have a common 
language is French. 
 
While the national identity is tied to France, Bernut (Interview 2014) claims that a Caledonian 
identity should integrate French and Pacific values and is more egalitarian and open to the world. 
The country may be politically French, but it employs a more multicultural model of society. 
Others, like Lafleur (Interview 2014) situate this integrated identity in terms of regionalism or a 
regional nationality. In this case, the Caledonian identity is similar to a regional French identity 
like the Corse of Corsica or the Bretons in Brittany. Taking this argument a step further, Blaise 
(Interview 2014) views French as the public identity and Kanak or something else as a private 
identity:  
[T]here is a time to be a Kanak and a time be French and live in the common 
space. I think that is the vision we have. You can live according to your traditions 
when you are at ethnic gatherings for weddings or anything, which is related to 
the life of your community. And there is a common space where the rule must be 
the same for everyone […] But I don't think cultural diversity is a problem, it is a 
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good thing if you see clearly what is your space. See in France, F France has a 
tradition of integration. I think it is a lie. You cannot ask people to forget who 
they are, but you can ask them to live according to the common rule in the 
common society. You cannot turn Arab or Asian people into Europeans, that's 
nonsense. We can respect them as citizens of a modern country, enjoy the same 
rights, the same prospects of success in society, provided they make the 
distinctions between what is private and what is public. 
 
I am deeply French. My culture is French. And I live in a part of France, so in 
Caledonia, Caledonia like Britons are in Brittany and Corse in Corsica. They are 
in a part of France. And I am in a part of France […] Well that's what being 
Caledonian is. It is living in a province of France. The people of Hawaii, for 
example, they live on an island, but they are American (Lafleur Interview 2014). 
 
Both Lafleur and Blaise’s perspectives on identity, while tied to France, allow for a level of 
pluralism not found in Bernut’s rhetoric. 
Nationalists do not argue that there is a strong French national identity in New Caledonia. 
They do not agree with Bernut that it applies to the entirety of the country. Instead, most 
nationalists use the term Caldoche to refer to a specific sub-group of French-Caledonians. The 
term Caledonian itself is complex and multifaceted in the New Caledonian lexicon. For some it 
represents an expression of nationalism or common citizenship based on the name of the country. 
For others it describes a united culture among all of the people living in the country. And yet, it 
can also be used to refer to the non-Melanesian, primarily white, ‘other’ population. Beginning 
in 1972 the term Caldoche was a primarily pejorative term referring to local born Europeans 
(Chappell 2013). Caldochitude arose as a constructivist national identity in response to the 
‘other’ – the Kanak independence movement and cultural resurgence. Intimidated by the 
possibility of increasing Kanak power under the Matignon and Nouméa Accords and the 
eventual referenda there were and are real fears of a Kanak dominated government. Some of 
these fears are based on a reverse political minority making, or the perceived desire for Kanak 
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assimilation of non-Kanak, or racism. Later, the use of Caldoche was expanded to specifically 
refer to French-Caledonians, French with distinct values and practices, or those with no 
connection to the territorial homeland. To some extent the Caldoche label has been expropriated 
in much the same way that the pejorative French term Canaque became Kanak: a counter-
identity that (re)balances the divisions created by a perception of minority privilege. 
 
Kanak Identity and Culture 
Indigenous groups may be alternately defined according to their presence prior to 
settlement by currently dominant populations, cultural difference, distinction from the dominant 
population, and political marginalization resulting in poverty, limited access, and a lack of 
protection against unwanted development (Niezen 2003). Indigenous groups tread a fine line 
between being distinct enough to justify development attention, but not develop to the extent that 
they lose that distinction and development assistance (Kowal 2008). Maintaining difference is a 
key strategy for gaining autonomy or independence. However, it can also prevent constructive 
relationships and cooperation within multinational states. For Kanak nationalists, social 
rebalancing requires the resurgence of a Kanak national identity that can act as a unifying force.   
Kanak culture began with the migration of the ancestral Melanesian people to parts of 
New Caledonia. All land in New Caledonia is considered Kanak land because they were the first 
settlers or original people (Leblic 1991). Space is an interconnected network between man, land, 
and the god-myth; it comprises important places of lived experience, and sacred encounters. The 
land is a living history of a community. Groups and individuals maintain that historic and 
personal connection with their homeland despite migration, segregation, colonization, or 
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displacement. “The composition and identity of groups is therefore inseparable from the history 
of the appearance of men in the region, expressed by the myth of origin – which refers to a much 
more encompassing social history - and their special way to occupy the space and 
understanding” (Leblic 1991, 2). Place names represent a particular family group or clan that 
belongs to that locale. Surnames signify a particular place. Each group records the memory of 
movement from their homeland in oral traditions. These historical and mythological oral 
traditions structure and frame relationships between groups at all social levels (Leblic 1991).  
Social organization in Kanak culture is expressed in a system of hierarchies. Elders are 
organized according to seniority and surround a primary chief who acts as the ruler. 
Supplementary roles are assigned to individuals and groups within each clan or village. 
Collectively, the group functions as a unit rather than as part of a definitive hierarchy 
characterized by members of higher or lower rank. These units are spatially distributed, and 
structured within vast networks of familial and alliance-based relationships. The integration of 
individuals and groups at a local and national level results in the balanced division of tasks, 
responsibility, and authority and, historically, ensured a coherent sociopolitical system. 
Foreigners or groups who migrated to a different area were assimilated into the existing local 
system (Leblic 1991). In this way, spatial identities are maintained and shared through oral 
tradition even when migration occurs or new members are added to the existing community 
(Horowitz 2001). The perpetuation of this memory allows families and groups to retain both land 
rights and maintain alliances with others from that place of origin. “All along this trajectory 
between the old place and the new, a clan’s history is inscribed in the landscape in the form of 
particular features that recall historical events and ancestral actions” (Horowitz 2001, 40). These 
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oral memories serve as claims for hierarchical status, outline networks and relationships between 
clans, define their origins, sources of support, and the networks of relationships that form 
identity (Horowitz 2001).  
Since territory is a social construct embedded in economic and political contexts (Soja 
1989; Sack 1986) and is assigned meaning through human belief and action (Knight 1982) it is 
important to frame territory in terms of the dynamic relationship between the physical landscape 
and the social contexts and ideologies that give it meaning (Murphy 1990). The indigenous 
inhabitants of New Caledonia, the Kanak, are intimately tied to the physical landscape. “Place 
serves as a constantly re-energized repository of socially and politically relevant traditions and 
identity which serves to mediate between the everyday lives of individuals […] and the national 
and supra-national institutions which constrain and enable those lives” (Agnew and Duncan 
1989, 7). Although French colonial practices transformed traditional land management, thus 
transforming Kanak identity, the critical relationship between individual, land, and identity 
remained. Traditions, family names and histories, and the Kanak culture are represented through 
place and expressed in terms of the physical landscape (Leblic 1991). Since the territorialization 
of identity can occur through small-scale homeland construction (Diener 2007) the application of 
self-determination, minority rights, and multicultural governance cannot be separated from the 
discussion of land and geopolitics.  
 Disconnected from traditional lands and forms of identity, the resurgence of the Kanak 
culture in the 1960s was the result of a conscious effort to reformulate the Kanak identity. Bensa 
and Wittersheim (1998) argue that contemporary Kanak nationalists have drawn inspiration from 
a variety of anticolonial influences and melded them with indigenous cultural perspectives. The 
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reconstructions of identity, in some instances informed by European ethnographic literature, 
stress the importance of Kanak ties to the homeland and nature (Horowitz 2001). One particular 
inspiration has come from a European educated Kanak national, Nidoshe Naisseline. In 1969 
Naisseline returned to New Caledonia and founded a protest group, the “Foulards Rouges” (Red 
Scarves), that later became a pro-independence political party (Chappell 2010, 38). In what 
would become the primary movement for independence and ultimately lead to the signing of the 
Matignon and Noumea Accords, Naisseline’s syncretism of Third World and Oceanian 
discourses sparked the “Kanak Awakening” (Chappell 2010, 38). This concept of combining 
elements from traditional and non-traditional Kanak heritage and identity has been a source of 
national mobilization, but also regional division. Leblic (1991) argues that Kanak identity and 
tradition has been transformed by their colonial and post-colonial history: some elements 
surviving and some changing. Land and social hierarchies, the influence of the Christian church, 
and political experience from the colonial system has resulted in an amalgamated or syncretic 
Kanak identity. These altered traditions form the basis of the Kanak identity and land claims 
which combine traditional notions of clan as the holder of land with the creation of a democratic, 
secular, socialist state.   
 Central to the affirmation of Kanak culture and identity is the recognition of a painful 
historical past and preservation of indigenous culture and their relationship to ancestors and the 
homeland (Carteron 2009). As Kanak culture and identity changes and a new sense of 
nationalism forms, the role of memory is increasingly important. Memory includes the mythical 
elements of traditional culture and the actual history and historical knowledges of Kanak and 
their colonizers. As some Kanak research and reify their identity, they are forced to use accounts 
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of European ethnologists and others to inform themselves of cultural practices and history. Thus 
the forming of individual and collective identity and nationalism is a process that addresses the 
pains of the colonial era, but also combines colonial and indigenous knowledge to form 
something new and unique that has the power to unite.  
 The continuing loss of cultural identity among Kanaks is a critical force in the push for 
independence. Smith (1989) argued, in more deterministic language, that national loyalties and 
ethnic fusion are only possible if a homogenous ethnic core and a shared sense of ancestry and 
identity exist. Therefore, myth, memory, symbols, and values, are essential for the development 
of a struggling or growing identity, because they are the tools that facilitate strong national and 
ethnic bonds (Smith 1989). The "living together" and "common destiny" discourses mobilized by 
different factions, act as federative values, but they have not acquired an ideological status able 
to transcend divisions between ethnic communities (Carteron 2009, 10). France broke the 
indigenous culture without fully replacing it – full assimilation did not succeed – leaving 
Melanesians marginalized in the Western New Caledonian culture (Chappell 2013). Therefore 
the imagined political community is characteristic of a sovereign nation rather than a cohesive 
nation state or multinational state.  
 Chappell (2010, 57) argues that there is a resurgence in traditional Kanak nationality that 
supports a federative ideology, “the indigenous notion that identity is defined by a web of social 
exchange relations.” These webs or networks that were so prevalent among historical clans and 
groups may help transcend diverse ethnic communities and divisions among indigenous 
populations today. Political ethnicity “is the deliberate politicisation and mobilisation of these 
‘consciousnesses’ in order to achieve certain political and economic objectives” and political 
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conflicts use ethnicity as organizing principle (Ajulu 2002, 252). Certain pro-independence 
movements in New Caledonia are using political ethnicity to mobilize anti-colonial, pro-
independence sentiment among Kanak.  
Kanak nationalism varies from a belief in primacy, to a mobilizing ideology or an anti-
colonial struggle, to a feeling of belonging, or a classifying discourse (Hall 1993; Kedouri 1960; 
Nairn 1977; Young 1976; Chai 2008; Triandafyllidou 1998; Verdery 1993). Colonial 
assimilation was designed to forcefully unify communities, and therefore resulted in well-defined 
reactionary ethnic-based political movements (Banting and Kymlicka 2004). During 
decolonization, liberation movements developed into self-determination movements whose goals 
included redefining citizenship. Groups that historically lacked rights aligned to ensure that these 
rights are granted in post-decolonization governance. National identity and in-group creation 
form the foundation for defining citizenship and the right to self-determination. Since politics 
and rights are indivisible from the social and ethnic divisions in New Caledonia, it makes sense 
that ethnic divisions will be a part of the fight for autonomy or as a reaction to minority rights. 
Inequalities were created by the French indigénat and civilizing mission policies and continual 
subjugation of the indigenous people. But the legacies of these policies also formed the basis for 
a strong collective memory (victimization and ‘victims of history’ narratives) used to justify and 
bargain for greater autonomy and bolster the Kanak national identity.  
For nationalists Kanak identity is created, not invented, and is characterized by the 
importance of collective rights and core Kanak values:  
After, perhaps, to accompany, to complete it, as told JMT, the future is before us, 
so I think that there is a large part of the project company, when one speaks of 
Kanak identity, there is much that we must create, not invent, but created, the 
future is before anything […] It is above all values, because after what areas we 
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can always technically work, propose, but it meets a number of values, values that 
we respect a lot in Kanak society, although sometimes we get lost. In Kanak 
societies in the Pacific companies, I mean, for example, the value of respect, it is 
for us to organize society for the value to respect is always in style (Pabouty 
Interview 2014). 
 
In New Caledonia you have a lot of people belonging to groups and those groups 
are communities, but actually Kanak are the only ones who are a people, the other 
are pieces of people who came here. The goal is to find common values, a 
common framework of living together, but letting everyone in those groups keep 
their own culture. It is not about imposing Kanak customs but finding a middle 
ground (Wamytan Interview 2014). 
 
Kanak identity is tied to the cultural and economic importance of land. Nationalist leaders 
highlight the importance of integrating customary values like dignity, hospitality, generosity, and 
respect. In this way, the continuation and primacy of the Kanak national identity can lead to 
social (re)balance and heal the social inequalities and marginalization perpetuated by 
colonialism. The formation of ‘other’ identity or the consolidation of sub-national identities is a 
crucial strategy for gaining recognition or autonomy. Unlike the civic nationalism promoted by 
loyalists, many nationalist leaders focus on ethnonationalism. Through ethnonationalism, sub-
national groups can form a definitive collective identity that promotes ethnic difference as a 
reason for autonomy from the state (Niezen 2003).  
In fact today, in fact, as we have not attained full sovereignty, Kanak is a term, 
you know, no community, but ethnic. But as part of a process of independence, 
accession to full sovereignty, the term Kanak is a nationality (Pabouty Interview 
2014). 
 
Caledonian nationalism: This is what we are currently working on. At the core of 
the claim to the right [of self-determination] is the Kanak. It is also those who 
were affected by colonization. And all that was done for thirty years since the 
FLNKS was created is oriented around the Kanak nationalist claims. But logic 
would dictate that to emerge Caledonian consciousness of belonging to a country 
that is in the middle of the Pacific, Melanesia, Oceania, it is a Caledonian 
nationalism that will emerge (Wamytan Interview 2014). 
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So in this project company, one citizen at the center, of course we are not in other 
countries, it is not in Europe, it is in Asia, we are still in the Pacific, and is 
Kanaky, so obviously the Kanak identity must be emphasized. The Kanak identity 
must be emphasized […] So obviously, that's why I said when accessing the full 
sovereignty, there is a sovereignty project to go with, and therefore in this project 
company there, there are people at center of the device, and then as we are 
Kanaky the Kanak identity, actually it is a vast identity to define the Kanak 
identity there must permeate the entire Caledonian society (Pabouty Interview 
2014). 
 
Nation building requires a selective view of history that promotes a distinct national identity 
where political claims are based on a sense of us versus them (Murphy 2002). Imagined cultural 
or political geographies are created by organizing populations into groups with distinctive 
identifiers like “indigenous” or “citizen.” Nationalist narratives tend to focus on the concept of a 
Kanak identity that is grounded in ethnicity and the idea of being the original people. But they 
also talk about belonging to a greater community that incorporates people from the Pacific region 
and others who have been the victims of colonialism. It is clear that Kanak remain at the center 
of any future New Caledonia. Identifying themselves as indigenous and as the original 
inhabitants gives the Kanak and their leaders the power to advocate on behalf of an identified 
group. Certain rights may be inherently given to these groups, once labeled, or they may become 
eligible for certain rights because they have been labeled in a certain way.  
Kanak national identity is not inherently primordial, people can become Kanak, but it is a 
mobilizing ideology tied to common ethnicity, language, assumed blood ties, race, territory, and 
customs (Hobsbawm 1990; Kaplan 1994; Geertz 1963; Hechter and Levi 1979). Just as some 
loyalists consider the Kanak French, some nationalists argue that all inhabitants of New 
Caledonia can and should become Kanak by adopting the Kanak culture.  
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And the term Kanak, it is for us a nationalist term. Like the inhabitants of the 
Americas are American, and the people of France are French (Lalié Interview 
2014). 
 
In UC the notion of Kanak, there is not a New Caledonian people. Kanak is not an 
ethnic or racial identity. Kanak refers to all the Caledonian people. Kanak is not a 
national identity, Caledonian is a national identity. You have the different 
communities living in New Caledonia, and the objective of the Kanak society is to 
build a multiracial society […] This vision is contentious, it is difficult to be 
accepted by everyone. Because the Caledonians refuse to be considered Kanak 
and Kanak means independence so it is politically oriented and not everyone 
accepts this. What we talk about it is Kanaky New Caledonia like Papua New 
Guinea (Goa Interview 2014). 
 
Both Lalié and Goa believe that all inhabitants of New Caledonia should become Kanak. For 
LKU and the Parti Travailliste the national identity should be Kanak and although citizenship 
allows for dual ethnic allegiance, he argues in favor of preferential rights. 
Pabouty (Interview 2014) views Kanak national identity in integrative terms, with the 
Kanak and French, Pacific and Western, traditions rather than the imposition of Kanak culture on 
all people. He believes that Kanak culture should irrigate New Caledonian society and values to 
create pluralistic forms of economy and law (Pabouty Interview 2014). Colonization has already 
created a melting pot, an integrated society:  
[…] indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the right 
of all peoples to be different and to be respected as such (Customary Senate 2014, 
4). 
 
At the same time, it is important to note that Kanak identity cannot be disconnected from the 
history of the independence movement or the legacies of colonialism and victimization. Kanak 
nationalism is equated with sovereignty, independence, a multi-racial society, reclaiming dignity, 
national identity, and the possibility of a Kanaky-New Caledonia. It is tied to political and 
institutional recognition. Some even argue that New Caledonian society means that there is a 
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Melanesian core or that Kanak identity is at the center of society. Loyalists describe Kanak 
identity and culture as undemocratic, violent and aggressive. They contend that Kanak national 
identity is ethnically based (Melanesian) and therefore non-Kanak cannot become Kanak.  
And the question that one evokes [brings to mind] at the moment [just] when 
these movements, it was anti-imperialism. But in the end, we see that things have 
moved. There is less talk ... let's say that imperialism and colonialism are always 
more or less present, but the designs [conceptions, ideas] change, we talk about 
globalization. So is that it is this phenomenon that has halted the anti-imperialist 
movement? Is that it had an impact on the willingness of people to be free or not? 
It is not at all a fashion [trend, style]. Imperialism was violent. Today it is more 
subtle and pernicious and it brings about less of peoples reactions. So this is a 
subject. There is some form of standardization in the phenomenon of 
globalization. Which was not the case even in the 60s where we can see the 
Portuguese colonized a certain way, and the English too. Today, with 
globalization we have entered a form of standardization, we are in a permanent 
acculturation with a model that is the same everywhere. Things have moved and 
people are not moving in the same way either (Washetine Interview 2014). 
 
There are real fears among Kanak and other sub-national groups that globalization is 
resulting in the standardization and acculturation of traditional cultures. Some nationalists 
contend that globalization is resulting in a loss of humanity and promoting a less rich Western 
culture that undermines the culturally rich indigenous traditions. This is troubling, considering 
that distinctive identities are part of a sub-national group’s argument for greater autonomy or 
sovereignty. 
 
Plural Identity, Multicultural Society, and the Caledonian Identity 
While loyalists and nationalists may privilege French or Kanak identity as the dominant 
affiliation, there is a strong basis (even within these views) for a plural Caledonian national 
identity. Kanak, Caledonian, French, Caldoche, and other identity groups are intimately tied to 
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historical memory, emotions, and political discourse. The term itself, rather than its meaning or 
practice, often becomes a point of contention. With a few exceptions, politicians generally agree 
on the need for a plural or multicultural national identity. Pluralism can be practiced differently, 
but reconciliation is essential to the integration of French, Kanak, and Pacific customs and 
values. On one hand, identity is an ideal type, a very personal connection to a community with 
strong ethnic foundations. On the other hand, identity in New Caledonia is rational-legal: 
connected to an institutional framework that incorporates indigenous customs into governance, 
policy, and justice (Breton 1988). Both require integration and further reconciliation.  
Even though, both sides agree that integration is necessary, they cling to the idea of a 
French or Kanak core identity. Gomès (Address 2009) offers a federal model that creates a New 
Caledonian-Kanak national identity with Kanak as a sub-division. Frogier advocates for a plural 
identity based on a mix of French and Kanak values. Lafleur (Interview 2014) leaves room for 
the possibility of a plural society saying that Caledonian identity is the hat that fits many ethnic 
heads:  
I think that there are identities, like Wallis, like Kanak who are proud to be 
Wallisians, being Kanak else who are proud to be Indonesian, but above all of us, 
we have a hat that is Caledonian. We have all these ethnic groups, which are the 
wealth of this country, but it is primarily Caledonian. 
 
Lafleur and Yanno perceive the need for a more multicultural society where Kanak is an ethnic 
affiliation rather than a competing identity. Gomès (LNC 2005) claims that a Caledonian identity 
should be built on the integration, appropriation, or mixing of the various cultures: a non-racial 
communal Caledonian identity that integrates French, Caledonian, and Kanak values. However 
this identity is still intimately tied to France – in a way similar to French regions like Corsica or 
Brittany.  
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 Other loyalists believe the Caledonian identity rests on a sense of belonging and a link to 
the territory that cultivates patriotism; the values of diplomacy and reciprocity; or non-
independence. Plural society can be a place where culture is self-defined, multiculturalism is 
based on political rights and equality of access, collective culture, and the formation of an 
universal society without consensus. Gomès (2009, 29) even goes so far as to call for a racially 
blind society that is united through its territorial ties and a sense of belonging: 
[W]e do not have a black New Caledonia and a white New Caledonia, New 
Caledonia is a country whose land is in our blood, it belongs to us, and we must 
build together. 
 
[We] live in a country where you have people with different skin colors and 
traditions, but who live in fraternity and tolerance of each other (Blaise Interview 
2014). 
 
Wamytan (Interview 2014) presents an argument for a plural society with a Kanak core 
that unites “pieces of other cultures” saying:  
The country is made up of aggregated people with the original people at the center 
[…] Indigenous people must be recognized, but everyone should be recognized in 
the process […] do not give up your culture, continue to live according to your 
Polynesian culture. 
 
He continues on to say that there should be a “feeling of being Caledonian first instead of French 
first” (Wamytan Interview 2014). While Wamytan and other nationalists repeatedly place the 
Kanak or the original people at the center of the Caledonian society, they make room for the 
recognition of other identities and distinct cultures that have settled in New Caledonia: 
emphasizing the importance of recognizing the equality of difference and allowing people to 
practice their own culture. To some nationalists, like Wamytan the Caledonian identity 
encompasses all inhabitants – it is a form of nationalism that represents a sense of belonging to 
the Pacific: 
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[We must] transition from a Kanak nationalism to a Caledonian nationalism, to a 
Caledonian consciousness of belonging to a country that is in the middle of the 
Pacific, Melanesia, Oceania (Wamytan Interview 2014). 
 
[S]o far the political struggle was carried by the Kanak. These are the Kanak that 
were at the heart of the changes we've had so far, and little by little, and elsewhere 
have also come to consider those who had come to appreciate the history, can also 
claim local citizenship, and indeed nationality. So that, in some way, for others, 
the so called victims of history at one time, their own future is taking shape here, 
with the original people. And there's a very strong feeling, some in the Caldoche 
community, a lot who have no connection to their homeland. The same goes for 
those who have been deported by the Commune, following the War of Algeria in 
the 60s ... so there's a number of communities who eventually validate the idea 
that they have a country here. So it's a quite a journey [a process] in time. I think 
the events in the 1980s gave a sudden, forced, boost to the idea that there is a 
people who are in the process of being set up [configured] here, through its 
history, and it is a Caledonian people with different components (Washetine 
Interview 2014). 
 
Others talk about a Caledonian humanity that is composed of Kanak, Melanesians, Europeans, 
and the Metis. This view is part of the victims of history narrative. It means that the Kanak have 
the inherent right to self-determination, but they have shared that right with other communities 
that are also victims of history. In the same way, a composite Caledonian identity has been 
created. 
Nationalist and loyalist definitions of a plural or multicultural national identity have a 
distinctive territorial component. They unite all populations through a shared connection to the 
New Caledonian territory and a sense of belonging, which is further reinforced in the eligibility 
requirements for the referendum electorate. The territorial component is supported by a 
constructivist vision of identity. In this case the integration of French, Kanak, and Pacific values 
is a constructivist approach to creating a national identity that can cut across a number of 
different cultures. Even here, identity is a tool of political elites, a mobilizing ideology. There are 
some adamant detractors, like Goa (Interview 2014), who believe a true Caledonian identity does 
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not yet exist and Blaise (Interview 2014) who sees it as an artificial representation of common 
destiny. By promoting an inclusive, integrative approach to national identity, every population 
feels included, a sense of belonging that foments a shared commitment to the future development 
of New Caledonia and less likelihood of ethnic violence. If exclusion continues it is likely that 
perceived threats to majority or ethnic power would be aggravated. Caldoche and minority fears 
of Kanak power and Kanak fears of a permanent French-Caldoche-Caledonian alliance under 
association will continue to divide inhabitants. Kanak nationalists feel entitled to minority 
privilege as result of their marginalization and victimization under colonialism. Unfortunately 
this sentiment, and the rights granted in the Nouméa Accord as a result, has led to Caledonian 
animosity.  
 
VICTIM AND VICTIMS OF HISTORY NARRATIVES  
The victim narrative is a defining factor employed by nationalists to gain concessions in 
the Accords, electorate, and the movement for full sovereignty in general. To loyalists the victim 
narrative is a uniquely Kanak mentality linked to the original people and their enslavement. 
Loyalists view it as an excuse to avoid adapting to the current division of political power or as 
the blatantly erroneous assumption that colonial problems have not yet been solved. However, 
the collective memory of colonization and associated victimization is a key part of the 
ethnosymbolist Kanak national identity based on the power of collective memory. A national 
identity is instrumentalist because the victimization narrative has become a tool used by political 
elites to promote the right to independence (Conversi 1995). 
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The victim narrative pervades the nationalists’ arguments and is a tool used to legitimize 
their right to self-determination and validate a sovereign New Caledonia. The historical 
injustices and suffering wrought by French colonial practices, struggle for rights and recognition, 
current electoral imbalance, influx of French public servants, and daily struggle for resources are 
all examples of Kanak victimization. These examples also, according to nationalists, validate 
their right to self-determination and full autonomy. Under French colonization the Kanak were 
made nothing, commanded, and possessed without permission. And yet nationalists argue, there 
have been few efforts made towards reconciliation.  
The primacy of the Kanak identity and semi-exclusive views of citizenship and self-
determination are at least partially founded in the victim narrative present among all nationalist 
narratives. For nationalists, the ever-present narrative of victimization is linked to the ongoing 
French presence. The système d’indigénat divided Kanak, created permanent destabilization, was 
a form of cultural genocide and exclusion.  
Colonisation hits all the Chieftainships in the Kanak country. In practically all the 
regions on the mainland, the violence of colonisation created the disappearance of 
Clans and Chieftainships, the displacement of all, or part of, tribes, and entire 
regions. These acts of violence resulted in long term traumas affecting both 
customary structures, and humans living hereabouts […]The setting up of 
reservations, during the period of time called the ‘Indigénat’ (native population) 
was an instrument of segregation and control of the Kanak People, while 
favouring land grabbing for colonisation. (Charter of the Kanak People 2014, 10-
11). 
 
According to nationalist leaders, colonization resulted in the suppression of autonomy, 
population displacement, degradation, loss of dignity and led to unconscious contempt, suffering 
foreign control, violence, riots, land theft, and segregation. A connection between land, nature, 
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and Kanak is at the core of their animist belief system and their social organization. The colonial 
experience was highly traumatic to both the people and the land:  
The name, given in Kanak language, links the person to its Clan and to the land. It 
describes the history of the Clan in the generational cycle of life in space and time 
[…] Kanak has belonged to this land for over 4000 years. The Kanak civilisation, 
also called the ‘Yam civilisation’, tamed in an uninterrupted way the natural 
areas, from the mountain to the sea, and beyond the horizon. It is the spirit of the 
Ancestor that organises and feeds the spiritual connection of the Clan and its 
members with Nature […] The social organisation is based on the respect of the 
Ancestors’ spirit in a given territory, on the management of the natural 
environment, on Clans’ complementarity and solidarity […] It is the land where 
we discover, where we learn, the roots of our life, the cement and backbones of 
the Kanak Society (Charter of the Kanak People 2014, 17-23). 
 
According to nationalists, the legacies of colonialism include long lasting environmental 
problems, racism, and Kanak marginalization.  
The independence referendum has been asked for by the pro Independence group 
since their first independence claim (1975). But the State has constantly put it off, 
claiming that the country was not ready. So from one agreement to another, the 
electorate for the referendum has been expanded. FLNKS has accepted many 
concessions. But today's conflicting interpretations are ushering in disturbing 
trends. The French Governments’ intentions concealed behind virginal neutrality 
and relayed by those of the anti-independence factions, who are becoming 
increasingly strident, are continuously pushing further for the expansion of the 
special electorates. It is imperative that we denounce these abuses that threaten 
the decolonization process in progress, but that also threaten peace in New 
Caledonia. The history of decolonization has also shown the need for vigilance 
when we see what the colonial system has been capable of: excluding indigenous 
peoples from the right to vote, double college, colony for settlement, real-fake 
colonial referenda, rigging of lists, etc. (Wamytan Special Committee 2013, 7-8). 
 
Colonialism has also created geographic imbalances between prosperous and heavily population 
Nouméa and the rural bush. This has created problems associated with urbanization and a lack of 
adequate housing and infrastructure because of massive internal and external migration to the 
capital.  
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We will not reinvent the wheel. We have to create wealth first in order to have tax 
on wealth and then do redistribution for inequalities. We have to identify which 
sectors we need to develop in order to have a dynamic economy. We already have 
this information so we need to continue to develop those sectors that are still 
working today. We have some new sector to develop like wood or agriculture, we 
import a lot. And it raises prices. For independence we have to develop these 
sectors. We prefer importing before from France, but in the future we can have 
our own project. There are too many things to do. It is a new, young country so 
lots of things to do. Economie de comptoir – colonial way. Dependent system 
here (Pabouty Interview 2014).  
 
Both nationalists and loyalists agree that inequalities caused by colonization preserve 
imbalances, foster economic dependence, and have created an artificial standard of living that is 
perpetuated by continued French aid. Their ideas for correcting these economic imbalances will 
be outlined in the following chapter. It is interesting to note that this is one area where loyalists 
and nationalists agree. However, nationalists seem to have a much greater preoccupation with 
France’s complicity in causing inequalities, economic or otherwise. Nationalists use the victim 
narrative to express France’s culpability and blame the state’s colonial practices for the problems 
plaguing New Caledonia today. 
In some cases, the victim narrative is used to justify the exclusion of non-Kanak or those 
populations not subject to colonization. However, despite harsh criticism against France many 
nationalists recognize that injustices were also perpetrated against other “victims of history.” 
These victims include the Kanak, Communards (French rebels sent to penal colonies on New 
Caledonia), Algerians, and forced laborers brought from other Pacific Islands and Southeast 
Asia.  
[T]he so called victims of history at one time, their own future is taking shape 
here with the original people […] all peoples have the right to decide what they 
want for their future. And we have always considered that the history of 
colonization and all that it has meant, it goes against the principle of humanity. So 
for us colonization was first that. I mentioned earlier that Kanak penned 
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[confined] in reservations. This is the fate endured by a number of workers like 
Indonesian, Javanese who ... so for us it is inconceivable. So the Kanak people 
considered that to restore their rights, it goes through the same command of the 
decision on the future of his country. So for us the question of independence 
arises in a natural manner. All peoples have the right to decide what they want or 
desire to do for themselves, for their country, for their homeland, for their subsoil 
[underground], their environment, and their right there to share it with others, 
those who came [later]. They were considered to have been somewhat victims of 
colonization, because they lived in the same exclusion (Washetine Interview 
2014).  
 
Although not members of the original people, nationalists have extended the shared right to self-
determination to these populations, integrated them into the body of citizens and created a 
communal sense of belonging. These are not the people nationalists are fighting to have removed 
from the electoral register.  
Dalby (1991, 7) describes otherness as involving “the social construction of some other 
person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as different from ‘our’ person, group, 
etc. Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological, and a crucially political act; it 
constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person 
specifying the difference” where the characterization of difference and the production of 
discourse is geopolitical. The constructed community of victims is an imagined community. Its 
restricted membership and unique historical attributes have allowed nationalists to deploy the 
victim narrative as a political bargaining chip: creating restricted electorates that will have a 
significant influence on the referenda on independence, gaining control of the mining industry in 
the Northern province, and restricting citizenship.  
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A ‘COMMON DESTINY?’ 
 If the victim narrative is one cause for social rebalancing and plural national identities are 
part of the process to achieve social rebalancing, then common destiny is the goal of social 
(re)balance. The Nouméa Accord (1998) calls for “establishment of a new sovereignty, to be 
shared in a common destiny.” But what is meant by a common destiny? Does this refer to a 
community of self-governing New Caledonians who represent a diversity of cultures? Or does 
this refer to a new contract between the French state and their overseas population? In the 
Preamble of the Nouméa Accord, common destiny is linked to identity and its material 
representations, citizenship, and rebalancing:  
These difficult times need to be remembered, the mistakes recognized and the 
Kanak people’s confiscated identity restored, which equates in its mind with a 
recognition of its sovereignty, prior to the forging of a new sovereignty, shared in 
common destiny (Nouméa Accord 1998). 
 
It is now necessary to start making provisions for a citizenship of New Caledonia, 
enabling the original people to form a human community, asserting its common 
destiny, with the other men and women living there (Nouméa Accord 1998). 
 
The present is the time of sharing, through the achievement of a new balance. The 
future must be the time of an identity, in a common destiny (Nouméa Accord 
1998).  
 
The full recognition of the Kanak identity requires customary law status and its 
links with the civil law status of persons governed by ordinary law to be defined, 
and provision to be made for the place of customary bodies in the institutions, 
particularly through the establishment of a Customary Senate; it requires the 
Kanak cultural heritage to be protected and enhanced and new legal and financial 
mechanisms to be introduced in response to representations based on the link with 
land, while facilitating land development, and identity symbols conveying the 
essential place of the Kanak identity in the accepted common destiny to be 
adopted (Nouméa Accord 1998).  
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While the Nouméa Accord does not clearly define common destiny it does acknowledge 
the need for something new that can be a project of cooperation for all New Caledonian 
inhabitants. The Accord refers to a “new sovereignty” and a “new balance” as something that is 
shared. Common destiny is also defined as a project related to identity and the formation of a 
human community. Interpretations of the common destiny ideal, by nationalists and loyalists, 
barely resemble these vague notions of collective sharing and cooperation outline in the Nouméa 
Accord.  
Well these are empty words. Because everybody is using these terms with 
different meanings. Common destiny is French diplomatic idiom, which has been 
used in the past in French Polynesia. In fact for us French loyalist, common 
destiny means political equality, it means that if you build a citizenship, everyone 
which has citizenship should have the same rights and the same dignity, and the 
same right to speak about the future of the country (Blaise Interview 2014). 
 
Some, like Blaise (Interview 2014) argue that common destiny does not exist: it is a 
misunderstanding, semantics, a diplomatic term with no real meaning. Loyalists’ view of 
common destiny is more broadly based on a fundamental belief that cultures enrich each other. 
This idea, that cultures enrich each other, underpins almost every definition of common destiny: 
the push for integration, core French values, and the idea of peacefully living together. If the core 
belief is that cultures enrich each other, than living together in a peacefully integrated society 
would be the preeminent definition of common destiny.  
The common destiny is the Caledonia is an example for the world, because there 
are all ethnic groups in that territory and they manage to live together. She has 
been an example to the world when Tjibaou and Jacques Lafleur stopped the civil 
war. we managed, there was racism that had settled in Caledonia and after that 
disappeared. People have said we will live together. And we all lived together 
very well (Lafleur Interview 2014). 
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Living together means creating a society with equal opportunity, basic rights, no 
chauvinism, includes all ethnic groups living in harmonious coexistence through sharing and 
respect, and shares the land. Carteron (2009) argued that the “living together” and “common 
destiny” narratives mobilized by different factions can act like federacies. They have the power 
to organize and structure relationships based on scales of autonomy and cooperation if they 
manage to transcend divisions between ethnic communities. Until then, imagined political 
communities like indigenous victims act like a sovereign nation, not a cohesive nation-state or 
multinational state. Loyalists, like Lafleur and Yanno maintain that a harmonious coexistence 
can be achieved through physical integration, intermarriage and greater mixing of the different 
ethnic groups to create a multiethnic population that mixes at the everyday scale. Integration and 
coexistence can also be achieved through appropriation and mixing of French, Kanak, and 
Pacific values. For the FPU this means mutual recognition, and making mutual concessions so 
that all inhabitants can live together in a harmonious coexistence.  
So the idea of a common destiny, actually. It is related to the notion of citizenship 
For us, the party from which I come, eventually citizenship it must be the 
common point between the gathering Pacific values, values Kanak and French 
values. These are also fully compatible, since freedom, equality, brotherhood with 
respect for elders, customs etc. are quite reconcilable. And the notion of common 
destiny, that's it for us. I'll try to summarize it in simple words. We are against 
independence, but we like Kanak. You see the difference. That is to say, that's the 
common destiny. It is finally learning to live together, learning to recognize 
themselves, regardless of the side also learn how to build something together, 
share things together (Bernut Interview 2014). 
 
Equal rights, equal dignity, the right to vote on the referendum, and Christian values are part of 
what loyalists hope to integrate into the common framework. Just like nationalists want to 
integrate some of their own customary values and practices. The difficulty is finding a workable 
balance between each faction’s values. According to Gomès, integration and reconciliation can 
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lead to a sense of shared future through the creation of common identity symbols. Specifically, 
the Nouméa Accord requires the country decide on a common flag, anthem, country name and 
currency. This is an effort to cement the idea of a shared future or shared destiny: 
During this period, signs will be given of the gradual recognition of a citizenship 
of New Caledonia, which must express the chosen common destiny and be able, 
after the end of the period, to become a nationality, should it be so decided 
(Nouméa Accord 1998). 
 
Part of the common destiny narrative is framed in terms of reconciliation. Forgiveness, 
healing the wounds of racism and social protest, and mutual recognition are all part of the 
reconciliation process and linked to common destiny. For example, Bernut (Interview 2014) and 
Frogier (NC 1ere 2014) saw the raising of two flags, the French tricolor and the Kanak 
independence flag as a significant move towards mutual recognition. 
Not all definitions of common destiny present a positive outlook. In some ways, Loyalists 
argue common destiny has already failed to unite ethnic and political divisions, reduce economic 
inequality, and end racism. While the Matignon Accords may have ended racism between Kanak 
and French (according to Loyalists) it has not tempered growing racism amongst Kanak and 
Wallisian populations led by “war chiefs.”  
[F]or some time, racism sprung from Wallisians and Kanak ethnicities and it's 
very difficult. There is an anti-white racism that goes up, there is an anti-racism 
Kanak comes up. And that is very dangerous for peace. Peace is very fragile. 
Very, very fragile. So politicians are irresponsible in the sense that what they both 
did, they are not able to continue to apply to live this handshake. And it is our 
role, newly elected to do that. While there are many, there often, I often say it's 
war chiefs. There is always one who wants to be, who wants to take over another, 
and that is what is wrong in Caledonia. We not afford to do that. We are not 
strong enough to do that. Peace is fragile. Democracy is fragile. So we must 
preserve it. And common destiny will, this is actually all these, there are a lot of 
interbreeding in NC. And all these people were living very well and that is why 
we must continue to preserve the peace. All these cultures that enrich each other, 
and prove to the world that we can live with lots of different ethnic groups. This is 
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proved so far, and there is no reason for it to stop. It is for us to preserve that. 
That's the common destiny. It is able to live together, whether you white, black, 
Javanese, Caribbean (Lafleur Interview 2014). 
 
There has been massive indigenous immigration from Wallis and Futuna to New Caledonia 
because France continued their policy of giving indigenous Pacific Islanders in Wallis and 
Futuna special status outside the civil code, while the Kanak gained customary status in New 
Caledonia (Trepied 2012). Furthermore, loyalists contest that nationalists view common destiny 
as assimilation and subservience, as a tool of vengeance.  
There are ditches where ethnic cleavages join social divisions and there are 
political cleavages where geographical divisions overlap, […] the embers of latent 
social protest, the embers of an ordinary racism, guts the speaker … the future is a 
time to heal the wounds, it is the price of peace (Gomès Address to Congress 
2009). 
 
Where loyalists talk about integration and living together, nationalists talk about 
integration and building together. For nationalists common destiny is linked to the concept of 
victims of history and double legitimacy. Double legitimacy is the idea that both Kanak and the 
Communards were victims of colonization and the French state (Chappell 2013). This gives New 
Caledonians double the right to self-determination and ties them together by a common history 
of struggle. There is some overlap. Nationalists have a greater tendency to think in terms of 
processes, construction, and building. So when they talk about living together, it is in terms of 
constructing a shared framework to live together. The UC-FLNKS defines common destiny as a 
shared project based on building a common framework that incorporates unifying symbols, 
reconciliation, common values, and a sense of belonging. Nationalists are quick to say that a 
foundation of common values should not negate an emphasis on both commonalities and 
distinctiveness. Specific examples of this integration include the creation of legal and 
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institutional pluralism based on Kanak/Pacific humanism. Integration also includes the 
construction of a common future based on dialogue, consultation, and recognizing the unique 
rights of colonized people. Some nationalists, like LKU, view common destiny as the exclusive 
right of the affected population or those mentioned under the Nouméa Accord. 
But when talking about common destiny, the challenge now, materializes itself 
like that, with the common destiny. We try to be together and we try to achieve a 
common awareness of being Caledonian because we all belong to the NC […] It 
is not about imposing Kanak customs, but finding a middle ground […] in NC 
you have a lot of people belonging to groups and those groups are communities, 
but actually Kanak are the only ones who are a people, the others are pieces of a 
people that came here […] the goal is to find common values, a common 
framework of living together but letting everyone in those groups keep their own 
culture” (Wamytan Interview 2014). 
 
[T]he reconciliation and symbiosis of these two visions in the context of a 
common destiny called a mutual understanding, an understanding of oneself and 
the other, which alone can lead to relations based on respect and good faith … and 
lasting social peace (Customary Senate 2014, 4). 
 
Reconciliation is also part of the nationalists’ common destiny narrative. Forgiveness and mutual 
understanding are at the core of reconciliation. Mutual understanding, nationalists argue, will 
lead to respect and good faith and social peace.  
A common destiny, the emergence of a nation, depends on our ability to reduce or 
negate the social inequalities related to history (Washetine Interview 2014). 
 
Integration is strongly linked to the idea of building together. This joint project is part of the 
decolonization process, is framed as a societal pact, and emphasizes the creation of a middle 
ground from of integration rather than Caledonian assimilation (to become Kanak). The goals of 
the social project include finding that middle ground, reducing inequality, fighting injustice and 
exclusion, managing interdependencies, and engaging in sustainable human centered 
development. For UNI-PALIKA common destiny and social rebalancing are attempts to end 
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inequality, which ideally would lead to peacefully living together. An example of a societal pact 
that can be built together is a Caledonian citizenship. Nationalists argue that this citizenship 
might be Kanak centered but employ unifying symbols that tie all populations together, and 
protects local employment. Another example is the construction of a sense of Caledonian 
responsibility through education and training. 
 Common destiny seems to be a buzzword: easily used, but not easily or clearly defined. 
The Nouméa Accord defines it in terms of creating a new project that is based on a shared 
identity and rebalancing. The primary difference between nationalist and loyalist views of 
common destiny is the distinction between building and living together. Nationalists view 
common destiny as an ongoing process that has not been achieved. Continued inequalities and 
the marginalization of Kanak are cited as major barriers to achieving a shared and balanced 
society. Loyalists counter that common destiny is something that has already happened. The 
diverse communities that inhabit New Caledonia are already living together peacefully and 
intermixing with each other.  
 
CONCLUSION: SOCIAL REBALANCING 
Internal social rebalancing stems from historical contexts like the Nouméa Accord and 
victimization frames and Kanak identity and inequality (see disconnected chords linked to social 
rebalance in Figure 4). Options for social rebalancing include using France to prevent minority 
privilege and promoting electoral exclusion or inclusion (dark green chords). France’s colonial 
and post-colonial role (light grey, grey-brown, and yellow chords) and victimization have caused 
or exacerbated social inequalities in New Caledonia. The very fact that social rebalancing and 
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reconciliation is still discussed emphasizes the ongoing role of racism and discrimination. 
Nationalists and loyalists dream of a common destiny, a plural society that lives together or 
comes together to build a unique multicultural society based on a sense of belonging. But this 
vision is problematized by Kanak seeking additional reparations and thus supremacy for 
victimization under French colonialism and Caledonians who reject notions of minority rights. 
Common destiny is thus defined by definitions of Caledonian citizenship (burgundy chord), 
plural identity (purple chord), the Nouméa Accord (black chord), and inclusion in the electorate 
(yellow chord). In turn, common destiny (teal chords) influences arguments about expanding the 
electorate and citizenship, and is tied to economic rebalancing strategies through public 
ownership. The Kanak identity (aqua chords) is intimately tied to the victim narrative, but plays 
a role in shaping social rebalancing through a restricted electorate and right to self-determination. 
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Figure 4. Connections and co-definitions among select objectives. 
As Niezen (2003) and Dieckhoff (2004) argued, negative perceptions of other 
populations make negotiation and effective governance in plural societies difficult. Their 
solution involves greater justice and fairness for both minority and majority populations (Niezen 
2003; Dieckhoff 2004). Caledonian fears of a Kanak dominated independent government and 
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Kanak fears of continued marginalization problematize effective cooperation. Unification 
through a sense of national identity or civic nationalism may provide the collective identity that 
multiculturalism lacks (Brown 2008). This seems unlikely if New Caledonia does not choose an 
option that includes full sovereignty and thus the creation of a national civil identity distinct from 
France and French power. Also called liberal nationalism (Miller 2000; Margalit and Raz 1990; 
Tamir 1993), civic nationalism promotes loyalty to the state rather than individual ethnic 
communities or sub-national groups. If loyalty to the state supersedes ethnic loyalty, intra-state 
conflict is less likely. However, the formation of civic nationalism usually involves the creation 
of a strong, privileged ethnic core that can result in a reaction amongst ethnic minorities and a 
counter upsurge of majority nationalism (Brown 2008). A consociational or centripetal system 
might resolve ethnic tensions related to unequal power relationships paving the way for a more 
inclusive civic nationalism. Within consociational and centripetal systems, ethnic divisions are 
encouraged as a means of defining political communities that are then forced to work together. 
Each group maintains its own ethnic identity, but a sense of communal nationalism based on 
citizenship or loyalty to the state of New Caledonia, Kanaky-New Caledonia, or Kanaky could 
result. Fears of Kanak or French domination need to be mitigated before the country can move 
forward. Consociational and centripetal systems offer an opportunity to achieve this. The 
“common destiny” discourse was mobilized to promote civic nationalism, but it has not been 
entirely successful at transcending divisions between ethnic communities as evidenced by 
multiple views on national identity.  
Plural societies are sharply divided sub-societies defined by a unifying feature and 
represented by their own political parties (Lijphart 2012). In New Caledonia pro-independence 
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parties are mostly Kanak and loyalist parties are predominantly Caledonian. Wesley-Smith 
(2007) would argue that these divisions require a renewed balance between local identities and 
networks of governance and ethnic nationalism. Examples of this do exist in New Caledonia. 
Policies enacted to promote social rebalancing include the formation of a Customary Senate and 
efforts to integrate Western and customary forms of governance. The rise of a multi-partisan 
desire for a plural Caledonian identity is another example of social rebalancing. Both are 
examples of recognition and sub-national autonomy that create a new balance between the 
Caledonian political majority and the majority Kanak population. However, divergent views on 
common destiny and continued calls for a core identity hinder the creation of a truly integrative 
national identity. The victim narrative is a source of contention, exemplifying the broader 
debates over exclusionary language and policy versus integrative electoral bodies and 
citizenship.  
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CHAPTER 7 
ECONOMIC REBALANCING 
 
Political and social rebalancing are deeply connected to and supported by economic 
rebalancing. The political role of France has contributed to its economic policies designed to 
exploit New Caledonia and use aid money to placate dissenting factions of the population. 
France’s history of colonization and victimization has also caused a lot of the economic 
imbalance that currently exists. It has also resulted in the current division over the contested 
provincial aid allocation divisions or key-sharing program. Their culture of aid has done little to 
mitigate this imbalance. Instead it has led to deepening dependency and a lack of domestic 
economic growth in areas other than nickel mining. Both nationalists and loyalists share a 
common vision of New Caledonia’s economic development, although they may disagree 
somewhat on actual methods of implementation. Nevertheless, both agree that the mining 
industry can serve as a crucial foundation for funding of other economic sectors designed to 
reduce French dependence. Internal rebalancing within New Caledonia and external rebalancing 
between France and New Caledonia are key to the future viability of the country – especially if 
the referenda result in some type of sovereignty.  
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THE ROLE OF FRANCE: COLONIZER OR PROTECTOR? 
Perceptions of the French state have long been contentious. Domestic politics in the 
metropole have had a significant effect on New Caledonian politics and French policy towards 
their territory. After WWII De Gaulle granted New Caledonia and its indigenous population 
some democratic rights, including the right to vote (Chappell 2014). The Socialists gave New 
Caledonia territorial autonomy in the 1950s only to have it rescinded by the Gaullists in the 
1960s. In the early 1980s Mitterrand promoted pluri-ethnic autonomy while the Gaullists under 
Chirac fought this policy. In response, the Socialists negotiated the Matignon and Nouméa 
Accords in 1988 and 1998. Following the Nouméa Accord Chirac and then Sarkozy attempted to 
hinder the transfer of powers to New Caledonia. The current French administration under 
Hollande has made some changes to French officials in favor of less antagonism towards 
nationalists (Chappell 2014).  
 Changing political policies towards New Caledonia have not disrupted strong economic 
ties. The way in which politicians view France and its role in New Caledonia is linked to 
economic relationships. For nationalists, France is primarily viewed as a colonizer and villain: 
hindering independence for continued economic benefit. To them, the only way to end this 
parasitic relationship is to completely break ties with France. Loyalists consider France as an 
absent benefactor and protector from external exploitation. Therefore, loyalists advocate for 
strengthening ties with France to continue to benefit from this protective relationship. Current 
French aid and control of the mining sector have perpetuated already hazardous inequalities 
cause by colonialism.  
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France as a Colonizer and Villain 
Nationalists overwhelmingly view France as a colonial actor. Interviews, articles, and 
other sources revealed that the colonial history of New Caledonia and its legacies are ever 
present in the minds of nationalists. Interestingly, loyalists argue that colonization in New 
Caledonia has completely ended and the only legacies of it are inequality in the Southern 
Province – inequalities created by the key sharing system (clé de répartition) under the Matignon 
Accords. In an effort to rebalance the economic inequalities created by colonialism, France 
agreed to divide its aid unequally between the three provinces.  
State investment financing in the territory will be distributed as follows: 3/4 for 
the Northern and Loyalty Island provinces and 1/4 for the Southern province, 
based on the 1988 budget (Article 4 Accords de Matignon-Oudinot 1988, 7). 
 
Anti-independence sentiment is presented in many forms. Nationalists argue that the 
establishment of a social hierarchy based on wealthy privilege has undermined reform. The 
Accords were an effort by France to delay independence an effort that was concealed behind a 
“virginal neutrality,” (Wamytan 2013 Special Committee). They claim that France wants to 
create a Francafrique or neocolonial puppet government system and that French encouragement 
towards regional integration is called a Trojan horse move.  
But there remains a long way to go against a state, which pursues a principle with 
its overseas territories: the red line of prohibited independence. It does so on the 
grounds of its place in the world, its higher interests and its position as second-
ranking maritime power in the world through us, the inhabitants of these 
territories. It is clear that the strategies initiated by France in some of its powers 
can be analyzed using this prism. The same can be said for the alternatives 
proposed for the Noumea Accord exit process as from 2014. They are actually a 
kind of remake of the ‘French Union, community or cooperation’ better known as 
the concept of ‘Françafrique’, kind of partnership whose common feature is to 
leave the sovereign powers to the former colonial power (Wamytan 2013 UNGA). 
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It is a move to promote dependency and containment. In other words France, according to 
nationalists has drawn a red line against independence and destabilizes nationalist parties in an 
effort to protect their interests in New Caledonia. Nationalists claim, they do this while telling 
the world they are an impartial arbitrator of decolonization – when in fact they engage in a 
pyromaniac/fireman maneuver. Wamytan, Goa, and Lalié, for example, still view France in a 
colonial role.  
Since the signing of the Matignon Accords, the French Government has adopted 
the attitude of an arbitrator between ‘two communities’: one for Independence 
and the other anti-Independence. This is a maneuver that can be described as the 
well known ‘pyromaniac / fireman’ maneuver. Because the French State is not the 
arbiter of colonization in New Caledonia, it is the main player in it (Wamytan 
Special Committee on Decolonization 2013). 
 
While the Republic provides aid to New Caledonia, it also restricts voting rights (electoral 
debate), is a vehicle for globalization and neo-colonialism, and fosters dependency and 
intentional minority creation. According to UNI-PALIKA the victimization of Kanak during 
colonization and after has led to a desire to control resources, a sense of being owed 
independence, and a re-imagination of the Kanak identity as a struggle. The very process of 
identity creation is a struggle. But Kanak actually define their identity as struggle rather than the 
process of struggle.  
[According to Neaoutyine, France] creates conditions of neo-colonial excess to 
destabilize New Caledonian institutions (Mainguet November 2012) 
 
France’s role as a colonizer is defined, by nationalists, in terms of historical and 
contemporary victimization through deliberate attempts to promote immigration that 
marginalizes Kanak. Victimization also occurs as France continues to refuse to turn over the 
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1998 referendum electoral list so that nationalists can determine who is and is not eligible for the 
2018-2022 referenda. 
I'm from clans who are from the Northern Province, and the East Coast, Touho 
where there has been colonization, but in a hard way. Where there have been 
riots, I cannot say too much rebellion, with land theft. At the beginning of 
colonization, as Touho and Hienghène as on the West Coast, Koné and Voh have 
experienced this situation. And this historical situation of injustice today it is not 
fixed, since we are still, despite some developments, some changes I'd 
institutional. But roughly speaking, in general, global repair this historic injustice 
it is not repaired […] in the South, where I would say the colonial power is still 
intact, the situation has not changed much (Pabouty Interview 2014). 
 
French colonial legacies and neo-colonial practices (imports, aid, providing civil servants) have 
led to continued inequalities. Nationalists argue that France continues to promote policies that 
are anti-independence. 
In addition, we are witnessing our country gradually being placed in a situation of 
economic dependency by the French State. Indeed, not having the slightest 
intention to withdraw from the Asia-Pacific region "the new place for global 
growth" as recently stated by U.S. President Barack Obama, France maintains its 
overseas territories in a situation of being welfare handout recipients through 
"targeted and selective", immigration excessive tax exemption, financial transfers 
and public servant salary index-linking, all of which contribute to creating an 
artificial bubble in which occurs artificial growth with high incomes, a high cost 
of living and major social inequalities (Wamytan Special Committee 2013, 14). 
 
Nationalists view France as a contemporary neo-colonial actor, sovereign foreigners that 
continue to colonize the Kanak people. They also accuse France of dragging New Caledonian 
into the global economy and as a result undermining customary economic and social structures.   
Violent imperialism has given way to pernicious and subtle globalization 
(Washetine Interview 2014).  
 
[P]eople are becoming more individualistic, because people have changed their 
lifestyle. They went from food self-sufficiency to an employee world (Wamytan 
Interview 2014). 
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It is difficult, therefore, simply because, in fact it is the current situation that 
makes it difficult. I would say the economic situation. Parents, for example, have 
less and less time to be able to talk to their children less and less time to teach 
them a little bit their tradition etc. Today it is difficult for a family whose father is 
unemployment is not working, and then the mother makes cleaning lady, it is 
difficult to send their children during the holidays, the Islands, at home, it's hard 
because it's too expensive. This is the context, I would say today that economic 
fact that it makes difficult (Pabouty Interview 2014). 
 
Globalization, the most recent iteration of neo-colonialism has corrupted New Caledonia with 
Western consumerism, standardization, and acculturation. Nationalists contend that violent 
imperialism has given way to ‘pernicious and subtle globalization’, creating an inherited 
imposed burden to be managed. Although not implicitly discussed in this dissertation, 
globalization and the trends that follow it are a major concern for Kanak nationalists. Significant 
out migration from the Northern and Island Provinces to the capital has resulted in increasing 
individualism among once collectivistic Kanak. Structural variables often hider these migrants 
from retaining customary ties with their clans and tribes. As a result, the younger Kanak 
generations are growing up more ignorant of the customary ways of life and much more 
integrated with the global Western culture of individualism.  
 
France as a Protector and Supporter 
France’s role as an absent guardian with a laissez-faire method of protection offers a 
sense of well-being and safety without the animosity of neo-colonialism. Much different than 
nationalists view of France as a colonial overlord. There is a strong trend among loyalists to 
argue against independence because of France’s guardianship. Possibly stemming from the 
French paternal system of colonization, loyalists maintain that France serves a variety of crucial 
  
  
  
  
  
180 
 
roles essential to the very survival of New Caledonia and its people. Fear of exploitation is also a 
contributing factor to loyalists’ perceptions.  
We are a small country with few people who are protected by the power of 
France, even if it is weak today. But protected against the violence of big 
companies like Vale. We are protected against the appetites of China, Australia, 
the US. And people do not always realize that (Blaise Interview 2014). 
 
Commensurate with the pro-association argument, loyalists argue that France offers 1) external 
protection against exploitation by other powerful states and MNCs, 2) internal checks and 
balances that protect against corruption and discrimination, and 3) aid necessary for the country’s 
survival.  
Warnings of external exploitation by China, Australia, and the United States exemplify 
the loyalists’ fears. There seems to be a general consensus or assumption that New Caledonia’s 
nickel resources would immediately result in foreign exploitation is France was not ‘protecting’ 
the country’s mineral interests.  
Finally, we must never forget that the Republic is as the reef around our island: it 
protects us. It protects us first some of us. Recent events bear witness that there is 
some in our Bainimarama on a small country ... It also protects us from external 
predators. Again, let's look at all these ‘independent’ states that surround us: they 
were re-colonized economically, financially and politically by regional powers. 
At the UN, it is China that tells them when to raise the finger today. Do we want 
such a destiny for our country (Gomès 2013)? 
 
That is to say, I do not believe in clear independence; that is to say that if 
tomorrow there should be independence, breaking with France in quotes, I think 
very quickly New Caledonia would catch up with the surrounding powers, to 
whose ranks China, or the United States or Australia etc. in addition Here we are 
a country in which there's nickel, There are potential in terms of raw materials and 
natural resources. Not just nickel, we agree, There are yet had a story on TV. 
Inevitably one will attract the appetite of international powers, which radiate in 
the area, most prominently China or even the United States (Bernut Interview 
2014). 
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According to Gomès, France is the “reef” around New Caledonia that protects it from “external 
predators.” Other loyalists share the same view: arguing that France is the only thing that stands 
in the way of dependency or re-colonization by another state. It is not just other powerful Pacific 
states that loyalists argue France protects New Caledonia from. They also refer to the violence of 
MNCs and talk about how easily New Caledonia could become a puppet of corporations. This is 
not to say, however, that loyalists will not acknowledge their current dependency on France. 
France is merely seen as the lesser of the possible evils. Moderate loyalist Isabelle Lafleur (2014, 
Interview) said: 
One has to develop, there is a wealth in the Pacific that is very important […] 
Everything goes through the Pacific. And I think not only what is represented as 
nickel, as a resource we will remain independent. One day we will be dependent 
on someone else. And I think we have more to fear from the other great powers as 
France has always supported us. 
 
Lafleur and others believe that New Caledonia is not yet prepared for independence. Someday, 
the country may develop enough to be able to take over control of their sovereign powers, but 
not at this moment. Therefore, France serves a crucial role to protect New Caledonia from 
harmful external and internal actors. Internally, loyalists fear a “Pandora’s box of corruption” 
and Kanak violence (Blaise 2014 Interview). According to the UCF and CE, France provides aid 
and checks and balances, preserves rights, and prevents exploitation. It also ensures economic 
development and supports the education, healthcare, and financial systems in New Caledonia. As 
a powerful state and the ultimate executive authority over the New Caledonian government, 
France is well placed as a counterweight to domestic politics. It provides checks and balances 
and preserves the rights of all Caledonians, but especially the non-Kanak. In particular France 
ensue economic autonomy, recognition, and ongoing aid as a partner in the development process.  
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Table 4. French Financial Assistance to New Caledonia in Pacific Francs.1 
 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Metropolitan 
Transfers  
(in millions 
of Pacific 
Francs) 
111,122 116,594 133,189 131,899 131,607 133, 609 132,656 
Total 
Revenue 
(in millions 
of Pacific 
Francs) 
242,741 320,980 400,485 407,008 426,120 453,641 482,135 
Metropolitan 
Transfer as 
Percent of 
Total 
46% 36% 33% 33% 31% 30% 28% 
 
In 2011, France invested an estimated 132 billion pacific franc in New Caledonia (see 
Table 4). This aid accounts for approximately one-third of New Caledonia’s four hundred and 
eighty-two billion pacific franc annual revenue. Today the amount is even higher. France 
currently contributes around 150 billion dollars to New Caledonia. Financial aid from France 
supports integrated banking system, education, and healthcare, a steady flow of imports, and 
training programs that assure economic development. Approximately one hundred and twenty of 
the one hundred and fifty billion pacific francs are remitted to France because it is used to 
support French public servants working in New Caledonia. Loyalists like the FPU view France 
as a force that can rescue the country in its times of need, and insurance plan that asks little and 
takes little. Nationalist’s view of French aid is oriented around continuing aid after 
independence. Congruent with the victimization theme, aid is considered a colonial debt. After 
                                                        
1 Revised Table from: Pascal Wiorek. March 2015. Les Comptes de Secteur Public: Embellie éphémère des comptes 
publics en 2011 et 2012. Institut de la Statistique et des Etudes Économiques Nouvelle-Calédonie 34:1-4. Available 
at <http://www.isee.nc/economie-entreprises/economie-finances/finances-publiques#analyser%E9sultats-
comment%E9s-2> 
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independence French aid will continue in the form of a limited mutual agreement designed to 
help New Caledonia learn to become sovereign and military protection of the marine corridor.  
 
DESTABILIZING AN AID CULTURE: REDUCING FRENCH DEPENDENCY 
One aspect of geoeconomics examines the economic situation of a particular country 
from a global scale and associated methods of wealth collection through market control (Cowan 
and Smith 2009). This approach emphasizes supranational relationships and the way in which 
social relations are reinterpreted through market economies (Cowen and Smith 2009). Internal 
colonization, for example, describes how supranational relationships and unequal control over 
the market result in the reinterpretation of social networks. Specifically, internal colonialism is 
the institutional devaluation of sub-national populations resulting in collective inequalities: a 
form of “system[atic] inequality” (Penderhughes 2011, 236). This leads to uneven development, 
inequality, and the formation of regional identities (Agnew 2001). Combined with the devolution 
of power, these variables often produce regional movements that begin with decolonization and 
democratization, before experiencing supranationalism and a widespread identity crisis (Agnew 
2001). French assimilatory practices, economic control, marginalization, and colonial 
governance exemplify internal colonialism. The systematic inequalities created under colonial 
rule have not been adequately mediated (if not outright perpetuated) in contemporary institutions 
and governance. The Matignon and Noumea Accords are prime examples of French attempts to 
perpetuate internal colonialism and retain control over sub-national populations and resources.  
Despite the advancements made towards decentralization and independence via the 
Accords, a highly controlled dependent relationship between New Caledonia and France 
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remains. Land redistribution under both agreements merely created a rural Melanesian poor and 
resulted in another reason for migration to the capital (Connell 2003). Recognizing the 
importance of economic independence, pro-independence leaders have promoted domestic 
business creation and greater local control over the mining industry. However, financial 
assistance and technical dependence on France has fostered unwillingness among individuals to 
form businesses without direct government support. Tension between maintaining traditional 
identities and assimilating to dominant socioeconomic structures has resulted in the failure of 
many rural development projects (Horowitz 2004). This dichotomy is similarly present in 
debates over mining and associated land rights. At a local scale, conflict over mines revolved 
around local inhabitants’ desire for power over decision-making and recognition of land rights. 
Local leaders’ concern with self-determination of land rights stems from increasing integration 
into the global market and a perceived loss of traditional authority. Support or resistance to 
economic development is thus measured according to recognition of land rights and authority 
(Horowitz 2002).  
As a relatively autonomous overseas territory of France, New Caledonia enjoys an  
“assisted economy,” funded by and growing on massive transfers of public aid from France and 
the EU with little supporting infrastructure (Freyss 1995, 203; Horowitz 2004; Rumley 2006; 
Chappell, 1999; McClellan, 1999). This system is a deliberate attempt to foster economic 
dependence and reduce calls for political independence (Slatter 1989; Freyss 1995; Horowitz 
2004). Rumley (2006) contended that the Matignon and Nouméa Accords were French attempt 
by the French to re-colonize New Caledonia by artificially supporting the cost of living, creating 
dependence through significant financial aid, undermining local political expertise by flooding 
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institutions with French public servants, controlling the mining industry, and strategic bribery.  
The influx of French aid at every economic or political crisis point has created economic 
dependency that makes metropolitan aid more available at every level of society and tends to sap 
individual entrepreneurship (Freyss 1995). Loyalists and nationalists tend to agree that one of the 
most pressing ways to reduce French aid is by reducing the number or salaries of French public 
servants that work in New Caledonia. Wage control can be accomplished by capping salaries and 
letting inflation naturally reduce them according to Blaise (Interview 2014). Other efforts might 
involve restructuring wages or replacing French public servants with trained Caledonians and 
Kanaks. Both sides agree on diversification in the export market and greater local production to 
compete with French importers. For both, local production is a top priority and a key aspect of 
regional development projects. In addition, they call for tax reform to increase domestic GDP 
and reduce the need for French aid to support key services.   
While French aid is considered a colonial debt by some nationalists, it has nevertheless 
caused rampant inequality. Efforts to combat this inequality are aimed at creating economic 
projects that promote local production and reduce dependency on that aid. While each party has 
created its own economic policies, there is some continuity among them. Many nationalists agree 
that regional integration and cooperation with international organization like the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group and the Pacific Islands Forum are the solution to combating French aid and 
MNC power. Creating free trade agreements among member states and taking advantage of the 
marine economy could create mutually beneficial trade networks. Nationalists acknowledge that 
true economic development will require the Caledonian people to reduce their reliance on a 
consumerist society. Perceptions need to change for real change. One of the big problems is 
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externally oriented investment by wealth Caledonians. Because of the uncertainty surrounding 
the referendum and the lack of a sense of belonging, they choose to invest in France or Australia 
rather than New Caledonia. Nationalists argue that this capital flight must be prevented and is 
better oriented towards fostering local businesses and employing Caledonians. Reducing their 
reliance on French aid is a necessary part of rebalancing and becoming more economically 
autonomous. 
Key Sharing Program and Provincial Inequality 
The key-sharing program is another aspect of French aid designed to reduce inequalities. 
Under the Matignon Accord, the country was divided into three Provinces that would receive 
unequal shares of New Caledonia’s revenue and French aid. The key-sharing program was an 
effort to rebalance the economic inequalities created by colonialism. Colonialism created an 
economic and industrial core in the capital, Nouméa. While the regions surrounding the capital 
developed quickly with the influx of French money, investment, and migrants, rural New 
Caledonia was less profitable. This created a great imbalance in development, standards of 
living, quality of living, and employment opportunities. The Southern Province, in which the 
capital and core of economic development is located is given 50% of the allocated funds from 
the country’s revenue (Chauchat 2011). The Northern Province receives 32% and the Loyalty 
Islands receive 18%. The equipment allowance divides revenues into 40% for the Southern 
Province, 40% for the Northern Province, and 20% for the Loyalty Islands. In addition to 
unequal distribution of revenues, French aid is also unequally distributed. The country as a whole 
received nearly one hundred and fifty-six billion pacific francs from France in 2013.  
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Since the famous allocation keys in place to encourage the North and the Islands, 
they should have cause to stabilize or increase the population of these two 
provinces, particularly the Islands Province, with fewer people than there were a 
few years ago, continued to empty the benefit of the Southern Province. That is to 
say, they have migrated to the PS. This is normal, they have the right to go 
anywhere in NC, they are home. Except that behind it created needs that could not 
be met somewhere. Because this influx of population in the south of the NC 
which had fewer resources because of the fixed allocation keys, communities 
were not capable of, it was too fast, to find a solution. We find ourselves in a 
situation in which applications continue to grow and people continue to live in 
squats (Bernut Interview 2014). 
Some argue that internal immigration has made the key sharing program a source of 
inequality. In 1999 the population was divided between the three provinces: 68% lived in the 
Southern Province, 21% in the North, and 11% in the Loyalty Islands. By 2014, the population 
distribution between the provinces is 74.4% living in the Southern Province, 18.8% living in the 
Northern Province, and 6.8% of the population is living in the Loyalty Islands. A significant 
influx of external migrants as well as internal migrants from the Northern and Island Provinces 
significantly increased the population in the South: especially in and around Nouméa. As a 
result, some loyalists believe that the key sharing allocation should be revised and the heavily 
populated Southern Province given a larger share of French aid.  
It is difficult for them, because in fact there has been a colonial era that disrupted 
[disturbed] separatists a lot. Or it is possible more, I can speak of colonialism, 
when I see that the institutions we have three provinces, the Northern Province 
which is led by the separatists, the Islands Province which is led by the pro-
independence and Southern Province, led by non-independence. The Government 
is collegial, so it makes everyone work, proportional democratic representation, 
so the separatists have political power. They have the financial power since the 
Matignon and Noumea did that to rebalance Caledonia, they have more money 
than the PS. This is exactly the problem is, we had a census here we are almost 
200,000 in PS with a budget where it happens more to deal with the people of the 
Northern Province and the Islands Province come (Lafleur Interview 2014). 
 
Although provincialization historically created a system of power sharing it has become 
ineffective and led to institutional fragmentation according to loyalists.  
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So all that to say that there are two solutions: build social housing but it will not 
be enough, and there rehabilitate squats. That is to say to these areas, sometimes 
become zones of lawlessness, of frequentable areas. That is to say, that families 
can have the water ... and as part of the release of the Noumea Accord, it will 
necessarily renegotiate the allocation keys (Bernut Interview 2014). 
 
By revising the key sharing system or the provincial system of governance as a whole, the FPU 
in particular argues that a more proportional institutional balance among the regions could be 
created.  
The Southern province which hosts a majority of the population would receive the 
additional funding it needs to create an infrastructure to support this growing population. There 
seems to be an underlying current among loyalist rhetoric that the current system, which was 
designed to funnel additional money to the less population but poorer Northern and Island 
Provinces is not achieving these stated aims. For loyalists, the extra money given to these areas 
where the population is decreasing is obviously not helping create industries or jobs in these 
areas. Therefore loyalists believe this money would be better spent on the goring population in 
the Southern Province.  
Nationalists do not advocate for the reformulation of key sharing, but they do propose 
better regional cooperation. Instead, collective development projects including customary land 
development, land reform, and rural economic development could encourage Kanak to stay in 
rural areas rather than migrate to Nouméa – eliminating the need to reformulate the allocations. 
Provincial balance could instead be cultivated through initiatives targeting sustainable tourism, 
ecotourism, and tourism projects with regional cruise lines. If the key sharing divisions remain 
the same, it is certain that the nationalists who control the Northern and Island provinces will be 
pressed by loyalists to show quantifiable results to justify the status quo.  
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MINING AND THE NEW CALEDONIAN ECONOMY 
The nickel industry is at the core of economic rebalancing plans for New Caledonia and 
addressing socio-economic inequalities. New Caledonia is the fifth largest producer of nickel ore 
and contains the fourth largest reserves. In 2000 the nickel industry contributed to 92.1% of 
export revenues although a large percent of those are expatriated (Henningham and May 1992). 
Nickel extraction and refinement accounts for only 10-25% of GNP (Horowitz 2004) and 5.6% 
of salaried employment (ISEE 2001). Used for protective plating, stainless steel, and the 
production of other alloys the country is the largest producer of ferronickel (an iron and nickel 
alloy) (Ali and Grewal 2006). However, nickel is vulnerable to fluctuations in international 
market prices. Since 2007 prices have been falling from $23.50/lb. because of the economic 
recession. Only recently have nickel prices begun a moderate increase (in 2012 it was $8.00/lb.) 
(Historical Pricing 2013).  
Colonialism stripped many indigenous groups of control over their ancestral lands, and 
the resources that were part of them. In New Caledonia, this process began as early as 1847 
when French company Société Le Nickel (SLN) first began extracting nickel (Ali and Grewal 
2006). At this time nickel was used in a nickel-copper-zinc alloy to create items that could be 
silver-plated. Later nickel was used in the production of coins. As local autonomy in New 
Caledonia increased and French control began to dissipate, pro-independence indigenous leaders 
recognized that if the country were to become independent, it would need a stable and profitable 
economy. Historically, mining operations have not played a major role in the independence 
movement because mining has a lot of support from the French government, occurs in sparsely 
populated areas that are usually not good for agriculture (so are seen as having little value), and 
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the Kanak have largely remained outside the market economy and are thus less aware of the 
benefits and costs of mining (Horowitz 2004). Where problems have arisen among Kanak 
communities, mining companies have mostly been able to reach an agreement by providing 
benefits like employment. For a long time, France refused to allow foreign investment in the 
nickel mining industry, strengthening their monopoly of control over the New Caledonian 
economy. It was not until the nickel boom in the 1960s that France encouraged nickel companies 
to expand to non-French trading partners (Connell 2003). By the early 1990s, liberalized 
restructuring allowed multinational conglomerates and the indigenous Kanak population to take 
part in the mining industry (Ali and Grewal 2006). While indigenous control over the mining 
industry has increased dramatically in recent decades, Kanak controlled corporations are far from 
implementing a completely sustainable form of self-determination.  
Although the French state legally has little involvement in mining unless it involves 
atomic substances, the High Commissioner (appointed by the French government) maintains a 
position on each mining consultative body and is subsequently able to influence decisions made 
concerning mining operations (Baker and McKenzie 2013). Tax incentive schemes further allow 
France to influence the way in which the mining sector operates at the state administrative level. 
However, the Congress and individual Provincial governments control most regulations and 
enforcement of mining law. Much of the current debate regarding nickel mining is centered on 
the construction of two particular mines: Koniambo and Goro. The geographic location and 
ownership of the two mines represent the two models for the future economic development of 
mining and the country more broadly.  
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Following a neoliberal business model, the Goro mining project is almost entirely foreign 
owned, nearly all profits and benefits are exported, and little concern is given for environmental 
and human-health related damage. The mine was originally owned by three parties: the Canadian 
International Nickel Company (INCO) controlled 69%, Japan owned 21%, and the French 
government owned 10%) (Horowitz 2012). In 2006, INCO’s shares were bought by a Brazilian 
multinational mining company, Vale, located in Toronto Canada. Only 5% of Goro is owned by 
New Caledonia. This share is part of the French government’s and is divided between the three 
provinces: 5% to South and 2.5% to North and Loyalty Islands (Serre 2005). Goro’s operations 
also benefit from a fifteen-year tax exemption followed by a five-year tax reduction. It imports a 
significant portion of its labor. In addition to the lack of economic benefit for New Caledonians, 
Goro’s owners have taken little more than token steps to even attempt to mitigate the 
environmental and health hazard issues resulting from the mining processes.  
Unlike the Goro operation, the mine at Koniambo represents a move towards a system 
congruent with Corntassel’s (2002) sustainable self-determination and is a testing ground for 
socialist economics in New Caledonia. In April 1990 the Mining Society of the South Pacific’s 
(SMSP) owner Jacques Lafleur, the conservative President of the Southern Province and an anti-
independence leader, sold his company to the Northern Province at the behest of France and 
ERAMET (SLN’s parent company and 55% French owned and 45% US owned). Control of 
SMSP was then transferred to pro-independence leader Raphael Pidjot (Ali and Grewal 2006).  
The indigenous Northern Province and independence movement now had a foothold in 
the country’s biggest economic sector. Pro-independence sentiments and growing unrest in the 
1980s and 1990s were used by SMSP to pressure the French government to hand over the rights 
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to the mine in Koniambo (Horowitz 2004). Codified in the Bercy Accord, which was part of the 
Noumea Accord, SLN sold the Koniambo mine to SMSP under the condition that they would 
partner with another transnational corporation (Maclellan 2013). SMSP maintained 51% 
ownership of Koniambo, but partnered with Canadian company Falconbridge on the 
administration of the mining operation (Ali and Grewal 2006). In 2006 Falconbridge was sold to 
UK-Swiss owned corporation Xstrata and the former chief operating officer of Falconbridge Ian 
Pearce became the Chief Executive of Xstrata Nickel (Xstrata Executive Committee 2012). 
Since then, SMSP has endeavored to build new relationships with Korean and Chinese 
companies to move business partnerships away from French influence, while retaining 51% 
ownership (Maclellan 2013). Plans for new processing plants in Goro and Koniambo are 
underway, but far from completed or operational. While a refinery in the Southern Province 
would provide some additional benefit for local communities, the publically owned processing 
plant in the North would, theoretically, be more likely to reduce inequalities and reinvest in the 
community and Province.  
The Koniambo Project represents an important move for nationalists and loyalists. Both 
sides view it as an opportunity to test a more socialist economic model and the ability of publicly 
publically owned businesses to reduce economic inequalities. Greater domestic control over the 
mining industry also gives the government the opportunity to use revenues for a variety of 
development programs. For nationalists in particular, Koniambo represents economic 
independence from France and the expression of self-determination and sovereignty over their 
territory (Horowitz 2004).  
For a long time France carried out a practice of neoliberal multiculturalism where 
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indigenous leaders who conformed to French ideology were given control over resources and 
simultaneously marginalized local opponents (Finley and Brook 2012). However decreasing 
nickel prices combined with labor repression resulted in a questioning of the French role and 
imposed inequalities that ultimately led to the rise of Kanak nationalism (Dornoy 1984). Even 
with some indigenous control of nickel mining, the industry has still produced significant 
inequality because of imported labor and elite control. As a result, non-European migrants often 
side with Europeans for fear of job loss and repatriation (Connell 2003). Today France’s 
economic interest in New Caledonia has diversified. In addition to ongoing nickel extraction, the 
French state also seeks to maintain control over offshore fishing rights and some of the largest 
discovered natural gas deposits (Rumley 2006). “Adding New Caledonia’s 1.74 million square 
kilometer EEZ to that of France, for example, increases that of the latter by a factor of six 
(Maclellan and Chesneaux 1998, 237)” (Rumley 2006, 233). The Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) surrounding New Caledonia gives France control of any aquaculture and strategic navel 
importance. 
 
Rebalancing the Mining Industry and Foundations for Development 
For the FPU, social rebalancing is all about trust and balance which paves the way for 
political rebalancing based on creating a cooperative mining strategy with domestic control of 
the mining sector.  
The second thing is the nickel industry … the mining industry is a place where we 
can find a common interest with both sides of the political debate. The problem is 
that NC needs to have a common policy on mining to face MNCs and to do that 
we need to cooperate and understand that we are all complementary and that is we 
find a way to build something in common it will be good for the whole country – 
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right now each party has their own policies on mining […] In the mining industry 
the first thing would be to recognize that all the mining industries here have 
complementary skills. SMSP owns a small amount of land but they have good 
technology. SLN owns a lot of land but does not have all the technology. So if 
they could cooperate they could grow […] And in the same way it would have 
SMSP can feed SLN-rich ore that would draw in the massive Koniambo. This is 
to ensure that companies, instead of being fierce competition, and shoot himself at 
the expense of the interests of the Caledonians, it would have to be able to get 
along with her, to face the economic, market conditions together (Bernut 
Interview 2014). 
 
Gomès, Pabouty, and others also advocate for greater public control of industries like nickel. 
Public control of industry would return control over revenue distribution and allocation to the 
Caledonian ‘public.’ Leaders hope that greater public control over mining and other industries 
will result in more effective distribution of revenues to the public services that need it. 
Nationalists, like Pabouty, also seem to be suspicious of MNC motives and actions. A belief that 
is most likely supported by historical French exploitation of the nickel industry that resulted in 
little benefit for Kanak inhabitants.  
Another point is that here we have some natural resources that we can manage to 
better redistribute the wealth. We have two mining projects. In the north the 
nationalist party has control of the mining projects and they did it in a good way 
in order to make sure that people here would benefit from the project. In the south 
we are not sure what the company is doing, because they are doing whatever they 
want to do (Pabouty Interview 2014). 
 
According to UNI-PALIKA who has close ties to the Koniambo mine, nickel offers a foundation 
of funding for economic diversification. Funding that would be more likely to be reinvested in 
New Caledonian if the mines are publicly owned. While nickel, nationalists argue, can serve as 
the foundation for development and fund diversification, they understand the importance of 
promoting locally made products and therefore reducing food imports from France. This project 
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would simultaneously help develop the agricultural sector for regional export in addition to 
increasing the country’s self-sufficiency.  
Our feature, our manner [path] of designing development (which is currently the 
prerogative of the provinces, but we want to expand throughout the country), is to 
work on the basis of mining resources to diversify the economy. We know today 
agriculture is somewhat moribund, tourism was hard to surpass 100 000 tourists. 
On these issues, the question of the distance vis-à-vis countries other major 
countries that could be purveyors of tourists, it is a handicap. But the other 
handicap is the cost of living is super expensive. It works there. It is through the 
implementation of major social reforms, especially the tax-related reforms. This is 
a big mess [construction site] that is open today (Washetine Interview 2014).  
 
It is just over all that was us, they made us suffer ... the others who command, 
who do everything and we are nothing, we suffer. That means we can conduct 
agriculture policies, agricultural ... support the development of the local market. 
Today, it is important, it is the supermarkets and importers are rain or shine. And 
we would like to change this, trying that for example what is gained on the mine 
could go on agricultural development, the development of fishing to produce for 
local production substitutes for imports to better control imports (Lalié Interview 
2014). 
 
According to nationalists, local and majority public control of nickel prevents MNC exploitation 
and ensures that the distribution of mining wealth is more egalitarian. Where loyalists advocate 
for continued French control, and thus protection, of the mining industry, nationalists argue the 
same goal can be accomplished by public control of the mining sector.  
We depend too much on nickel industry and the transfers from France. I do not 
believe in the capacity of political power to promote economic diversification. 
[…] I believe in the fact that people will find their own way if we create the 
conditions, the good economic climate. So we need to keep the tax rate to a 
reasonable level (Blaise Interview 2014). 
 
To reduce dependency loyalists advocate for, using the Northern mining plant as a center of 
economic development, creating a cooperative mining strategy among parties and encourage 
sharing resources between SMSP and SLN. AN agreement between SMSP and SLN would, they 
argue, encourage regional cooperation. A partnership between the publically owned SMSP and 
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the French/multinational owned SLN would ensure that New Caledonia could retain local control 
of mining operations and encourage community participation in the process. Loyalists also 
believe this partnership would encourage sustainable development, increase employment, and 
form an east-west balance. All of this would be possible because a greater portion of the mines 
would be domestically controlled. The local population could have more control over decision-
making.  
 
CONCLUSION: ECONOMIC REBALANCING 
The role of France as a colonizing force (mustard chords) is linked to the victim 
narrative, common destiny, the Nouméa Accord, economic and social inequalities, and the view 
of France as a colonizer who exploits New Caledonia (see Figure 4). According to political 
leaders, France’s role as a protector also necessitates economic rebalancing designed to mitigate 
economic inequalities (black chord) – in the same way that its colonizer role presupposes the 
need for social and political rebalancing. France acknowledges its culpability in the preamble of 
the Nouméa Accord (1998): 
On 24 September 1853, when France claimed ‘Grand Terre’, which James Cook 
had named ‘New Caledonia’, it took possession of a territory in accordance with 
the conditions of international law, as recognized at that time by the nations of 
Europe and America. It did not establish legally formalized relations with the 
indigenous population, The treaties entered into with the customary authorities in 
1854 and subsequent years did not represent balanced agreements but were, in 
fact, unilateral instruments.  
 
Nationalists and loyalists agree that the dependent relationship created with France is unhealthy 
and unsustainable. In practice they agree on a number of methods for reducing French aid. 
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However, loyalists maintain that New Caledonia should retain strong political ties with France 
despite moving towards a less economically dependent relationship. Nationalists argue that 
dependency and economic balance cannot be achieved without a complete break from France. 
One area of agreement is greater domestic and public control of the mining industry. Domestic 
control would ensure that more mining revenue returns to the Caledonian economy and could be 
used to reduce inequality and fund the growth of other economic sectors (i.e. agriculture and 
food production and aquaculture). Economic rebalancing (blue chord) has also influenced how 
the electorate is structured and the Kanak victim frame – to give greater power to marginalized 
Kanak seeking public control over mining industries.  
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Figure 4. Connections and co-definitions among select objectives. 
Economic rebalancing is composed of a complex series of economic projects proposed by 
political parties. In general, economic projects are aimed at reducing inequality (black chord) and 
dependency on French aid (mustard chord) by shifting control of industries and businesses to a 
public model, diversifying the economy, emphasizing local production, reducing imports, tax 
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reform, and reform of the public servant salary model. Unfortunately the economic infrastructure 
created by capitalism in New Caledonia has perpetuated an infrastructure based on uneven 
development, problematizing the possibility of positive relationships between the goals of local 
communities and industries (Horowitz 2012). Although many of Kanak were rapidly integrated 
into the market economy at the beginning of the colonial period, the indigenous cultural-
economic sphere is marked by a discourse and practice emphasizing equality (Merle 1995; 
Naepels 1998; Bensa 1995). This orientation means that possessing greater wealth than one’s 
neighbors is not a mark of high social standing, a concept in direct contradiction with Western 
notions of capitalism and market economy (Horowitz 2002). As a result, development projects 
are unsuccessful because success is contingent on integrating dominant Western socio-economic 
structures that are repressed by Kanak leaders who are opposed to French control but not always 
the French government itself (Freyss 1995).  
Loyalists and nationalists share many of the same ideas for economic rebalancing or 
economic development. To reduce inequalities they advocate improving purchasing power 
parity, creating a democratic economy, increasing education and specialized training, correcting 
the artificial standard of living by reducing the cost of living, land reform, wealth sharing to 
prevent violence, increasing access to local employment, and regional development among the 
provinces in the form of education and immigration of skilled labor and businesses. Some 
loyalists promote a liberal economic plan, citing the Marshall Plan, but adapted for New 
Caledonia.  
It's a real Marshall Plan that should be involved. We need, at the same time, 
improve the purchasing power of the most disadvantaged populations and the 
middle class, fight against the high cost of living, increasing access to local 
employment and ensure greater tax fairness (Gomès Address 2009).  
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The original Marshall Plan was designed to raise standards of living and fuel economic growth 
by using the US aid to stimulate European productivity and import more European products 
(Sanford 1982). These goals would be achieved by expanding agricultural and industrial 
production, financial and budgetary restoration, and by stimulating regional and international 
trade (Tarnoff 1997). For New Caledonia, like other European Territories at the time, some of 
the aid money was set aside for development in sectors like nickel mining (Tarnoff 1997).  
CE’s economic project also involves increasing competition, especially to combat the 
dominance of French imports and chain stores. Leaders of CE, like others believe that greater 
public control of industry will make it easier to funnel mining revenues into other economic 
sectors and diversify the economy. Tax reform is also part of the economic strategy to combat 
the French monopoly on imports. Gomès also encourages New Caledonia’s participation in 
regional organizations as a way to create networks within the Pacific region. These are common 
themes in loyalist and nationalist rhetoric about economic rebalancing.  
Because we are … our economic model is based on the exchange of nickel ore 
against imported manufactured items and food. We have a local production, but it 
is very narrow. So if tomorrow we were independent and we lost the […] fixed 
rate of exchange the wages would be lower but then people would have to buy the 
same items we import – cars, food, gasoline, anything – for the same international 
prices, so they would be one-third or one-half poorer. And that would be a 
catastrophe for the country, for the people (Blaise Interview 2014). 
 
Nickel will not support New Caledonia fully, it is impossible. You have to live in 
other sectors (Lafleur Interview 2014). 
 
Everybody is talking about that. We depend too much on nickel industry and the 
transfers from France. I do not believe in the capacity of political power to 
promote economic diversification. […] I believe in the fact that people will find 
their own way if we create the conditions, the good economic climate. So we need 
to keep the tax rate to a reasonable level (Blaise Interview 2014). 
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For the UCF, economic rebalancing is about reducing inequality through tax reform, diversifying 
the nickel industry, remaining open to immigration and skilled labor, and rural development. 
Education, one loyalist leader believes, is at the core of any effort to balance economic 
inequalities and provide new opportunities for young Kanak and New Caledonians.  
Another reason why we have the problem with these inequalities is the inequality 
in education levels. Illiteracy is really high in New Caledonia, and the situation 
has been worsening for the past forty years because in the 1980s when we had the 
political events many children left school for political reasons and today we have 
to deal with the children of these children. They have been bred in families with 
two generations of un-schooling, motivated by political discourse, and in the end 
you will find the one-third of Kanak population is illiterate and in today’s world 
even for low qualification in jobs, if you cant read and cannot write, you are dead. 
So there is a correlation between this problem and the problems of inequality. In 
New Caledonia forty years ago, anyone could go to the nickel factory with any 
school and could have a career – those days are over (Blaise Interview 2014).   
 
Blaise identifies education as a critical cause of inequality that has led to economic inequality 
between Kanak and non-Kanak communities. He claims that Kanak have a tradition of not 
attending school as a form of political protest. This has led to successive generations of 
uneducated parents and children who have few job opportunities.  
First of all we need to be open to the world because we are too few people. You 
cannot expect from 250,000 people the number of soldiers, pilots, or specialists in 
computer science that you can find in a country of several million people. So we 
need to remain open to the outside world, and we need to educate people here. I 
am quite pessimistic of the prospect of the Kanak people if they don't have a 
change of mentality regarding school. Today the reject of France brings a 
rejection of school and that is a big mistake for them because they are 
condemning their children to be slaves in the world we live in (Blaise Interview 
2014). 
 
So you have to send young people, like you, to be trained for that [skilled jobs], 
that can do it all. For now we cannot, it is not enough, there is not enough people 
for that. So for now we brought in people from outside. And then we said, and 
local employment, why not go ahead. And why? Because we have to bring in 
people from outside, because none are here (Lafleur Interview 2014). 
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To complicate matters, the development of New Caledonia has moved beyond mineral 
extraction. While nickel remains a core part of the economy, jobs for uneducated youth in the 
mining sector have decreased. Blaise and Lafleur stress that in the contemporary global 
economic landscape, an education is critical for success. A lack of education prohibits individual 
economic development and economic advancement for the country as a whole. Without 
specialists and trained service industry workers advancement from a mining based economic to a 
service or information technology based economy will be nearly impossible.  
Transitioning away from a dependence on the mining industry is important for both 
loyalists and nationalists. Both encourage decreasing New Caledonia’s dependence on French 
aid.  
So first of all you need to train people, you need to reduce the share of public 
servants in the workforce in NC. We have too many public servants that would 
amount for almost 25% or 1/3 of the people. But you need to be sure that the 
people will succeed, you need to control the level of wages for the public servants 
and let inflation bring up wages in the private sector so the difference would be 
nonexistent. And then when a public servant retires you should not replace them 
like they do in France. Only one out of two. But you need to protect people 
against competition or unfair competition. I am a liberal, I believe in the power of 
competition, but I am also very realist that if someone gets into competition 
without the weapons to succeed is dead (Blaise Interview 2014).  
 
In addition, we are witnessing our country gradually being placed in a situation of 
economic dependency by the French State. Indeed, not having the slightest 
intention to withdraw from the Asia-Pacific region ‘the new place for global 
growth’ as recently stated by U.S. President Barack Obama, France maintains its 
overseas territories in a situation of being welfare handout recipients through 
‘targeted and selective’, immigration excessive tax exemption, financial transfers 
and public servant salary index-linking, all of which contribute to creating an 
artificial bubble in which occurs artificial growth with high incomes, a high cost 
of living and major social inequalities (Wamytan UNGA 2013, 14). 
 
To accomplish this New Caledonia needs to train and employ their own public servants, create a 
solid tax base that can replace some of the aid money from France, and reduce the cost of living 
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so that people are able to reasonably contribute to tax revenues. Blaise advocates for keeping the 
current aid rate at the same level and allowing inflation to decrease it naturally. 
The first thing that should be restructured is the tax system. This tax system relies 
to much on the global situation and the LME (the London Exchange of nickel 
prices). So if we are going to lower this reliance, that would be good and it could 
be done through tax restricting. One example is the VAT, which is something that 
does not exist in NC. That could lead to lowering of prices of products here. And 
in the same way it could lead to strengthening company’s actions, export, and 
development (Bernut Interview 2014). 
 
Like the other parties, FPU’s economic policy promotes tax reform, increasing exports, locally 
owned businesses, and diversification. Bernut (Interview 2014) is critical of the division of 
powers among provinces and therefore the management of resources:  
Each province has competences in tourism, employment, and environment, on 
their own with different structures and actions. This involves three more time 
people than needed. So this should be concentrated into one department with less 
people. The second thing is the nickel industry … the mining industry is a place 
where we can find a common interest with both sides of the political debate. The 
problem is that NC needs to have a common policy on mining to face MNCs and 
to do that we need to cooperate and understand that we are all complementary and 
that is we find a way to build something in common it will be good for the whole 
country – right now each party has their own policies on mining. 
 
He, like other loyalists and nationalists, understand that nickel is the core of the New Caledonian 
economy. This core has been destabilized, in Bernut’s opinion, by ineffective management. 
These problems could be remedied by creating a cohesive countrywide set of mining policies. 
Bernut also acknowledges the fear shared by many loyalists of MNCs or other countries taking 
advantage of a New Caledonia without France’s protection. However, if the country created a 
comprehensive mining strategy, they may be more likely to counter these international powers.  
Nickel is the sinews [nerve center] of war. That is to say, we will not find a priori, 
it is our belief, we will not find it to be any institutional solution without solving 
the issue prior the question of nickel between loyalists and separatists. Why is it 
necessary? Because today it there's three plants on our soil and it would require a 
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minimum of complementarity and negotiations, a strategy that is finally 
implemented for that competition benefits the NC and does not come to his 
detriment. And unfortunately it is clear now that there are as nickel strategies as 
there are political parties (Bernut Interview 2014). 
 
For the UC-FLNKS economic rebalancing specifically refers to rural development as a 
strategy for reducing inequalities. This is not surprising given the primarily Kanak demographic 
of their constituents. The Northern and Loyalty Islands in particular suffer from economic 
inequalities compared to Nouméa and the Southern Province. Both DUS and UNI-PALIKA also 
encourage rural development. Like loyalists, nationalists promote using revenues from the nickel 
industry to fund development projects and other sectors (like agriculture and aquaculture) that 
will help diversify the domestic economy. For nationalists, the ultimate goal of boosting 
domestic economic sectors is lessening the country’s reliance on French imports and aid.  
And so, it necessarily good, we talk about wealth creation from natural resources, 
mineral and stuff like minerals etc., which are exportable. There is that. And then, 
so not much of sustainable development, but actually there to avoid, to make it 
less dependent, the NC to reducing dependence vis-à-vis the outside world, in 
particular vis-à-vis imported products, consumption ... and all that. So we think 
here at home in terms of agriculture has the ability, at a number of things, to 
ensure, for example, for drinking and stuff that are untapped today or little use. 
Because until now, there has always favored the things that are, because it sells 
well, and other things we left them aside (Pabouty Interview 2014). 
 
Our feature, our manner [path] of designing development (which is currently the 
prerogative of the provinces, but we want to expand throughout the country), is to 
work on the basis of mining resources to diversify the economy. We know today 
agriculture is somewhat moribund, tourism was hard to surpass 100 000 tourists. 
On these issues, the question of the distance vis-à-vis countries other major 
countries that could be purveyors of tourists, it is a handicap. But the other 
handicap is the cost of living is super expensive. It works there. It is through the 
implementation of major social reforms, especially the tax-related reforms. This is 
a big mess [construction site] that is open today (Washetine Interview 2014). 
 
This is part of what Pabouty (Interview 2014) calls a “counter colonial economy.” This is an 
economic project designed to reduce New Caledonia’s dependence. The goal is to increase 
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exports and reduce imports. UNI-PALIKA adds that the creation of local businesses can help 
create a stronger export economy.  
Anyway, there are many things to do. It's still a new country. When we spoke of 
imported products, we are still in the spirit of colonial counter economy (Pabouty 
Interview 2014). 
 
We assume that New Caledonia is rich in raw materials, either nickel, tourism, 
land ... explorations on hydrocarbons, nickel under the mother, fish ... so here we 
risk of impoverishing itself, it imports everything and have nothing [nothing is 
made here] (Lalié Interview 2014). 
All of the nationalist leaders encourage continued participation with regional organizations. The 
Melanesian Spearhead Group in particular is cited. For nationalists, these regional organizations 
are ways to circumvent French control and ways to strengthen New Caledonia’s ties to the 
Pacific rather than their dependence on France.   
The separatists have projects in terms of economic projects, which are more 
oriented towards the region. Through the group Spearhead, we want this to be as a 
political space, solidarity between the Melanesian countries, but that it is also an 
economic space, economic exchanges. As soon as there is between Fiji, Vanuatu 
and the Solomons and exchanges. But we're in the Iron Group Lance, as a 
Movement, but we want the country to enter this exchange system. But that's in 
the Melanesian Group, but we want it to be extended to the whole of the Pacific 
(Pabouty Interview 2014). 
 
For its part, the FLNKS by its institutional representatives in Kanaky will 
reinvigorate the partnership with the Melanesian Spearhead Group through senior 
staff training, economic and trade cooperation, the development of trade, etc. The 
position of Chair of the regional organization will be in the hands of the FLNKS 
after the summit in June this year and will be a historic opportunity to anchor 
New Caledonia even more deeply in the Pacific and Melanesian environment 
(Wamytan UNGA 2013, 16). 
 
Wealth redistribution is another pervasive theme in nationalist narratives. Wealth redistribution 
refers to better management of public funds.  
Because the concern of the Government, the future state is to ensure that what we 
can gather in wealth redistribution is better. It is the public who can do it, whether 
  
  
  
  
  
206 
 
the provinces or the Government Caledonian Kanak future that can make this 
redistribution of wealth (Pabouty Interview 2014). 
 
The argument is tied to the key sharing allocation and the debate over provincial finance 
divisions.  
It's true that 72% of the population of the NC live in Greater [the agglomeration 
of] Nouméa. And so they want to change. We say that, no, the imbalances still 
exist due to the very long history. Of course there are ongoing discussions with 
the Presidents of the various collectives to see how to change things, to find ways, 
including PS to meet his own needs (Washetine Interview 2014). 
 
Some loyalists argue that migration to the southern province requires a redefinition of the key 
sharing divisions. The population in the Southern Province has increased while the populations 
in the Northern and Loyalty Islands has decreased. Meaning that the Southern Province should 
have a greater share of the country’s revenues to take care of the larger population. Nationalists 
contend that taking this money away from the Northern and Island Provinces will negatively 
impact the development of these regions. The money, they argue, funds businesses and training 
programs intended to promote economic development in rural communities. Tax reform and 
reducing the salaries of (primarily French) public servants is another primary tenet of 
nationalists’ economic programs.  
But we want to say that it is up to us to decide what we want to do in terms of 
cooperation. This is out of a central power scheme held by others. Vigilance also. 
Because we see that even if it is not the state often has a stranglehold on the 
domestic policies of countries, today it is rather the multinationals. So too, we are 
vigilant because the shape of independence can be undermined tomorrow, even if 
we have the political power. But if we do not have control of economic power that 
allows us to live and service [infrastructure] our country, we will be totally 
dependent on other countries (Washetine Interview 2014). 
 
All these things we cannot do now because we do not have the powers 
[jurisdiction over], the control over these areas, it is under French control. But 
after independence we can talk about these things. We have other powers around, 
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and it is about finding support from them to help people here in NC live as good 
as possible (Goa Interview 2014). 
 
Goa and Washetine bring up an important argument in the context of economic strategies and 
their implementation. One of the five sovereign powers still retained by France is foreign affairs. 
Certain political parties like FLNKS have found a loophole by holding observer or special status 
in regional organizations like the PIF or the MSG as a political party. However, the country’s 
ability to negotiate and enter into trade agreements with other countries and MNCs is limited by 
French control over the remaining sovereign powers. Political parties seem to agree that 
dependence on French aid and imports is a detriment to New Caledonia’s economy. Revising the 
current civil servant system, creating taxes that encourage domestic production or regional 
imports rather than French imports, and cooperative public control of the mining sector are areas 
of agreement. These are solutions that transcend ethnic tensions and may provide a place to 
begin negotiating a future for New Caledonia where each faction can agree on a common goal.  
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CHAPTER 8  
OPTIONS FOR THE OUTCOME OF THE ACCORD 
 
A broad literature exists on the possible relationships between former colonizers and their 
overseas island territories. The precedent for mainland-island relationships is extensive. 
Examples from Europe, the United States, and the South Pacific typically characterize a federal 
power structure with varying levels of local autonomy and rights shared with mainland citizens. 
Numerous studies have found that dependent relationships like association and shared 
sovereignty can be more beneficial than independence for some island countries (see 
Baldacchino 2004; 2010; Baldacchino and Hepburn 2011; Baldacchino and Milne 2009; Dunn 
2011; Hintjens 1997; McElroy and Mahoney 2000; Trompf 1993; Connell, 2001; McElroy and 
Sanborn 2005). In France decolonization resulted in independence for the colonized country or 
integration as an overseas department or territory. Departments enjoy the same rights and 
privileges as the metropolitan regions while territories have limited autonomy (Corbin 2011; 
Daniel 2005). Despite increasing decentralization the indivisible Republic rhetoric remains 
strong (Palayret 2004; De Jong 2005).  
The precedents set by other French collectives may outline possible options for New 
Caledonia. However, New Caledonia is in a unique situation because of the irreversible power
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transfer and level of local autonomy guaranteed by the Nouméa Accord. New Caledonia enjoys a 
significant level of autonomy and cultural pluralism (Young 1976). Its status as a sui generis 
territory means that New Caledonia is a federacy. The relationship between France and the 
territory mirrors a decentralized federal model, except that the New Caledonian government has 
a limited role in the French government and their relationship can only be ended by mutual 
agreement (Baldacchino and Milne 2009). The term sui generis literally translates to something 
being in a class of its own. The statutes outlined in the Nouméa Accord offer new possibilities 
for New Caledonia unique to other French Overseas Departments (DOMs) and Overseas 
Territories (TOMs). In addition, as a member of the UN Non-Self Governing list, New 
Caledonia is subject to the edicts and process of decolonization outlined for members of this list.  
Implicit in France’s taking on its UN responsibilities as administering authority, is 
an acknowledgement that New Caledonia is a non-self-governing territory, the 
future of which would therefore be bound by UN decolonisation principles. These 
principles provide a pointer to the possible future status of New Caledonia. The 
principles are laid out in two linked UNGA resolutions (1541 and 1514). UNGA 
Resolution 1541 of December 1960 provides for three options by which a territory 
‘can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government: (a) Emergence as 
a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with an independent State; or 
(c) Integration with an independent State’ (Annex). The principles include a 
commitment to an outcome based on ‘the free and voluntary choice by the 
peoples concerned’ (Principle VII (a)). In the case of the integration option, the 
outcome is to be based on ‘equal status and rights of citizenship between the 
peoples of the erstwhile territory and the independent territory to which it is to 
become integrated’ (Principle VIII), begging questions about the special 
citizenship rights France provided under the Nouméa Accord (i.e., the restricted 
electorate for the final referendum on New Caledonia’s future status) (Fisher 
2013, 195). 
 
The text above states that the UN identifies three possible solutions for the outcome of the 
Nouméa Accord: full sovereignty, independent-association, and association. Within these three 
options, my research has revealed a split among politicians who are open to independent-
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association with France or independent-association with a South Pacific International 
Organization like the Melanesian Spearhead Group. As a result of this distinction, I evaluate the 
option of independent-association with France separate from independent-association within the 
Pacific. This increases the number of options to four. Furthermore, a third accord has been 
discussed among select loyalists and nationalists. A third accord that continued to grant more 
sovereign powers to New Caledonia and further delayed a final decision or move to full 
sovereignty could fall under the association option outlined by the UN. New Caledonia would be 
continuing a conditional association rather than a permanent one. This again increases the 
options for the referenda to five possibilities. The spirit of the Accord (based on Courtial and 
Mélin-Soucramanien’s 2014 analysis), however, seems to limit these five options to full 
sovereignty or some type of independent-association. Association, and with it the possibility of a 
third accord, is not conducive to the ultimate goal of the Nouméa Accord: 
Ten years on, a new process needs to commence, entailing the full recognition of 
the Kanak identity, as a pre-requisite for rebuilding a social contract between all 
the communities living in New Caledonia, and entailing a shared sovereignty with 
France, in preparation for full sovereignty. […] The State acknowledges that it is 
appropriate that New Caledonia achieve complete emancipation at the end of this 
period (Nouméa Accord 1998). 
 
Interestingly, a contingent of both loyalists and nationalists believe that the outcomes of 
the referenda are pre-determined. Loyalists believe the 60/40 division in favor of loyalists in the 
New Caledonian government will translate to a 60/40 split in favor of maintaining ties with 
France. Nationalists believe that the Kanak majority within the population and the freezing of the 
electorate will give them an advantage in favor of full sovereignty. The referenda are merely the 
democratic acts that lead to political decolonization (Néaoutyine 2014). Instead of a consensus 
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solution, Goa (LNC 2013; DNC 2014) argues that people must battle together for independence 
through the referenda. 
Although the Nouméa Accord calls for three successive referenda on independence, 
loyalists like Gregoire Bernut and Philippe Gomès believe that there should only be one 
referendum held. In the Declaration of his party, Calédonie Ensemble, Gomès writes: 
[B]ecause there will be winners and losers the referendum will inevitably raise the 
questions of the acceptance of those who were beaten […] it is unrealistic to think 
we could gather around a table […] winners will inevitably be prisoners of their 
victory in the face of the vanquished humiliated by their defeat. 
 
Instead Gomès argues for one informed referendum where the options for the outcome of the 
Nouméa Accord are clearly presented by all sides. The fear narrative is not unique to Gomès nor 
is the possibility of political violence in the wake of the referenda. Here Gomès talks about the 
referenda as if they are predetermined, destined to fail and destined to lead to nationalist-led 
violence. However, fear and uncertainty are common themes found in loyalist critiques of the 
referenda and independence.  
[…] that is the right to vote and the right to local employment. That's citizenship 
for now. As it will evolve? I fear that if we close ourselves off, it will be even 
more restricted. And for New Caledonia that is not a good thing, people should be 
able to come here, live here (Lafleur Interview 2014). 
 
Well most non-Kanak are scared of independence because what they hear in the 
speeches of the nationalist movement is a threat to them. And during the last 40 
years there has been a lot of violence against the ones who are not Kanak. So they 
know that in an independent country, they would be under-citizens. It is very clear 
when you listen to what the most radical of the nationalists say. Even if they have 
white people with them and try to have a different image. The fact is, when you 
scrape the surface you very easily find the rest of this discourse/speech [ethnic 
superiority]. They tend to be more on the pro-French side. You will find that is 
true among most of the Wallisians. Some leaders like Sako who tried to negotiate 
a place for the Wallisian people with the nationalists based on the fact that they 
are both people from the pacific ocean. Well that is, in my opinion, that is a very 
intellectual way of seeing each other. Because in the places where there is unrest 
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like Canala or Saint Louis, you don't find many Wallisians in there. There used to 
be Wallisians in Saint Louis, but they were expelled. I think that if we had, 
against us, a true nationalist, multiracial movement we would have lost a long 
time ago. But their main weakness is that they are too ethnic and they cant bring 
confidence to the other communities so most people know they need to remain 
French if they want to survive (Blaise Interview 2014). 
 
The referenda are repeatedly framed in terms of violence, chaos, and ethnic tension. The 
violence in the 1980s, although deadly and grounded in ethnic divisions, never rose to the 
extremism of ethnic cleansing. Some have described it as a civil war, but the more common 
reference is the Events. The threat of violence in the context of the independence debate today is 
cited (almost exclusively) by loyalists refers to protests in the wake of the referenda.  
While some of our people [loyalists] are scared by the violence that the 
nationalists may extort [or result] on us do not to go to the referendum and reach 
the conclusion of the Noumea agreement there will be dangerous. But democracy 
is not dangerous: democracy is democracy (Blaise Interview 2014). 
 
[I]t is totally unrealistic to think that we can be gather around a table, with the 
independence to discuss together after they have undergone one, two, or even 
three successive failures. Winners will inevitably prisoners of their victory in the 
face of the vanquished humiliated by their defeat. We must avoid that the winners 
of the referendum are prisoners of their victory over the vanquished humiliated by 
their defeat. However, the issue of independence, which is delayed for thirty 
years, can not be dodged forever. It must therefore be asked, but not in terms of 
front and sterile opposition between those who are for and those who are cons: 
you have to put it in terms of projects for our country, building a shared set of 
alternative output of the Noumea Accord. This is the new horizon that we offer 
(Gomès 2013). 
 
Gomès is one of the most outspoken loyalists who believe a series of referenda will lead to 
violence. The idea behind one informed referendum is making sure that the population and all 
political actors understand the choice before them, and the consequences that will result from 
their ultimate decision.  
They are afraid of what will happen to them. You cannot ask business leaders to 
invest, when you invest is expensive, it is on the long term. When we do not know 
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what will become of not investing. So the territory's economy is very fragile 
(Lafleur Interview 2014). 
 
The independence that could result from the referenda is described as an institutional void; the 
nationalists plan a mere fig leaf. In the meantime, the country’s political uncertainty has, 
according to loyalists, created economic uncertainty, an unwillingness to invest internally, fear, 
and economic fragility.  
 The Nouméa Accord and international law restrict and open new possibilities for a post-
referendum New Caledonia. According to the Nouméa Accord, three referenda on the future of 
New Caledonia must take place between 2018 and 2022. However, the Accord does not define 
what question or questions must be voted on in the referenda. International law offers three 
possible questions or outcomes: full sovereignty, independent-association, or full association. 
The data shows that these options have been expanded and refined into five possible choices 
facing New Caledonians: full sovereignty, independent-association with France, independent-
association with a country or international organization in the Pacific, full association, or a third 
accord. Chapters Five through Seven identified and deconstructed the themes and narratives that 
influence decision-makers’ stance on independence. The following sections in Chapter Eight will 
explore how those narratives and the way in which they are framed promote or hinder each 
possible outcome.  
 
OPTIONS FOR THE OUTCOME OF NOUMÉA ACCORD: STEERING COMMITTEE 
 
Each year following the signing of the Nouméa  Accord a group of Caledonian politicians 
gathers in Paris for the annual Signatory Committee. Both loyalists and nationalists meet with 
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French officials and discuss the progress made towards the outcome of the Nouméa  Accord. 
After the 2011 Signatory Committee, the French Prime Minister created the Steering Committee 
on the Insititutional Future of New Caledonia (SCIFNC) in response to the demands of the 
signatories (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014, 3). The goal of SCIFNC was to determine 
the options for the completeion of the Nouméa  Accord independent of the political parties. Jean 
Courtial (French Councillor of State), Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien (French law professor), 
and Stéphane Grauvogel (delegate of the French Overseas Deputy General) explored and 
synthesized the institutional options for the future of New Caledonia: presenting their findings in 
a cohesive Report to the Prime Minister in 2014. The eighty-six page document outlines three 
primary options for the institutional future of New Caledonia based on the Nouméa Accord: full 
sovereignty (independence), sovereign state partnership (independent association), and extended 
or self-perpetuated autonomy (autonomy within the French Republic or provisional autonomy). 
Independent association can be realized through a partnership with France or another 
independent state or international organization. This exapnds the number of options, in reality, to 
four. As part of option three, association with France (or self-perpetuated autonomy), New 
Caledonians could choose to enter into a third accord that would again delay a decision on 
indpendence. Thus, there could be up to five options for New Caledonia in the upcoming 
referenda. These options are: 1) full sovereignty, 2) independent-association with a sovereign 
Pacific state or international organization, 3) independent-association with France, 4) assocaition 
with France, and 5) a third accord. Despite these options, the authors readily admit that the spirit 
of the Nouméa Accord requires eventual full sovereignty. Therefore, options three and four do 
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not completely adhere to the text of the Nouméa Accord, but can still be asked as part of the 
referenda.  
 The first option for the outcome of the Nouméa  Accord is full sovereignty. The term full 
sovereignty is used instead of independence because independence fails to acknowledge the 
necessary interdependencies of seemingly sovereign states. In today’s globalized world, 
complete independence is nearly impossible. Therefore, the term sovereignty or full sovereignty 
is more often used. Full sovereignty would certainly fulfill the spirit and mandate of the Nouméa 
Accord (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). Initial cooperation with France after 
independence would necessarily be narrow. At first, the country would focus on creating its own 
institutions, dealing with transferred powers, and developing the state. Courtial, Mélin-
Soucramanien, and Grauvogel (2014) agrue that New Caledonia should rely on France for the 
first several years after independence. Cooperation in areas like education, defense, foreign 
relations, justice, and public health could help New Caledonia better develop institutions to 
support these formerly French controled powers. The authors offer several examples of these 
types of cooperative agreements from the decolonization of Côte d’Ivoire. The treaties included: 
consultation on foreign policy issues, military assistance, a five-year aid package, cooperation on 
judicial procedure, higher education, culture, and civil servants. However, this system created an 
almost puppet government and perpetuated dependency on France and Europe. Therefore, 
Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien (2014) advocate for the termination of French aid after full 
sovereignty is achieved. In a fully sovereign New Caledonia, sovereignty would be determined 
by the state’s population. A decision regarding Caledonian citizenship and the possibility of dual 
nationality would need to be addressed. After full sovereignty, New Caledonia and France could 
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reach an agreement about dual nationality or France could enact a law providing for New 
Caledonian nationals (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014).  
The second option for the outcome of the Nouméa Accord is independent association. 
Under independent association, New Caledonia would first become sovereign and then choose 
which powers to delegate or or share with a foreign sovereign state. New Caledonia would give 
up some of its sovereignty to a foreign state or regional network. New Caledonia would be able 
to partner with France, a Pacific country, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group, or others. Although France retains control of the sovereign power of international 
relations, New Caledonia and the political parties that represent it have made significant 
connections with regional and international organizations. These organizations offer an 
important opportunity for independence parties advocating independent association and 
rebalancing more broadly. New Caledonia currently headquarters and s a member of the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) that includes 22 island states and territories and their 
colonizers (Australia, France, New Zealand, the UK, and the US) (Rumley 2006). France 
essentially banned any political discussion including New Caledonian independence at the SPC.  
As a result the South Pacific Forum (later the Pacific Islands Forum) was founded in 
1971. The SPF initially prevented France and all of its territories from becoming members in the 
organization. However, after signing the Nouméa Accord, New Caledonia became an observer 
and then associate member of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) composed of al of the self-
governing and fully sovereign states Pacific Islands. PIF also includes dialogue partners or states 
with regional interests in the Pacific like France. This organization made a special associate 
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member status for New Caledonia and continues to affirm the importance of self-determination 
and the full implementation of the Nouméa Accord (Fisher 2013).  
New Caledonia is also a member of the international economic community called the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group. Current members include Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon 
Islands, Vanuatu, and the FLNKS party in New Caledonia (Rumley 2006). The Group was 
initially formed to support Kanak claims to independence in New Caledonia. Recently it has 
shifted to an economic focus. In 1993 the Group formed a Free Trade Agreement and followed 
up with the creation of a Free Trade Zone in 2006 (Fisher 2013). As part of the South Pacific 
Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement between Australia, New Zealand, and 
other regional states ties to Australia and New Zealand are likely to grow (Rumley 2006). 
These types of partnerships are defined by their density or duration, are constitutionally 
based or merely consist of the exchange of resources (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). 
Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien (2014) emphasize the importance of a fully sovereign 
partnership. Each state involved is fully sovereign and can terminate any agreements at any time. 
The partnership could be implemented in two different formats: through an international legal 
agreement or as a domestic law in each state’s constitution. By anchoring the agreement in the 
domestic laws and constitution of each state, it is less likely that fluctuation in the political 
majority will result in the dissolution of the agreement. While not limited to a partnership with 
France, Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien (2014) argue that their common history, language, and 
culture provide a solid foundation for continued association. Regardless of the partner state or 
states, the authors emphasize the importance of a strong partner or regional network that can 
foster beneficial interdependencies and serve as a protector. Under this system, dual nationality 
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would be provided to those who wish to maintain ties with France or their home country. An 
examination of comparable agreements finds that partnerships are often long term and 
incorporate both an international agreement and supportive domestic laws. Like the first option, 
independent association is congruent with the Nouméa  Accord because New Caledonia becomes 
fully emancipated and all sovereign powers are transferred from France.  
The third option for the outcome of the Nouméa  Accord is extended or provisional 
autonomy. These options are similar to independent association except that France would retain 
or be delegated control of the sovereign powers (public order, justice, defense, currency, and 
foreign affairs) in a form of federalism or decentralized autonomy (Courtial and Mélin-
Soucramanien 2014). Although New Caledonia would remain part of the French Republic, its 
autonomy would be even further extended. The authors explore examples from the UK and New 
Zealand where this combination of federacy and unity with the state have been implemented. 
This option would require asymmetrical federalism, adequate Caledonian representation in 
France, internal federalism and balance, a more effective method of political decision-making 
(alternative to consensus), and the creation of an agreeable definition of citizenship. Federal or 
quasi-federal systems with varying autonomy allow regional units greater control and autonomy 
over certain aspects of political, social, and economic life (Dieckhoff 2004). Multinational 
federations like France and its Overseas Collectives include national minorities that are tied to 
the state through some form of territorial autonomy and internal boundaries. Within this model, 
power distribution can ensure that each national group is able to remain a distinct self-governing 
cultural community. Unfortunately, this option does not fully comply with the Nouméa  Accord. 
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Therefore it might be implemented as a provisional agreement where the atainment of full 
sovereignty is merely delayed (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014).  
 
Table 5. Outcomes Advocated by Political Party. 
Possible Outcomes of the 
Nouméa Accord 
      
Independence/Full 
sovereignty 
UC-
FLNKS 
UNI-
PALIKA 
DUS Lafleur 
(UCF)2 
  
Independent-Association 
(with France or with 
another state or 
international organization) 
UC-
FLNKS 
UNI-
PALIKA 
DUS    
Permanent Association 
with France 
   UCF FPU CE 
Third Accord   DUS UCF   
 
There are strong political loyalties to the options presented by the Steering Committee. 
Almost all loyalists outright reject the possibility of independent-association, but leave the option 
for a third Accord that might lead to eventual full sovereignty open. Table 5 indicates the options 
for the outcome of the Accord and which party blocs are willing to entertain those outcomes. 
According to the Special Committee of 24 on Decolonization, colonies have three options for 
decolonization: integration with equal rights (independent-association), free association 
(association), or independence (full sovereignty). The following sections examine political 
leaders’ perspectives on the possible outcomes of the Nouméa Accord. These individuals will be 
among the fifty-four congressional representatives that determine the questions asked and voted 
on in the referenda. A number of them will also be implementing the outcome of the referenda.  
                                                        
2 Isabelle Lafleur is currently anti-independence. However, she is open to the possibility of independence in the 
future, provided New Caledonia continues to develop and becomes less reliant on French aid and support. This view 
is not shared across the coalition of parties that compose UCF. 
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PARTY PLATFORMS AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES ACCORDING TO THE 
LOYALIST COALITIONS 
 
Union pour Calédonie dans la France (UCF) Coalition 
Anti-independence leaders of the UCF argue that independence will lead to a loss of 
French aid, an increase in inequality, and will result in the sacrifice of political liberties. The 
referenda therefore should result in association with France.  
My opinion is that we need to re-organize the status quo. There are some French, 
we can farther than today. Because we are already very far from the Republic – 
one step beyond and we will be independent. Some people try to sell us an 
independence that will be left and a federal state, but the French political tradition 
is based on the unitary republic. If France was a federal state like Australia or the 
US there would be no debate we could incorporate a New Caledonia state and 
things could be clear, but if we build something that would have the name ‘state’ 
in New Caledonia, there would happen in a few years conflicts of legitimacy 
between the authority of the state and the local power. I am convinced that if after 
this kind of political innovation, if we had unrest, a civil war – anything, and a 
local political leader contested the authority of the French power, France would 
not be in a position to bring in the police, gens d’armerie, or the military. Because 
then this local person may be legitimate to ask for the mediation of the US, and 
then who would be sent to New Caledonia. Blue helmets from Papua New 
Guinea, from Fiji, from the spearhead countries. We know what that means to us. 
So I fight against the idea of the ‘false good idea’ of New Caledonian state 
because that is a lie that is independence in disguise of autonomy. We need to 
know who in the end has the last word and that must be the French state.  
Whatever happens, even if we have unrest or insolvency there cannot be two 
masters on a ship (Blaise Interview 2014). 
 
The referenda, they say, have created economic uncertainty and a fear of unknown violence. The 
UCF advocates for permanent association with France because leaders believe that New 
Caledonia and its government are not ready or prepared for independence.  
But in my opinion is that the Caledonia, and I shocked many when I say that, is 
not ready for independence. If one day it had to be independent because the 
population would have decided, we must be ready for that, you have to be trained 
for that, be educated, have the skills. We are transferring a lot of powers 
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[authorities]: law, civil law, commercial law, the right to judge, they all come 
from the outside. So I think we are a small population on an island, far from 
everything, and what is important is to be trained for that. It is legitimate for the 
Kanak, because it is an ideology that they have had for a long time access to that 
independence. Me, my feelings, I am very down to earth, is independence, if we 
are prepared, if one is able to assume financially, humanly, technically, yes. But 
for now this is not the case, it is absolutely unable to fend for himself (Lafleur 
Interview 2014). 
 
While Lafleur (Interview 2014) leaves open the option for eventual independence, she is not 
hesitant to say that the lack of a local skilled and educated class along with the idealism of 
nationalist parties has left the country unprepared for the responsibility of independence. A third 
accord is therefore a different way to frame continued association. Unlike the option for 
permanent association, a third accord would provide a definitive end date for New Caledonia to 
prepare for the possibility of full sovereignty.  
 
Front pour l’Unité (FPU) Coalition 
The theme of consensus is pervasive in the FPU’s vision of association with France. 
Bernut (Interview 2014) highlights the need for dialogue and discussion prior to the referendum. 
He advocates for a freely negotiated option where the parties could reach a consensus that 
includes remaining integrated with France.  
The idea is to maintain the current status. It is already very autonomous, but there 
remain a lot of powers [authorities] to be transferred. So the idea is to find a 
solution, according to the expectations of each other, which creates a consensus 
[…] (Bernut Interview 2014). 
 
That is to say, I do not believe in clear independence; that is to say that if 
tomorrow there should be independence, ‘breaking with France,’ I think very 
quickly New Caledonia would be scooped up by the surrounding powers, to 
whose ranks China, or the United States or Australia etc. (Bernut Interview 2014). 
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FPU’s leaders argue that New Caledonia already has a significant level of autonomy, so 
permanent association would include status as a special territory in France, shared sovereignty 
and territory, and liberal decentralization. Liberal decentralization would mean continuing New 
Caledonia’s autonomy from France, a kind of laissez faire self-governance without French 
involvement.  
 
Calédonie Ensemble (CE) Party 
As a loyalist party, CE is against independence. Independence is framed as a “leap into 
the void” and as an unknown outcome. Therefore, Philippe Gomès advocates for one informed 
referendum rather than three, which he believes would prevent increasing Kanak violence after 
each subsequent referendum.  
The referendum of the Noumea Accord would lead to chaos, we have always 
considered in Caledonia Together, the referendum, as provided by the agreement 
would lead to chaos. First, because by opposing advance winners and losers, the 
referendum will inevitably raise the question of acceptance of the result by those 
to be beaten. Then, because it is totally unrealistic to think that we can be gather 
around a table, with the independence to discuss together after they have 
undergone one, two, or even three successive failures. Winners will inevitably 
prisoners of their victory in the face of the vanquished humiliated by their defeat. 
Last but not least, because none of the options posed by the referendum is 
completed. If "yes" to independence won, no part of this independent state status 
is known. Nor its institutional organization, nor the system of civil liberties or the 
nationality or the place of non-nationals, nor the economic and financial relations 
that would remain, if any, with France. Clearly, if independence is chosen by the 
Caledonians, it's a real leap into the void that is proposed by the Noumea Accord. 
And in the same way, if this is the option that France wins, we know nothing 
about the future institutional organization of the country, because the Noumea 
Accord has nothing definite about it (Gomès 2013). 
 
Like, the FPU he argues that negotiations should take place prior to any referenda. Prior 
negotiations will allow the parties to define their goals, platforms, and define emancipation and 
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independence. This information can then better inform the populace and their choice during the 
referenda.  
Other political movements - independence and non-independence - Want to go to 
triple referendum under the Noumea Accord, likely to occur after 2014. If this 
were the case, there would be chaos. First, because it would draw the Caledonians 
against one another, partly because it would lead to an institutional void. Indeed, 
if the ‘yes’ to independence won, no part of the independence option is 
understood or known. Similarly, if the proponents for staying in France were the 
majority, the Nouméa Accord does not provide an option for the institutional 
organization of New Caledonia emancipated within the Republic. Rather than a 
blind referendum Caledonia Ensemble offers negotiate with the separatists and the 
government, following the provincial election of 2014, a new political agreement 
defining the contents of the two social projects Possible future: that of 
independence and the maintenance within the Republic. This is because we will 
build together the two branches of the alternative policy that is offered to our 
country that the election results will be accepted by all. It is through this process 
of dialogue and mutual respect that we can overcome our differences and the 
Caledonian can vote knowingly. It is this method that offers Caledonia Together 
for the release of the agreement: that of an informed referendum leading to a 
choice for the future appeased. Released in which we focus our project for our 
country: that of New Caledonia and several emancipated asserting its own identity 
within the Republic (Gomès 2013). 
 
Why an informed referendum? [Gomès responds] “Because the Noumea Accord 
provides that the Caledonians first choose their future independence or continued 
in France and trying to give content then. We, we propose to do the opposite: both 
projects, that of independence and that of an emancipated country in the Republic, 
must be clearly defined before being submitted to a vote of the people.  
Why a referendum for peace? Because this approach requires us to conduct 
negotiations on the two branches of the alternative, before the referendum, instead 
of being forced to negotiate, later, on the only path chosen by the people. We 
think this way, each political sensitivity will be better able to take on the choice 
made by the Caledonians for the country's future, whatever it is” (Frédière 2013).  
 
CE is split on the idea of consensus. Gomès believes that consensus would result in a 
guillotine referendum where each party would pick and choose the aspects of the Nouméa 
Accord that they want to implement rather than accepting all parts of the document as a whole.  
Calédonie Ensemble, from the outset, favored a "consensual solution" because we 
believe the referendum out of the agreement - for or against independence - a 
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referendum is "guillotine", which will draw the Caledonians against each other, 
generating ethnic, social and political tensions (Gomès 2013). 
 
However, Poadja (a Kanak congressman from CE) argues in favor of a need for consensus 
among actors. Association is defined by CE as a shared project or shared alternative that will 
lead to peace. Emancipation will occur through shared sovereignty between New Caledonia and 
France. According to Gomès, the idea is to maintain the current system; which he believes 
already provides New Caledonia with extreme autonomy, sovereignty, and limited emancipation. 
CE allows for a potential independent-association relationship with France on the condition that 
New Caledonia cedes all of the five sovereign powers to the French Republic.  
 
 
 
PARTY PLATFORMS AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES ACCORDING TO THE 
NATIONALIST COALITIONS 
 
 The goals of nationalist parties can be broadly organized in terms of Mikesell and 
Murphy’s (1991) table on policy solutions to minority-group aspirations. The territorial 
objectives of nationalist parties are ultimately independence, even though they would accept 
independent association. Although independence has not yet been decided, nationalists in New 
Caledonia have gained aspects of territorial separation and autonomy. Separation might include 
“exemption from societal norms” and be legalized through “community autonomism”  (Mikesell 
and Murphy 1991, 589). In New Caledonia this is exemplified through tribal communities and 
the return of customary lands. Autonomy might be expressed through “control of minority 
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region, devolution, or regional unilingualism” (Mikesell and Murphy 1991, 589). The Nouméa 
Accord ensured the devolution of powers from France to New Caledonia and the Matignon 
Accord divided the territory into three Provinces that gained some self-governance and 
autonomy.  
The Kanak in New Caledonia have succeeded in all of the non-territorial objectives 
outline by Mikesell and Murphy (1991): participation, access, and recognition. Participation 
typically implies some type of power sharing or involvement in policy decision-making. Possible 
avenues for participation include: proportional representation, ethnic quotas in public servant 
positions, or special majorities in legislative bodies. The Kanak dominated North Province and 
Loyalty Islands benefit from proportional representation in the Congress. They often gain a 
majority or nearly all of the seats in the Provincial Assemblies. In addition Kanak nationalists 
and loyalists enjoy a significant level of participation in the territorial Congress and Executive if 
not in French legislative bodies. Within nationalist discussions of economic rebalancing, a 
number of policy demands concerned with access were brought up. Mikesell and Murphy (1991) 
relate access to a lack of discrimination, employment opportunities, opportunities for 
advancement, and special subsidies. These objectives can be solved through affirmative action 
programs, anti-discrimination laws, and assistance programs. Both the Matignon and Nouméa 
Accords have made provisions for Kanak job training, education, and have encouraged local 
employment. However issues of access remain a concern for many Kanak living in rural areas. 
Finally, recognition is accompanied by acknowledgement and respect of a minority group’s 
unique characteristics through the institution of an official language of special cultural 
institutions. These were also addressed as part of the Preamble of the Nouméa Accord. These 
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objectives and results combined imply that New Caledonia is more pluralist on Mikesell and 
Murphy’s (1991) scale.  
 
Union Calédonienne-Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (UC-FLNKS) 
Coalition 
 
The leaders that I interviewed and collected information about in UC-FLNKS believe that 
the future domestic government, under independent-association or full sovereignty, should be 
characterized by a democratic system that integrates Kanak and French values.  
After one has advantages the advantages are to rediscover our freedom. We are 
not free here since it's another country that tells us a number of things including 
sovereign powers. Because there are all the powers [authority, jurisdictions] 
transferred to New Caledonia, but on the issue of sovereign powers, it is the state 
that is not ours, strangers [foreigners, aliens] who are present here which dictates 
their own laws. So the advantage is first to rediscover together all these powers 
exercised not by a people in a given country, and from there this people and this 
country decides what to do with their own freedom. But people are sovereign in 
their decisions. This is the first advantage (Wamytan Interview 2014). 
 
And that is the challenge to Kanak people is how to share with others who are 
there already for a long time, there are some who are there from the beginning of 
colonization, so how to ensure to share this right then with the others. And we still 
feel that there is always a kind of friction between this project the vision of this 
country should become independent because it is our right, it is a right and then 
the others who are here with us and that hinder [impede, slow], because they are 
not so keen to be independent, because they are afraid or they do not see why it 
should be independent and they think in terms of the benefit. While we is not in 
terms of benefits we reason, our logic is not benefit us is above all a right. We 
were colonized and ask only that makes us our freedom. And this is the fault line 
[dividing line] between us and others (Wamytan Interview 2014). 
 
To decide what we want to do for our future. Disconnect our management of the 
country over a Western France that puts us in a consumer society becomes 
infernal today. For us, our claim is to be able to opt for social justice, allow 
political decisions that govern our lives. So opt for a policy of social justice, 
which accounts for human values and the other more. Perhaps also a policy that 
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considers more the environment […] So we, are thought to be, to have 
sovereignty, it allows us to make decisions that will enable us to live better. To 
live in harmony with wealth, the needs and the future of our country is far from 
the world and today is somewhat sacrificed on the interests that are not 
necessarily ours. That does not mean that we do not want to be in the 
development of the world, we simply want to be, have the power to decide (Lalié 
Interview 2014). 
 
In particular, they propose a system of legal multiculturalism or pluralism. This is where their 
continuity with loyalists ends. According to nationalists, independence is the cumulative result of 
social justice and would ensure freedom, dignity, and sovereignty.  
But the central issue is to permanently close the parenthesis [digression/ close a 
chapter on], of colonialism. Because having another country who put you under 
the influence is there. After one has the option following the three options, either 
to be completely independent, or to partner with France and then to integrate fully 
and there colonization is closed, colonialism. Since restored the colonized people 
that possibility to tell which way I'll go […] Of the two options [in the 
referendum], the preference order of priority is the full and complete 
independence. Independence in association necessarily with France. And a final 
integration. As we are in the Pacific, for example if tomorrow working on a 
federation Melanesian States, with Solomon, Papua New Guinea, if these 
countries manage to federate, integrate, in these cases New Caledonia could 
integrate itself in the Federation of the Melanesians States, since it is our area. If 
you want politically I lay open, the second formula of the association is left open. 
The association with the French state is an option in the second option (Wamytan 
Interview 2014). 
 
New Caledonia cannot avoid independence. The point is to get ready and contact 
NC neighbors so when it is time to talk – the idea is to put police behind the fronts 
and the other countries will be there to support New Caledonia in the talks. Their 
vision is to build a country with all the citizens that were here to build this country 
and reinforce the mining countries to have more weight internationally and also 
countries. We also represent French culture in the middle of an Anglophone 
pacific […]UC chose independence and then independence with association. But 
you can’t talk about association until after independence happens because that is 
what the Noumea agreement requires. Because we are under French control we 
cannot discuss state to state, we are not on the same level yet (Goa Interview 
2014). 
 
Certainly, like all independent countries, there will be agreements, contract 
management, things that can be shared with other partners, including France, 
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Australia, the USA, Japan over dynamic or geopolitical interests that engage us all 
in the Pacific Basin. Because we feel good that there is a shift of interests, since 
there are riches on earth, but now it goes to the riches diving. So it is also 
necessary that we be there for our decision can weigh. Otherwise we will find 
ourselves always suffer the decisions of people who do not have the same 
interests. And also with a little to preserve our humanity Caledonian, which is 
Kanak or Métis finally Melanesian or European origin (Lalié Interview 2014). 
 
Them they want us to stay as we are, we are the absolute sovereignty is proposed 
to have the power of decision, even after passing the agreements with France on 
the management of areas, but not on the full skills. So we may terminate the 
agreements when we are not in agreement, or that we are disappointed because we 
have control over the decision. But compared to the geopolitical interests of 
France may wish to monitor the economic zone, but otherwise if they are not we 
will work with other countries. That is why we must explain because there is 
more independent countries. Independence We talked to place things, but there is 
no independent country. Even France is no longer independent, so the notion of 
independence is more the concept of decision making, but that means that there 
are accompaniments [strings attached] (Lalié Interview 2014). 
 
Under independent-association, New Caledonia would become an autonomized territory of 
France or the region. The relationship would be federally structured with greater autonomy given 
to New Caledonia. The option for eventual full sovereignty would remain open and New 
Caledonia would engage in regional consensus or receive financial assistance from France.  
 
Dynamique Unitaire Sud (DUS) Party 
Sylvain Pabouty, President and founder of Dynamique Unitaire Sud, views independence 
as emancipation from a colonial power. Fear of the unknown, he argues, holds critics of 
independence back.  
Obviously the party, the movement to which I belong, and that is the DUS, 
composed mostly of former PALIKA militants, campaigning in the South, is 
strongly positioned in the independence camp (Pabouty Interview 2014). 
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Along with that option for us FLNKS with the independence movement in 
general, they must also accompany this, a separatist project. That is to say that 
would give guarantees to those who are wondering which ones not hesitate 
radically are against independence, period. For those who say you never know, or 
maybe not. This is because they have no real answer except the fact that we must 
move towards independence, to access the full sovereignty. But it is necessary 
that the independence movement gives them guarantees, guarantees on citizenship 
guarantees on land, guarantees I would say when I talk about the nationality, 
citizenship, is that they can have the double -nationality or not for a while, or not 
etc. etc. These are things that they arise, they are very practical, that for now the 
independence movement did not give clear answers, we must work on it […] So 
we need the nationalist movement to be able to say, to be able to tell the 
Caledonians who voted, they have no fear, no it will not be chaos as claimed by 
the loyalists, and finally the non-independence. To say, here is how we will 
manage sovereign powers, for a while, with such powers, either with France or 
with countries in the region etc. etc. Because there are countries in the region that 
are independent, and with whom we can work on some issues (Pabouty Interview 
2014). 
 
Pabouty (Interview 2014) acknowledges that nationalists’ plans for independence are unclear. As 
a result Caledonians want guarantees in the form of citizenship, land, and the option for dual 
nationality. Although he acknowledges the option of a third Accord (quasi-independence) and 
says that independence is always the first choice, Pabouty (Interview 2014) does outline an 
option for independent-association. 
After, I think the Noumea Accord, this irreversible process of the Noumea Accord 
is a result of a previous situation of the Matignon. This is a sequel only better, 
there is a progression. And the Noumea Accord, the Matignon is an improvement 
over earlier statutes. So anyway, a situation after the Noumea Accord can not be 
below the Noumea Accord, it must necessarily be more of the Nouméa Accord. 
That's why I was saying that if we implement all the features of the Noumea 
Accord, it would put us in a quasi-independent status. And after the Noumea 
Accord, one must discuss these sovereign powers. I'll just add that this is, as the 
situation after going to be a quasi-independence (Pabouty Interview 2014). 
 
He emphasizes that this option means cooperation between states as equals. Independent-
association is a form of independent shared sovereignty like the relationship between France and 
the European Union. This relationship is possible with France or within a regional Pacific 
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organization. A partnership with a regional organization is more symptomatic of consensus and 
collegiality, and would necessitate the integration of Kanak, French, and Pacific values.  
 
Union Nationale pour l’Independence – Parti de Libération Kanak (UNI-PALIKA) 
Coalition 
 
For UNI-PALIKA the referenda, which all of the historically excluded can participate in, 
are a truly democratic act and represent the culmination of political decolonization.  
We the issue of independence is above all a right. All peoples have the right to 
decide what they want for their future. And we have always considered that the 
history of colonization and all that it has meant, it goes against the principle of 
humanity. So for us colonization was first that. I mentioned earlier that Kanak 
penned [confined] in reservations. This is the fate endured by a number of 
workers like Indonesian, Javanese who ... so for us it is inconceivable. So the 
Kanak people considered that to restore their rights, it goes through the same 
command of the decision on the future of his country. So for us the question of 
independence arises in a natural manner. All peoples have the right to decide what 
they want [desire] to do for themselves, for their country, for their land 
[homeland], for their subsoil [underground], their environment ... and their right 
there to share it with others, those who came [later]. They were considered to 
have been somewhat victims of colonization, because they lived in the same 
exclusion. So for us it is inconceivable to live under the dictates of the powerful, 
multinational, the world of money. So to get out of there, the option is the 
independence of the country. And independence is above all to put the country's 
resources to the service of the greatest number [of people] (Washetine Interview 
2014).  
 
The leaders of UNI-PALIKA make a point of saying that the referenda should be informed – an 
argument first made by Philippe Gomès the President and founder of Calédonie Ensemble. 
However UNI-PALIKA still believes in holding three referenda unlike Gomès. UNI-PALIKA 
claims that association would lead to confusion and New Caledonia would become a mere 
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puppet government of France. Therefore, full sovereignty or independence is the first option for 
the outcome of the Nouméa Accord. 
[T]he issue of independence is the case of countries that have been decolonized in 
the 1960s. France has decided to, for example, to give independence to African 
countries. But that's a unique transformation [change]. It's more of France ... they 
have simply  put people but continues to produce the same things. This is called 
‘fantoches’ or puppets. So, that type of independence is not what we want here 
(Washetine Interview 2014). 
 
Full sovereignty is the ultimate expression of decolonization, but Caledonians fear it because 
they “fear a socialist stamp on the output of the agreement” (Néaoutyine LNC 2014). There is a 
second option however. UNI-PALIKA would support a system of independent-association with 
France or as part of an international regional organization. Finance in particular would be an area 
of collusion. 
So to give independence can be broken down in several ways. Independence, we 
all know that countries today say, or want to be independent are no longer at all. 
Take the example of a sovereign country like France, which today has decided to 
abandon a number of sovereign prerogatives. France no longer has its own 
currency, it is no longer independent in the matter of security ... it works in an 
institution that is NATO. So for us independence, it is above all that the people 
here decide their own future. How is this done [achieved] ? In terms of 
cooperation it is still possible to imagine, because it is not possible to imagine 
living completely closed in on ourselves, we need to live within a region. That's 
why we made the effort to work in conjunction with the countries of the 
Melanesian group. We try to work with countries in the area of cooperation. So 
the idea of working in particular with France is not excluded. After it will be to 
say what is the perimeter that we would be prepared to accept, and who should 
play in a shared manner between the state and us, a free and independent country. 
 
Néaoutyine and Washetine view independent-association as a middle ground option between full 
sovereignty and association. Washetine argues that the whole idea of consensus goes against the 
Nouméa Accord. But for Néaoutyine, in particular, the whole concept of independent-association 
as a result of the referenda represents a consensus solution. Nationalists achieve full sovereignty 
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and loyalists could succeed in retaining ties with France be ceding some powers to it after 
independence is achieved.  
 
POST-REFERENDUM DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT, CONSENSUS, AND 
DEMOCRATIC MULTICULTURALISM 
 
 Aside from party divisions over independence or association, there is a debate regarding 
the future structure of the domestic government in New Caledonia. Regardless of the result of the 
referenda, there is a good chance that the domestic political institutions in New Caledonia will 
undergo at least some revision to alleviate the concerns of the losing side. The current political 
system in New Caledonia combines parliamentarianism, representative democracy, and 
collegiality.  
There are three Provincial Assemblies, directly elected on a five-year basis. Of the 
members of the Provincial Assemblies – forty members in the South, twenty-two members in the 
North, and fourteen members in the Islands fifty-four are elected by popular vote to five-year 
terms in the unicameral Congress. Proportional representation means that the South receives 
thirty-two seats, the North fifteen, and the Loyalty Islands receive seven. The Congress elects an 
Executive Government or cabinet of five to eleven members that are responsible to the Congress. 
The head of the Executive Government is the President of the Territorial Government. The 
proportional voting procedure ensures that the main parties together make up a collegial 
government. The Congress Executive consists of a President, eight Vice-Presidents, two 
secretaries, and two questeurs that are elected annually. Each year a Standing Committee and 
Standing Committee President are also elected. The Customary Senate is a consultative body that 
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oversees matters concerning the Kanak population specifically. It contains two representatives 
from each of the eight customary regions.  
There is little doubt that multiculturalism informs governance in New Caledonia. The 
minority rights assigned through the Nouméa Accord both recognize and maintain cultural 
difference through citizens’ rights. The Kanak enjoy certain rights as members of a customary 
society that are not available to all citizens of New Caledonia.  
Two civil states are in force in the territory: a special status and common law. 
This is the decree of 21 June 1934 instituting in New Caledonia a civil state of 
indigenous citizens of particular status, in order to take into account customary 
procedures for certain acts, including marriage and adoption. The coexistence of 
these two civil states is recognized in the 1958 Constitution, which guarantees for 
citizens of overseas French, conservation and respect for their personal status; 
which implies in particular the recognition of customary forms of family 
organization and transmission of assets. The customary status is currently 
governed by a decision of the Territorial Assembly of 3 April 1967, recently 
completed by the Organic Law of 19 March 1999. These are the mayors and 
officers of the civil state who keep records of customary civil status Customary 
Society 2012). 
 
These rights include automatic inclusion on the Provincial electorate and Referendum special 
electorate and governance under customary civil law rather than French civil law. 
Individuals whose personal status is within the meaning of Article 75 of the 
Constitution, the Kanak customary status described by this Act, shall be governed 
by customary civil law (Organic Act Article 7 1999, 6). 
 
Customary status also affords Kanak representation in the customary senate, which informs on 
issues related to Kanak identity. Approximately 39% of the population in New Caledonia holds 
customary status.  
Any project or proposed law of the country related to identity symbols, as defined 
in Article 5, customary status, the customary land regime and 
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especially the definition of leases to govern relations between customary 
landowners and operators in these lands and customary discussion regime, 
boundaries of customary areas, as well as election procedures customary senate 
and customary councils is transmitted to the customary Senate by the president of 
the congress (Organic Law Article 142 1999, 57). 
 
The Customary Senate is consulted, as appropriate, by the President of the 
Government, by the president of Congress or the president of a provincial 
assembly on interesting projects or proposals deliberation Kanak identity. It can 
be consulted by the same authorities on any other project or proposal for 
deliberation. It can also be consulted by the High Commissioner on matters within 
the competence of the State (Organic Law Article 143 1999, 58). 
 
Customary lands cover approximately 27% of the total land area in New Caledonia (Customary 
Society 2012). These areas are under the particular jurisdiction of customary councils, clans, and 
tribal governance. They are inalienable, non-transferable, and not open to seizure. The 
organization of customary lands, jurisdictions, and the political system can be organized into this 
chart created by the Customary Senate (Customary Society 2012): 
 
Figure 5. Customary Governance Structure in New Caledonia. 
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Finally, legislation and programs designed to promote Kanak customary languages and culture 
were created to preserve their distinct identity in the face of increasing marginalization by 
Caledonians and recent immigrants. Eight customary languages, based on the eight language 
families, are taught in junior high and high schools throughout New Caledonia (Customary 
Society 2012).  
In order to contribute to the cultural development of New Caledonia, the latter 
after consultation with the provinces, the State concludes with a special 
agreement. It deals in particular with the Kanak cultural heritage and the Tjibaou 
cultural center. Kanak languages are recognized as languages of instruction and 
culture (Organic Law Article 215 1999, 105). 
 
However, according to Banting and Kymlicka (2004) multiculturalism also rejects policies that 
promote assimilation or selective exclusion. How can a government assign and uphold minority 
rights without inherently excluding the majority population? This debate is pervasive in the New 
Caledonian context. Blaise’s response to whether multiculturalism exists in New Caledonia is 
telling:  
[I]n New Caledonia we have built a political system that takes into account the 
nationalist movement since we have cut New Caledonia into three provinces. Two 
belong with the racial population of the nationalist movement – they are headed 
by Kanak people and that will not change for generations because they are in a 
majority in the North and almost alone in the Islands with 98% of the people. So 
we have a long way before taking the Island province. So this multicultural or – I 
don't know if its multicultural – in fact we take into account the minority that 
already exists. The government is collegial which means that the congress elects 
members of the government on the same ratio as the elected people in the 
Congress. But the problem with that is that it is very hard to lead this government 
because when they don't want to sign a text you need to buy the agreement with 
gifts in exchange of their vote. That is not a good way of leading a country, so in 
many ways this can only be helped by asking for a return to the majority rule. 
You know in the modern democracy you can be elected President with 51% of the 
votes and no one will contest that – you won. And the other one lost. Because you 
need someone to lead the country so democracy is an imperfect system, but it is 
the less stupid we have found. So my opinion is that we have explored the limits 
  
  
  
  
  
236 
 
of what we can do to inform the minority in the government. Going farther would 
be a political impotency (Blaise Interview 2014). 
 
There is a sense among nationalists that integration between Kanak, French, and Pacific values 
needs to continue to occur. And that it should be formally integrated with the judicial and 
governing system to create symbiosis between the populations. Caldoche and Caledonian fears 
of a fully sovereign new Caledonia controlled by Kanak nationalists may also be a contributing 
factor. Some loyalists like Blaise argue that the minority rights given to Kanak far surpasses the 
mandate of the Nouméa Accord and which should certainly not be extended further. Others may 
believe that maintaining these minority rights and further cultivating programs like legal 
pluralism will help pacify Kanak without needing full sovereignty.  
With fear of exclusion and marginalization on both sides, Banting and Kymlicka’s (2004) 
liberal multiculturalism seems to be an ideal solution for New Caledonia because it is the attempt 
to create more space for democratic multicultural politics – something advocated for by loyalists 
and nationalists promoting integration and democracy. Liberal multiculturalism also seeks to 
mitigate fears of ethnic politics creating destabilization by providing sub-state groups a form of 
quasi-sovereignty and equality within the state system (Banting and Kymlicka 2004; Galston 
2004; Larmore 1996; Rawls 2005). For indigenous groups, liberal multiculturalism includes: (1) 
recognition of land rights, (2) recognition of right to self-government, (3) upholding treaties, (4) 
recognition of cultural rights, (5) recognizing customary law, (6) representation or consultation 
in the central government, (7) constitutional or legislative confirmation of the distinct status of 
indigenous peoples, (8) support/ratification for international agreements on indigenous rights, 
and (9) affirmative action for indigenous communities (Banting and Kymlicka 2004, 248). All of 
these requirements are already in place to some extent in the domestic governance of New 
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Caledonia. However, some loyalists argue that the sub-national rights awarded to the indigenous 
population are counter to the ideological equality promoted by the French Republic since the 
Nouméa Accord and multiculturalism itself.  
 The formation of a consultative customary body, collegial representation in the executive, 
and parliamentarianism already promotes several of the ideals of multiculturalism. However, 
both nationalists and loyalists are calling for changes in the political structure to ensure equal 
representation of the population. Self-determination is possible through policies aimed at 
recognition, and control over land, resources, justice, recognition of human rights and 
punishment of rights violations, and the opportunity to freely express cultural diversity 
(Kolvurova 2010; Weller 2009; Berg 2009; Knight 1982; Barelli 2011; Niezen 2003). A number 
of these forms of self-determination have already been granted under the Nouméa Accord. The 
Accord set up an institutional basis for customary governance and created programs to encourage 
Kanak culture that are examples of recognitions and the right to express cultural diversity. The 
Accord further granted control over certain areas of land and resource rights giving Kanak the 
opportunity for economic self-determination. Finally, the Accord sets up a system of legal 
pluralism in the justice system. The legal pluralism called for in the Nouméa Accord has been an 
ongoing platform for nationalists advocating for greater multicultural integration in New 
Caledonian institutions. Nationalists are calling for greater integration of customary modes of 
governance, legal pluralism, and democracy.  
The Kanak identity has to irrigate all the sectors and in all those sectors it can be 
an inspiration for doing thins. One example is consensus, the government here is a 
consensus type government. So people who are a member of the government, 
from all the parties, everyone is in the government. They are all represented, and 
this is a Kanak way of doing things, consensus. It is also and Oceanian, Pacific 
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way. This is one of the examples of how the Kanak identity can irrigate all of the 
sectors. Consensus government is unique in the world (Pabouty Interview 2014).  
 
[The Nouméa Accord calls for] Redefining the legal status of acts of customary 
authorities to give them full legal force. Promoting the role of traditional 
authorities (social prevention and criminal mediation association in the 
preparation of decisions of local assemblies) (Regional Caribbean Seminar 2001). 
 
According to UC-FLNKS, legal pluralism means that the justice system integrates aspects of 
customary mediation and local context. The Charter of the Kanak People (2014) defines legal 
pluralism as: 
The co-operative legal pluralism: The solution retained by the Kanak people is to 
set it up through writing, and adopt the common system of Kanak values, then to 
register it in a system of co-operative legal pluralism where coexist together, on 
the same level of equality, common law and customary law. The customary legal 
system should be more flexible and more pragmatic, because it will be a matter of 
respecting principles and not written codified rules. 
 
Similarly, UNI-PALIKA argues that a future government must integrate characteristics of 
customary governance – a form of political rebalancing at the national scale. UNI-PALIKA and 
UC-FLNKS advocate for better management of provincial governments so that they can serve as 
a checks and balances system – something that greatly concerns many loyalists. 
Some loyalists view consensus as another form of political rebalancing. They argue that 
emancipation can still be achieved through shared sovereignty and general agreement or 
consensus. Consensus is defined as majority agreement on an issue. However the majority can be 
defined in a variety of ways. For example, I believe loyalists view the majority and therefore 
consensus solutions in political terms – politically, loyalists hold the majority of power. This is 
exemplified by their repeated denial of the possibility of independence due to a 60/40 political 
split in representation. However if the majority is defined in terms of the population of New 
Caledonia the 60/40 split becomes a 40/29/31 (Kanak, European, other) split favoring the Kanak 
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(ISEE Statistics 2009). Loyalists also advocate for integrating Kanak customary and French 
values and greater democracy. Some promote social democracy, a form of majoritarian 
democracy that is not collegial and does not include minority rights, and others promote a more 
direct participatory democracy and power sharing.  
[We] need to find ways to transform the legitimate aspiration for dignity of 
marginalized Kanaks into a more noble way that provides access to 
responsibilities, welfare, and material success without sacrificing political 
liberties … (Blaise Interview 2014) 
 
With few distinctions, the UCF outlines a plan for the structure of the New Caledonian 
government after association. The government would be based on a democratic, majority-rule 
type system. For Blaise (Interview 2014) this means no federalism, collegiality, or preferential 
minority rights. For Yanno (DNC 2013) this means a federal relationship within the French 
Republic, consensus, and a negotiated future. For Lafleur (Interview 2014) the domestic 
government would be both collegial (with an elite class that shares power equally) and 
proportionally (the number of representatives is based on population) democratic to prevent 
corruption. For the FPU the New Caledonian government would be characterized by majority 
based power sharing, participatory democracy, and require proportional representation in 
Congress. Under association, CE characterizes the domestic government as a social democracy 
that combines “ground floor earth sharing” and “liberty, equality, fraternity” and prioritizes 
respect and freedom (Gomès LNC 2014). 
 
  
  
  
  
  
240 
 
INCORPORATING PARTY OBJECTIVES INTO POTENTIAL OUTCOMES  
 The pro and anti-independence outcomes promoted by each party are a simplified means 
of summarizing complex networks of narratives and perspectives. In Chapters Five through 
Seven, I identify the dominant narratives underpinning the independence debate and explore how 
those narratives are framed or defined. Chapter Eight begins with a discussion of the possible 
outcomes and how parties frame their pro or anti-independence narratives. However, dividing 
parties into pro and anti-independence camps oversimplifies their platforms, affiliations, and 
goals. In this section I give equal weight to every goal (or frame) identified in political narratives 
irrespective of whether the frame is associated with a loyalist or nationalist party. Nationalists 
will always promote independence in some form and loyalists will always advocate for 
association with France. But each politician identified specific objectives that are part of a 
network that supports a particular outcome.  
 I initially used a concept map to outline the dominant narratives and their associated 
definitions or frames that can impact the outcome of the referenda (see Figure 6). Ovals represent 
the narratives that can influence the outcomes and the rectangles are the way in which political 
parties frame those narratives. For example, the stance on sovereignty narrative represents a 
politician’s platform on independence. Beneficial means that a politician supports independence 
and detrimental means that they do not support independence. Stance on sovereignty is valued 
equally with the other twelve narratives. Figure 6 summarizes the narratives and frames 
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identified and explained in Chapters Five through Eight. 
 
Figure 6. Framing of Objectives that define outcomes. 
The way these objectives or narratives are framed and how they co-define each other can 
be used to identify which of the five options facing New Caledonia meet a majority of the 
politician’s objectives. Each frame supports, does not support, or has no discernable impact on 
each of the five possible outcomes. As explained in the methodology, I categorized each frame 
according to whether it supports, does not support, or has no impact on each of the five outcomes 
using the information gathered from interviews, news sources, and other party documents. The 
following sections explain how each frame was categorized and the reasoning for that 
categorization.  
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Electoral roll eligibility restrictions have not prevented an increase in the number of 
voters registering for the special electoral role. Despite an increase in the number of eligible 
voters and an increase in participation, overall participation has dropped from 77% in 2004 to 
73% in 2009 and 70% by 2014. At the same time, pro-independence parties are gaining ground 
in the national Congress. In 2004 congressional seats were about 67% loyalist and 33% 
nationalist. By 2009 this had changed to 57% loyalist and 43% nationalist and in 2014 54% 
loyalist and 46% nationalist. If the additional eligibility restrictions required for the referendum 
electorate are taken into consideration, the split between pro and anti-independence voters is 
estimated closer to 50/50 (Bolis 2014). The goal here is to examine my third research question: 
how does the framing of the narratives identified in Chapters Five through Seven and the 
narratives themselves promote or hinder certain outcomes? There are five options that can be 
voted on during the three referenda: full sovereignty, independent-association with France, 
independent-association with another state or international organization, association with France, 
or a third accord. While I do not advocate for one outcome over another, the following 
assessment provides a useful starting point for examining the potential outcomes of the Nouméa 
Accord and the extent to which certain narratives and objectives outlined in Chapters Five 
through Eight support these outcomes.  
 
Legality of Outcomes, The Nouméa Accord, and Decolonization 
In their report on the institutional future of New Caledonia, Courtial and Mélin-
Soucramanien (2014) offered five options or five questions that could be asked in the referenda. 
Of those five options, they found that association with France or a third accord that lengthened 
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New Caledonia’s association with France did not entirely uphold the spirit of the Nouméa 
Accord (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). They are part of a grey area that is not entirely 
legal vis-à-vis the Accord, but is not out of the realm of possibility either. The Nouméa Accord 
legally supports all of the outcomes, but is more likely to support full sovereignty or independent 
association because that is its ultimate goal. It does leave room for the less likely possibilities of 
association with France and a third accord as a means of further preparing New Caledonia for 
eventual sovereignty. 
According to the political parties, all of the options outlined are possible vis-à-vis the 
Nouméa Accord. Nationalists believe that the Nouméa Accord allows for full sovereignty and 
independent-association. Loyalists believe the Accord make exceptions for association with 
France or a third accord if either of those options receives a majority vote in the referendum. The 
United Nations and international law also uphold these possible outcomes with the exception of a 
third accord. A third accord would mean another delay in making a final decision on full 
sovereignty that does not respect the timeline agreed to by France, the signatories of the Nouméa 
Accord, and the UN. Simply based on legality, the most likely options are full sovereignty and 
independent-association.  
The Nouméa Accord also outlines a process for the decolonization of New Caledonia:  
 
Decolonization is the way to rebuild a lasting social bond between the 
communities living in New Caledonia today, by enabling the Kanak people to 
establish new relations with France, reflecting the realities of our time. […] Ten 
years on, a new process needs to commence, entailing the full recognition of the 
Kanak identity, as a pre-requisite for rebuilding a social contract between all the 
communities living in New Caledonia, and entailing shared sovereignty with 
France, in preparation for full sovereignty (Nouméa Accord 1998). 
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Nationalists tend to frame decolonization as a process whose only terminus is full sovereignty 
and therefore an independent New Caledonia. Decolonization framed as independence is more 
likely to result in full sovereignty or independent-association and not likely to result in 
association or a third accord. Others frame decolonization in terms of rebalancing to promote a 
common destiny, which can be achieved as part of any outcome. In this case, decolonization as 
common destiny would make any of the options likely because a common destiny and 
rebalancing can be achieved through any of the outcomes. The idea of a common destiny is 
defined in numerous ways. Framing decolonization in terms of common destiny merely means 
that decolonization is part of the development process of New Caledonia. Decolonization is a 
process experienced by all inhabitants of New Caledonia so, in terms of common destiny, it does 
not present a strong argument in favor or against any particular outcome.  
The Accord itself seems to clearly call for full sovereignty. Loyalists argue that New 
Caledonia is not ready for complete independence and should continue sharing sovereignty with 
France. Some loyalists are open to the possibility of eventual full sovereignty while others hope 
that another delay will make some pro-independence communities complacent with the status 
quo.  
 
Common Destiny 
 Common destiny itself is a popular sentiment that is both well and ill defined. Many 
iterations have been outlined in Chapter Six. It is most frequently defined as living together or 
building together. Common destiny as living together is used by loyalists and emphasizes New 
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Caledonian populations living together peacefully and a cooperative relationship (living 
together) with France. This framing makes an association relationship or a third accord the most 
likely outcome. Full sovereignty or independent-association are less likely to satisfy this type of 
relationship with France given the Republic’s desire to maintain control over mining and other 
economic interests in New Caledonia.  
The building together approach to common destiny is dominant among nationalists who 
view common destiny as a process that is not yet complete. Building a common destiny together 
is an internal process where France is excluded because of its colonial role. As a result this 
requirement is more likely exemplified in an independent relationship where France has less 
power and involvement. Association with France or a third accord would give France the power 
to perpetuate New Caledonia’s dependence on French aid, imports, and public servants from the 
mainland. 
Internally, common destiny is defined as reconciliation, the desire for equal rights, 
integration, and in some cases, leaders argue that it promotes racism. Reconciliation is possible 
through any of the possible outcomes. However, none of the outcomes strongly promote 
reconciliation, making it likely to occur with any outcome. Integration, while promoted by both 
sides, is more of a loyalist discourse in the sense that integration, like living together, is framed 
in terms of internal integration and external integration with France. Integration with France is 
most likely to occur through association or a third accord. However, nationalists and loyalists 
also seek internal integration among the diverse populations inhabiting the country. Integration 
can mean integrating customary and French forms of governance, values, or law. This is likely to 
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occur under any of the outcomes because most decision-makers argue that this is a necessary part 
of living together peacefully.  
Although loyalists seem more apt to ignore the racial undertones present in the 
independence debate, Kanak nationalists are very aware of them. Racism is present between 
Kanak and Caledonians, between Kanak other Pacific Islanders who have migrated to New 
Caledonia, and between recent European migrants and Kanak. Given France’s approach to 
minority rights and tolerance of other cultures, association or a third accord might be less likely 
to end lingering racism. Racism between Kanak, Caledonians, and Pacific Islanders might be 
best solved through independent-association where New Caledonians are forced to cooperate and 
build strategic relationships with other Pacific countries. Some of the problems that foster racism 
among these groups might be solved by closer ties with other Pacific countries on immigration, 
or economic development. But given France’s current stance on ethnicity and ability to ignore 
racial issues, association with France may serve to only exacerbate these problems in New 
Caledonia. Equal rights are a loyalist vision of common destiny that promotes greater inclusion 
of all inhabitants of New Caledonia. This means broadening membership in the special electorate 
and giving more inhabitants the right to citizenship. This would skew the expanded voting 
population in favor of association or a third accord. It would also win over non-Kanak minority 
populations who fear marginalization by Kanak and desire greater power in the domestic 
government. This makes full sovereignty and independent-association less likely. 
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Victimization, Identity, and Social Rebalancing 
 The victim narrative, social rebalancing, and definitions of identity are intimately tied 
together (see Figure 2). Those who believe the Kanak were the only victims of colonialism also 
emphasize the dominance of the Kanak identity, assimilation to Kanak culture, and promote an 
extreme view of Kanak rights above all others. This perspective is most likely to result in full 
sovereignty or independent-association within the Pacific. Independent-association with France 
is possible and association or a third accord is not likely. Social rebalancing as a means of 
reversing Kanak marginalization is more likely to occur if the country became fully sovereign or 
independent because the Kanak would have greater control of the domestic government without 
intervention from the French state. Kanak marginalization is not likely to be reversed if the 
country becomes permanently associated with France or if a third accord is agreed to because 
France and loyalists will continue to marginalize Kanak power.   
A slightly more generous view argues that Kanak were not the only victims of 
colonization. The Communards, forced laborers, and other colonized people were also victims of 
history. Those who agree with this argument are more likely to view identity in terms of a 
Caledonian national identity or a plural identity that respects diversity and rejects a unitary vision 
of identity. A Caledonian or plural identity that integrates all communities is likely to result in 
any outcome. The victims of history narrative also supports the current eligibility requirement for 
the special electoral roll and the restricted electorate that would result in any of the possible 
outcomes. Both of these arguments are commensurate with the idea of Kanak marginalization 
and social rebalancing that might include minority rights or special privilege for these groups. 
The victims of history narrative is thus likely to result in any of the outcomes.  
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A small group of loyalists believe French-Caledonians were the victimized (given Kanak 
violence in the 1980s) and uphold a French identity in New Caledonia based on a common 
language and history with France. This view is more likely to promote an associative outcome or 
likely to promote an independent-association with France that would ensure a continued close 
relationship with France. This population would also believe that Caledonians are being 
excluded and that social rebalancing would insure this population garners greater power and ends 
minority rights that prohibit total equality. The final requirement in social rebalancing is the 
acknowledgement of segregation in the contemporary New Caledonian society. This concept is 
directly connected to the idea of racism explored as a failure of or obstacle to common destiny.  
 Segregation refers to the social inequalities that exist in New Caledonia. Kanak tend to 
hold lower paying jobs and suffer higher rates of poverty. For rebalancing to occur, the cost of 
living and unemployment rates among Kanak needs to decrease. French imports, aid, and public 
servants have artificially inflated the cost of living. According to nationalists, full sovereignty or 
independence that lessens French control over public servant wages, the economy, and their 
monopoly on imports would help decrease social inequalities. Currently France controls a large 
portion of and provides a vast amount of the imported goods available in New Caledonia. Many 
local grocery stores purchase goods almost exclusively from their partner companies in France. 
In conjunction with French aid, this is another method for continuing dependence. Independent-
association, association, and a third accord leave room for policy to be enacted to reduce 
inequalities, but are less likely to result in significant change. 
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Citizenship  
 Citizenship, like identity can influence how people think about independence and what an 
independent New Caledonia would look like. Currently citizenship is defined as the right to vote 
in the provincial electorate and the right to hold local employment in New Caledonia. After the 
referenda a decision will have to be made on the members of the Annex Table. The definition of 
citizenship reevaluated to either include or exclude members of this population. While the 
inclusivity or exclusivity of citizenship may not have a direct impact on the outcome of the 
referenda it is certainly a contributing factor in the decision of which outcome is the best for the 
future of a peaceful New Caledonia. The status quo is an exclusive citizenship based on the 
current restricted electorate and could result in any outcome. The restricted electorate offers an 
even split between nationalists and loyalists. 
 Kanak who fear marginalization if recent immigrants are given citizenship may tip the 
balance towards independence. However if voters and politicians believe that the post-
referendum citizenship will be Kanak (citizens of Kanaky) they may be more likely to choose an 
association relationship that would ensure France could be a counter balance to Kanak power. In 
this case, association or a third accord is more likely. If citizenship is defined more inclusively 
any of the possibilities are likely. Caledonians who know that they will retain equal footing with 
the Kanak population may fear independence less and may be more willing to accept full 
sovereignty or independent-association.  
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Special Electorate, Self-Determination, and Political Rebalancing 
Certain objectives are framed in a way that would result in the redefinition of the special 
and restricted electoral rolls. As a result the 50/50 split between pro and anti-independence 
factions predicted for the restricted electoral roll could shift in favor of Kanak or non-Kanak 
voters. Self-determination as a shared right, political rebalancing through freezing the electorate, 
and an exclusive frozen special electorate exemplify the current interpretation of the Nouméa 
Accord. These views could result in any of the outcomes. If self-determination is defined as a 
uniquely Kanak right then the restricted electorate should only consist of Kanaks. A restricted 
electorate defined in these terms is more likely to vote in favor of full sovereignty or 
independent-association. 
On the other hand, the right to self-determination for all would allow all or nearly all 
inhabitants of New Caledonia to participate in the referenda. Equal rights as part of common 
destiny, political rebalancing through the termination of minority rights, political rebalancing 
through equal rights, and instigating a sliding or inclusive special electorate would all result in a 
similar outcome. Allowing nearly all of the inhabitants in New Caledonia to vote on the 
referenda would significantly tip the scale in favor of a non-independence outcome. Association 
would be more likely, full sovereignty would be not likely, and a third accord could be likely to 
result. Equal rights for all inhabitants is less likely under independent-association because 
nationalists (who are not as supportive of recent immigrants) and loyalists would have equal 
power. A sliding electorate may also result in independent-association with France since it 
represents a middle ground between the two widely divergent views.  
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Economic Rebalancing and Perception of France 
Economic rebalancing and economic projects are framed in relation to perceptions of 
France. Politicians view France as a helpful partner and protector or as a colonizer and villain. 
This view of France directly impacts each party’s plan for economic rebalancing. Within party 
narratives on economic rebalancing there are three areas of agreement: reducing inequality, 
reducing dependence on France, and increasing local control of the mining sector. For 
nationalists, reducing inequality is best accomplished by becoming fully sovereign and then 
perhaps working with France or another state or organization on mutually beneficial economic 
agreements. Full sovereignty or independent-association are more likely to result in this 
outcome. For loyalists, reducing inequality is possible only through continued partnership with 
France in a permanent association. A compromise between these situations might be 
independent-association with France. Reducing economic dependency on France and retaining 
greater control over mining is most likely to occur under full sovereignty where the government 
of New Caledonia or its citizens could have greater control over internal policy and industries.  
If France is viewed as a supporter and protector of New Caledonia and its interests an 
associative relationship or independent-association with France would be the best way to 
continue that protection. However if France is considered a colonizer or villain that seeks to 
control and exploit New Caledonia for its own gain then full sovereignty or an independent-
association relationship where New Caledonia is a sovereign partner are more likely to achieve 
this goal. Similarly, if a party and the population views full sovereignty as beneficial to the future 
of New Caledonia it logically follows that they will vote in favor of an outcome that includes 
some level of independence. However if full sovereignty is framed as detrimental to the future 
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development of New Caledonia, votes are likely to favor an associated outcome whether it is full 
association or a form of shared sovereignty.  
CONCLUSIONS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE NOUMÉA ACCORD 
Taken together, the narratives and frames identified in Chapters Five through Seven 
present a series of narratives and frames that support each party’s pro or anti-independence 
stance. These thirty-nine frames represent the primary narratives found in loyalist ad nationalist 
rhetoric about the independence debate. They can be summarized into nine themes: self-
determination, identity, rebalancing, citizenship, the role of France, the role of the UN, common 
destiny, the electorate, and victimization. These nine themes are further grouped into narratives 
on: self-determination as a right, the goal of decolonization, the goals of the Nouméa Accord, the 
stance on the transfer of powers, electorate eligibility, citizen membership, definition of national 
identity, victimization, definition of common destiny, the role of France, the role of the UN, 
stance on French aid, stance on key sharing, plans for the mining industry, general plans for the 
economy, and desired outcomes for the independence debate (see Figure 6).  
The loyalist and nationalist parties primarily identify as either pro or anti-independence. 
In general the narratives identified and interviews suggest that full sovereignty may be 
nationalists’ first choice, but they are certainly open to allocating certain powers to France or 
another state after independence. They recognize that New Caledonia has come a long way in its 
development, but understand the country’s current limitations. The loyalist leaders, with the 
exception of Lafleur, unwaveringly focus on association as the only option open to New 
Caledonians. Lafluer argues that New Caledonia might not be ready for independence right at 
this moment, but she does not rule out the possibility for eventual independence. In the previous 
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sections, I examined the narratives and objectives of each party individually. By approaching 
party objectives in this manner, I found that nationalist and loyalist narratives have greater 
instances of cooperation than initially recognized.  
In particular, both factions agree on several points regarding decreasing New Caledonia’s 
reliance on French aid and encouraging growth in the domestic export market. While nationalists 
and loyalists may not agree on whether the key sharing allocations should be revised, they both 
recognize that the inequalities that exist between provinces should be remedied. Both sides find 
continuity in the idea of common destiny being a project that is accomplished together and 
recognize that there is room for improvement. A significant portion of both loyalists and 
nationalists also seem to recognize the need for a multicultural or plural national identity that 
integrates French, Pacific, and Kanak values and customs. Areas of difficulty remain in regards 
to who has the right to self-determination and therefore who has the right to become a citizen and 
vote on the referenda.  
For right now, at least, this is the biggest issue facing the Territorial Congress in the next 
few years because the electoral divisions and membership has the power to tip the balance in 
either direction. If the electorate remains frozen, the voting population will have to determine 
whether they want to: further delay a decision on full sovereignty or continue the status quo and 
risk long term investment in the country and Kanak discontent, balance French and Kanak 
interests and goals by choosing independent-association with France or another state and run the 
risk of a post-sovereignty Congress not reaching a consensus about what powers to cede to 
whom, or become fully sovereign and loose French aid and oversight but gain freedom from a 
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dependent situation. These are not easy choices, nor are they simply a matter of independence 
versus non-independence.   
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CHAPTER 9  
CONCLUSIONS 
  
The current Territorial Congress in New Caledonia will be responsible for conducting the 
first of three referenda on independence in 2018. They will be the ones deciding which questions 
are voted on. The wording of these questions will be very important for deciding the future of the 
country. According to the Nouméa Accord and international law, there are three primary options 
for the referendum: full sovereignty, independent-association, or association with France. Full 
sovereignty means complete independence. Under independent-association, New Caledonia 
would become fully sovereign, but could then cede some of its powers to another country (like 
France) or an international organization. Based on my research and the study conducted by 
Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien (2014), politicians would choose between independent-
association with France, another Pacific state, or with an international Pacific organization. 
Association with France would cement a system much like the status quo. A fifth option is a 
third accord. A third accord would be a combination of the first three options. New Caledonia 
would enter into another accord with France and a decision on full sovereignty, independent-
association, or association would be delayed. 
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The historical precedent for post-colonial mainland-island relations is extensive. Greenland has 
attempted to economically bypass Danish control by decreasing their reliance on aid from 
Denmark. Instead Greenland has sought trade agreements with the European Union as a whole 
allowing them to become more self-sufficient. The Netherland’s Carribean have domestic 
governments that are locally elected in a loose federal relationship with the mainland state. 
Portugal and Spain’s island territories have sought to encourage locally elected government 
governments to increase political participation and autonomy through civil and economic 
responsibility. Many of the UK’s overseas collectives have adopted local constitutions. The UK 
retains responsibility for external powers and each territory has sovereignty over domestic 
concerns. These terrtories remain reliant on the UK aid to develop successful economies because 
they are generally small islands with little ability to compete independently on the international 
market. Australia’s island territories typically host locally elected legislative bodies with 
executives appointed by the Australian state. Some have adopted commonwealth status in 
exchange for Australian aid. New Zealand’s territories are some of the few islands to have made 
a significant attempt to incorporate customary councils and customary forms of governance. 
Parliamentary democracies in these territories mix customary councils with elected 
parliamentary systems and territorial assemblies. Some US territories have integrated forms of 
Western and customary governance. Others have adopted a commonwealth model with elected 
local governments, US Congressional representatives, and have adopted the US constitution. 
 Post-colonial dependent relationships between France and its overseas countries have 
mirrored some of these policies. Generally relationships are structured by a federal model where 
the status of the island country (as a DOM or TOM) determines the level of domestic autonomy. 
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Historically, France pushed for assimilation of its island colonies and inhabitants. While the 
unified French Republic ideology still exists, the state is more accepting of local identities. This 
trend is exemplified by the decision to grant special rights to some indigenous populations in 
DOMs and TOMs. However, France remains hesitant to grant additional minority rights, because 
of its increasingly multinational mainland population. 
In the context of the New Caledonian independence debate, this research seeks to answer 
three questions: 1) what are the dominant narratives underlying the independence debate, 2) how 
are these narratives defined and 3) how does the framing of these narratives and the narratives 
themselves promote or hinder certain outcomes? The theories derived from this research are 
based on my findings to these three questions. In Chapters Five through Seven, I identified nine 
dominant themes that structure politicians’ concerns and goals for the independence debate: self-
determination, identity, rebalancing, citizenship, the role of France, the role of the UN, common 
destiny, the electorate, and victimization. These nine themes can be further divided into 
narratives on: self-determination as a right, the goal of decolonization, the goals of the Nouméa 
Accord, the stance on the transfer of powers, electorate eligibility, citizen membership, definition 
of national identity, victimization, definition of common destiny, the role of France, the role of 
the UN, stance on French aid, stance on key sharing, plans for the mining industry, general plans 
for the economy, and desired outcomes for the independence debate. These narratives and the 
ways in which they are framed form the core of independence and anti-independence rhetoric. 
Perhaps most notably and importantly, the independence debate in New Caledonia is 
underlined by a pervasive discourse of (re)balancing. The concept of rebalancing links all of the 
themes and narratives (Figure 2). The desire for rebalancing is both internally and externally 
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defined. Internally, it is the tension between Caledonian and Kanak supremacy within a 
multicultural society. Externally it is the desire for greater economic or political autonomy from 
France. Self-determination, decolonization, the Accord, the transfer of powers, the special 
electorate, and citizenship are all areas of contention and potential sites of political rebalancing. 
Self-determination is alternately defined as a uniquely Kanak right, a shared right between the 
victims of French colonialism, and a right that should be available to all inhabitants in New 
Caledonia regardless of when they migrated there. Nationalists consider the UN a guardian who 
safeguards and ensures the Kanak right to decide on the political future of their country. To 
loyalists, the UN is a meddling watchdog that is trying to complicate an uncomplicated debate. If 
the Nouméa Accord is defined in terms of decolonization and independence the transfer of power 
should continue, according to nationalists. However, if the Nouméa Accord merely provides the 
right to a decision on independence, as loyalists argue, the transfer should be frozen until a final 
decision on independence has been made. A frozen electorate might give nationalists a greater 
chance to ensure full sovereignty, but it marginalizes recent immigrants and others who do not 
meet the eligibility criteria. This is why loyalists argue for a sliding electorate that would include 
some of these people, but would ultimately marginalize Kanak voters. Citizenship, like electorate 
eligibility is based on length of residency. Nationalists promote a restricted citizenship while 
loyalists argue for an open definition that would include more of New Caledonia’s inhabitants.  
Grounded Theory #1: Restricting or expanding the right to self-determination is the 
central concern of political rebalancing in New Caledonia. The Nouméa Accord and perspectives 
on the outcome of decolonization (Figure 4: black chords) reflect and influence these definitions 
and determine membership in the electoral bodies and citizenship. Restricted or inclusive 
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definitions of self-determination (Figure 4: hot pink chord) translate into restricted or inclusive 
policies on citizenship and the electoral bodies allowed to vote on the referenda. For loyalists, 
colonial legacies of inequality emphasize the need for inclusion throughout the political sphere. 
Nationalists believe a restricted electorate, citizenship, and self-determination will rebalance the 
inequalities (black chords) caused by structural and social violence committed during 
colonization by increasing Kanak political power.  
Grounded Theory #2: The social rebalancing theme is influenced by and influences 
national identity, common destiny, and the victimization narrative (Figure 2: dark green chords). 
Common destiny is the goal of social rebalancing: it is the solution to the social inequalities 
pervading New Caledonia. Loyalists define common destiny as living together and nationalists 
define it as building together. Both promote integration as part of this project. But nationalists 
view integration in terms of political and legal pluralism where customary and Western logics 
are mixed. Loyalists define integration as ethnic mixing, perhaps believing enough mixing will 
resolve ethnic-based social and political tensions. The parties maintain three types of national 
identity. A Common French-Caledonian Identity or Caldochitude has arisen as a form of 
counter-identity. It is a political tool for collective bargaining designed to (re)balance the 
divisions created by a perception of minority privilege. Kanak identity is based on a dichotomy 
between maintianing difference as an independence strategy and preventing cooperation within 
the multinational state because of this difference. The Kanak identity is linked to the collective 
memory of victimization, which helps the indigenous argument for autonomy but prevents 
healing between the Kanak and French and Kanak and Caldoche. Loyalists consider the victim 
narrative a nationalist tool designed to involve the UN in New Caledonia’s domestic affairs and 
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promote the right to full sovereignty. Nationalists argue that the narrative legitimizes self-
determination and justifies rebalancing in favor of the Kanak (Figure 2: dark blue chords). 
However, it is also a way to unify all communities impacted by French colonization. The middle 
ground is defined by a desire for a plural Caledonian identity that is supported by the Nouméa 
Accord, electoral definition, a sense of belonging, and a tie to the territory. 
Grounded Theory #3: Economic rebalancing stems from a need to end financial 
inequalities domestically and reliance on French aid. Both loyalists and nationalists want to 
reduce reliance on French aid through public servant wage reductions, diversification, and tax 
reform. There is also multi-partisan agreement on using the mining industry to fund 
diversification in other economic sectors. However different views of the role of France cause 
divergence on France’s future poltiical and economic role in New Caledonia. Loyalists consider 
France a force of protection against other predatory multinational coprporations and states 
seeking to exploit their nickel resources. Nationalists argue that France is a barrier to economic 
development because the Republic promotes depednece through aid, import monopolization, and 
by upholding an artificial standard of living. All of these frames impact the possibilities open to 
New Caledonia after the referendum and influence the questions that will be asked during the 
referenda.  
Therefore, in Chapter Eight I outlined each party’s platform on the outcome of the 
independence debate. I examined the way in which each party framed the narratives derived 
from their rhetoric on the outcomes of the Nouméa Accord. The narratives identified in relation 
to the potential outcomes include: decolonization, independence, the Nouméa Accord, options 
for the outcome of the Accord, the referenda, self-determination, and the transfer of powers. 
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Chapter Eight looks specifically at the framing of independence, the referenda, and the options 
for the outcome of the Nouméa Accord. While all of the political leaders were quick to take a 
stance for or against independence, many were open to exploring other options. Although in 
some cases these options were ill defined and exceedingly vague. As part of this analysis, I 
examined party’s views on what the domestic government in New Caledonia should be with or 
without full sovereignty. Loyalist and nationalist agreement on the need for integrating French, 
Pacific, and Kanak values was juxtaposed by competing calls for consensus and majoritarian 
democracy. Finally, I explored the ways in which the narratives identified in my research 
influence the possible outcomes or choices for the referenda.  
Full sovereignty is the first choice of all nationalist leaders. But they need to convince 
loyalists and their constituents that New Caledonia is prepared to take on the powers previously 
managed by France. UC-FLNKS’ commitment to regional organizations shows a willingness and 
ability to manage foreign affairs, but concerns about the economic impact of the loss of French 
aid must be addressed. Nationalists will also need to allay fears of a Kanak nationalist take-over 
in the wake of independence. The Kanak are the demographic majority in the country, but not the 
political majority. Nationalists might garner support and simultaneously stem fears by creating a 
clear plan for power sharing and expanding the right to citizenship for recent immigrants after 
independence. Independent-association seems like a clear compromise for loyalists and 
nationalists. A lack of trust between ethnic communities, however, makes this option difficult in 
practice. Loyalist arguments against this option can be summarized into three criticisms: French 
rejection, marginalization, and unpreparedness. Even if sovereignty is achieved, and nationalists 
agree to cede some major powers to France, loyalists are not convinced that France would want 
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the burden of an independent New Caledonia. Nationalists counter that the same economic and 
strategic advantages that have motivated France to hold on to New Caledonia so long will also 
convince them to enter into a mutually beneficial agreement with a sovereign New Caledonia. 
Generally, loyalists are skeptical that nationalists would agree to cede some powers after 
independence is achieved. However the interviews I conducted show that nationalist leaders 
understand the limitations of their small country and are willing to work with France as long as it 
is on ‘equal’ ground. Loyalists hold fast to the notion that New Caledonia is unprepared and ill 
equipped to face independence and instead promote continued association with France. While 
loyalists may lure Kanak voters into seeing the benefits of remaining part of a powerful state like 
France, they will have a difficult time convincing nationalist leaders. Nationalist leaders are 
convinced that moving steadily towards full sovereignty is the best option for the country. If 
loyalists succeed in luring Kanak voters to the anti-independence camp, they will have a difficult 
time retaining their voters after the referendum. Inequality created by an artificial standard of 
living, the employment drain of French public servants, and the suppression of domestic 
industries because of the domination of French imports are all issues that need to be addressed in 
the context of French aid. The final option, a third accord, does receive some multi-partisan 
support. Any further delay on a final decision would negatively impact long-term investment 
because of New Caledonia’s unknown future. There could also be some blowback created by 
delaying a decision that has already been over twenty years in process.  
Grounded Theory #4: Framing the independence debate in terms of (re)balancing 
politicizes economic, social and political problems that could be dealt with regardless of the 
outcome of the referenda. As a couple interviewees stated: many of the inequalities that are tied 
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to the independence debate or are simply overlooked should be solved before the referenda – this 
may even negate the need for a referendum at all. Politicians have used the rebalancing 
narratives and associated discourses to reframe the independence debate in a way that obscures 
the real issue: how can all New Caledonians build a peaceful multicultural society that integrates 
and includes all inhabitants.  
Colonial legacies and the federal power-sharing systems borne from decolonization have 
resulted in the formation of island states with plural and often marginalized societies, unequal 
power structures, and sometimes-inadequate representation within their federal mainland-island 
systems. Various forms of multicultural politics have attempted to alleviate these consequences 
of colonialism. Banting and Kymlicka (2004) combine both sides of the minority and 
collectively equal rights arguments in his vision of multicultural governance. He argues that 
multicultural policies are not inherently exclusionary. Multiculturalism rejects homogenous and 
assimilative nation-states and policies that promote selective exclusion. Instead, citizens are 
encouraged to maintain their ethno-cultural identities while equal access to institutions and 
citizenship is implemented throughout a country. This project can be realized through liberal 
multiculturalism. Liberal multiculturalism accomplishes equal access with ethnic difference by 
encouraging democratic multicultural politics through recognition, guarantees of representation, 
and some self-governance for minority groups. This idea is to give all actors representation and 
to respect both the majority and minority population’s particular forms of customary governance. 
Liberal multiculturalism establishes institutions and policies in favor of diversity, giving sub-
national groups quasi-sovereignty and equal representation within the state system (Galston 
2004; Larmore 1996; Rawls 2005).  
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To some extent, these policies have already been implemented in New Caledonia through 
the Nouméa Accord. Moving forward, regardless of the outcome of the referendum, the tenets of 
liberal multiculturalism need to be considered. There is real fear in New Caledonia that an anti-
independence outcome for the referenda will result in violence or a Kanak takeover that would 
leave non-Kanak communities marginalized and without representation. Nationalists too fear that 
without a sovereign New Caledonia the Kanak will continue to be politically and socially 
marginalized by recent immigrants. These fears can be addressed by restructuring the system of 
political representation in New Caledonia and more clearly outlining the options for a post-
referendum New Caledonia. Nationalists and loyalists need to come to an agreement now about 
citizenship status and voting rights for recent immigrants. Even if this population cannot vote on 
the referendum, they need to know that they will have the opportunity to gain citizenship and the 
rights inherent to that status after the referenda are held. Greater integration of customary forms 
of governance and legal proceedings may also help alleviate the concerns of nationalists and 
Kanak who feel their identity is marginalized in the political and legal landscape. In addition to 
clearly laying out the options for the referenda and how those options would play out in the post-
referendum environment, politicians need to focus greater attention on the social and economic 
issues currently plaguing the country. Many of the party goals identified in this research do not 
require a decision on independence to be solved. Political, social, and economic rebalancing may 
be aided by a final decision on the future of the country, but change can start in the years leading 
up to that decision. The colonial legacies facing New Caledonia, competing ethnic factions, 
economic inequality, a politically strong indigenous population, and French intervention make 
the New Caledonia political development case study unique. The diverse communities that make 
  
  
  
  
  
265 
 
up this country have a wealth of options before them. If they can learn to disconnect their goals 
from historical injustices and work together to create a system that integrates customary and 
Western notions of governance, they have the chance to create a new model for multinational 
governance elsewhere and provide hope for other marginalized indigenous populations. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Introduction … 
FR: Pourquoi est-ce que vous avez décidé devenir un politicien ?   
EN : Why did you decide to become a politician ? 
 
Le Programme de votre Parti Politique:  
EN: What is your party’s platform on independence, departmentalization, or another accord? Do 
you see these as the only options facing New Caledonia in 2018 ? (for example : What are the 
alternatives to independence?)  
FR: Quel est le programme de votre parti sur l'indépendance, la départementalisation, ou un autre 
accord? Croyez-vous que ce sont les seules options qui s'offrent à la Nouvelle-Calédonie en 
2018? (par exemple : Quelles sont les alternatives à l’indépendance ?) 
 
EN: If independant, would you accept an associated state with France ? 
FR: Si la Nouvelle-Calédonie devient indépendante, accepteriez-vous un Etat-associe avec la 
France ? 
 
EN: What do you see as the benefits and drawbacks of becoming independent or a D/TOM – 
remaining part of France? 
FR: Quels sont, selon vous, les avantages et les inconvénients à devenir indépendant ou à rester 
un DTOM? 
 
EN: What is the concept of “common destiny” and what does it mean to you? 
FR: Qu’est-ce qu’est l'idée de «destin commun» et qu'est-ce qu’elle signifie pour vous? 
 
L’Auto-détermination: 
EN: How would you define self-determination?  
FR: Comment définiriez-vous l'autodétermination?  
 
EN: In the context of the independence debate, what is the importance or role of: 
FR: Dans le contexte du débat sur l'indépendance, quelle est l'importance ou le rôle de: 
 
 National Identity/Nationalism (for example New Caledonian citizenship and identity)  
FR: Identité nationale française / nationalisme calédonien (par exemple la Nouvelle-
Calédonie citoyenneté et identité, ou double nationalité ?) 
 
 Ethnic Identity  
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FR: l’Identité ethnique 
 
 Multicultural Governance, the Customary Senate 
FR: Gouvernance multiculturelle, Le Senat Coutumier   
 
 Territory and control over land 
FR: Territoire et la question du contrôle du foncier 
 
 The Mining Industry : How will independence or D/TOM status impact the 
nickel mining industry? 
FR: L’Industrie minière - Comment l'indépendance ou un statut de D/TOM 
impacterait l'industrie minière de nickel? 
 
 Economic Aid from the French government … Is there an effort to decrease 
dependence on French aid? If New Caledonia becomes independent do they 
have the revenue to make up for the lost French aid ? 
FR: Développer les aides économiques du gouvernement … Est-ce que un 
mouvement pour réduire la dépendance sur les aides économiques du 
gouvernement français ? Si oui, comment ?  Le gouvernement de Nouvelle-
Calédonie a-t-il les revenus pour maintenir toutes les choses qui ont financé par 
France si l'indépendance se produisait? 
 
L’Avenir de la gouvernement Nouvelle-Calédonienne: 
 
EN: If New Caledonia does not become independent, what level of autonomy would you 
want?  
FR: Si la Nouvelle-Calédonie ne devient pas indépendante, quel niveau d'autonomie 
voudriez-vous?  
 
EN : What is the economic future of New Caledonia ? What is the economic plan going 
forward and how might this be influenced by independence? 
FR : Quel est l'avenir économique de la Nouvelle-Calédonie? Quelles sont les 
perspectives économiques pour l'avenir et comment pourraient-elles être influencées par 
l’Indépendance?  
 
EN: How will New Caledonian citizenship be defined in the future? 
FR: Comment la citoyenneté calédonienne serait-elle définie dans le futur? 
 
EN: What role do immigrants play in the independence debate? 
FR: Quel est le rôle des « immigrants » (ou personnes qui est ni Kanak ni Européenne) 
dans le débat sur l’autodétermination interne ou externe? 
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Les Autres Questions: 
Il y a une identité calédonienne? Quel est le positionnement de cette communauté vis-à-
vis du débat sur l'indépendance? 
 
EN: How will the ethnic diversity of New Caledonia be protected in the future? 
FR: Comment la diversité ethnique de la Nouvelle-Calédonie pourrait-elle être protégée 
dans l'avenir? 
 
Quel est l’impact de la migration sur la communauté Kanak, leur cohésion culturelle, la 
force de l’identité, et le mouvement pour l’Independence? 
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APPENDIX B 
List of News Articles Collected 
20 ans d'accord. 23 January 2013. Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes. Available at 
<http://www.lnc.nc/article/2014/la-racine-du-systeme-institutionnel> 
 
25 ans déjà. 13 June 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
3 Questions à Gérard Reignier. 13 February 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
3 Questions à Alain Christnacht. 3 July 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
3 Questions a Jean-Claude Briault. 28 February 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available 
at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
3 Questions à Sonia Backès. 25 April 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
Accords de Matignon-Oudinot : les 25 ans. 26 June 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. 
Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Accords de Matignon et de Nouméa : un devoir de mémoire. 10 October 2013. Demain en 
Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
A la Foa urbaine et rurale. 26 June 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
Au rendez-vous de la pensée clivée. 25 July 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
Avant d’éclairer le référendum, il serait opportun d’éclaircir l’émancipation de l’Accord de 
Nouméa 4. 3 July 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Aux larmes citoyens! 11 April 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
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Bernut, Gregoire. 15 January 2015. 3 Questions à Gregoire Bernut. Demain en Nouvelle-
Caledonie, Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Bernut : « Il faut que Pierre Frogier reste ». 12 June 2014. Calodosphere. Available at 
<http://caledosphere.com/2014/06/12/bernut-il-faut-que-pierre-frogier-reste/> 
 
Cap, Captain. 17 July 2013. Frogier annonce l’indépendance association. Calodosphere. 
Available at <http://caledosphere.com/2013/07/17/frogier-annonce-lindependance-
association/> 
 
Calédonie en semble partira seul. 11 April 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
Calédoniennes en dés Accord? 7 March 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
Calendrier institutionnel. 8 May 2014. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
Cartes sur Table. 3 July 2014. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Ce qui les attend. 22 May 2014. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Charte du Peuple Kanak Ni une fatalité, ni un hasard. 30 April 2014. Demain en Nouvelle-
Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Citoyenneté : Calédonie ensemble réagit. 8 April 2013. Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes. Available 
at <http://www.lnc.nc/article/pays/citoyennete-caledonie-ensemble-reagit>  
 
Commémoration. 26 June 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Commémorations 25 ans après. 8 May 2014. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
Commémorer la poignée de main. 13 June 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
 
Communes, les parents pauvres du budget. 27 March 2014. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. 
Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Confiant pour l’avenir économique calédonien. 13 June 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. 
Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
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Coopération régionale. 6 June 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
Corps électoral calédonien. 9 May 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
Courtial, Jean and Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien. 2014. Reflexions sur l’avenir institutionnel 
de la Nouvelle-Caledonie, Rapport au Premier Ministre, p. 1-86. ISBN 978-2-11-009883-
2 Available at <www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr>  
 
DÉBAT L’ÉCONOMIE CALÉDONIENNE. 20 June 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. 
Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Debout la République : une autre alternative de la poli tique française. 25 April 2013. Demain en 
Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Des propos lamentables et scandaleux. 17 July 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available 
at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Didier Guénant -Jeanson. 16 May 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
Disparition de Léopold Jorédié. 12 September 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available 
at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Diversifier les exportations pour éviter une trop forte dépendance au nickel. 11 April 2013. 
Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Droit de réponse. 16 May 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Droit de vote aux élections provinciales de 2014. 2 May 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. 
Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Drôle de destin commun! 7 November 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at 
<www.dnc.nc> 
 
Éclairons. 11 July 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
ERRATUM! 1 August 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc> 
 
Eschembrenner, Louis P. 24 January 2014. Décolonisation – Mythe & Réalité. Calodosphere. 
Available at <http://caledosphere.com/2014/01/24/decolonisation-mythe-realite/> 
 
Être plus ambitieux pour la jeunesse calédonienne. 10 October 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-
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